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Abstract
Recent years have witnessed a convergence of interests across the social 
and cognitive sciences to consider the nature of the inanimate object. A 
variety of disciplines have turned their analytic attention to the ways in 
which objects and artefacts feature in, and stand in relation to, action and 
activity. Moreover, they have begun to examine how the sense of objects is 
constructed by society. This thesis deals with these very issues. However, 
it adopts a distinctively interactional and ethnomethodological approach 
to them. It considers how participants display their own understandings 
of objects in interaction with others. In doing so, it describes how the 
sense of objects is constituted within sequences of interaction and shows 
how the interactional environment in which an object is encountered 
instructs an individual's perception of it. Moreover, the thesis shows how 
the sense of an object is (re)produced ongoingly in each and every action of 
an interaction. In such a way, the thesis highlights the practical, 
embodied, interactional and reflexive aspects of the constitution of objects.
These issues are illustrated by audio-visual recordings of everyday 
workplace activity. In particular, the thesis explores the ways in which 
personnel render visible objects to their colleagues; how they encourage or 
invite others to look at some object with them. Through an analysis of 
these collaborative viewings^ the thesis describes the interactional 
practices in and through which participants establish mutual orientation 
towards an object and, thereby, constitute some 'shared' sense of that 
object. It also considers the resources available to participants that enable 
them to (confidently) assume that they have achieved some intersubjective 
understanding of an object. Finally, the thesis investigates the troubles 
that emerge when individuals are denied the resources that they rely upon 
in co-present interaction. It does this by analysing interaction in a 'virtual 
workplace'.
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C hapter 1
Introduction
Objects and artefacts permeate the very fabric of social life. Our actions 
and activities are situated within a world of objects and often involve 
specific treatment of an artefact - typing on a word processor, watching the 
television, tying a tie and so forth. Moreover, interactions between  
individuals recurrently focus around or make reference to some object in 
the local milieu. Take the world of work, for example, where collaborative 
tasks are routinely mediated by inanimate objects. Colleagues work 
together over documents, diagrams, plans, models, computer screens, and 
the like. They discuss, look at and manipulate these objects both on their 
own and with others in order to accomplish their work. Yet, until recently, 
analyses of social activity rarely paid much attention to the ways in which 
inanimate objects contribute to, or feature within, those activities. Indeed, 
the traditional status of the object within sociology has led one prominent 
commentator to liken artefacts to the working classes of the nineteenth  
century:
What our ancestors, the founders of sociology, did a century ago to
house the human masses in the fabric of social theory, we should do
now to find a place in a new social theory for the non-human masses
that beg us for understanding.
Latour, 1992, p. 227.
In recent years, however, a range of disciplines across the social and 
cognitive sciences has begun to take more seriously the relevance of 
objects to social life. In part, this increased interest has been stimulated 
by the startlingly rapid development and distribution of new technologies. 
Although these studies of technology dominate the emerging sociology of 
the object, others have also considered how films and diagrams are used in 
scientific experiments (e.g. Amann & Knorr-Cetina, 1990); how piles of 
documents are used for symbolic effect in legal argument (e.g. Lynch & 
Bogen, 1996); or even how the body is sometimes treated as an object (e.g. 
Emerson, 1970; Heath, 1986). Indeed, there is a range of work which 
examines a variety of 'objects'.
However, two key issues seem to resonate across many of these studies. 
One issue is how objects relate to, feature in or contribute to social action. 
The interest here lies in the nature of the impact objects have on social 
activities and how an attention to objects might enrich our understanding 
of the organisation of social life. Then, a more specific, yet related, 
concern revolves around the meaning of objects or how the meaning of
objects is attributed, created or constructed in and by society. This thesis 
will address these very same interrelated concerns, but will adopt a 
distinctive approach to explore them. This approach has three key  
features.
Firstly, relatively few studies have considered the ways in which objects 
are made sense of by participants them selves. Often existentia l 
characteristics of relevant objects are assumed or constructed by the 
analyst. Even when studies attempt to uncover how meaning is embedded 
in or constructed by society, they often impose their own agendas onto 
observed social action. Instead, this study will prioritise members' own 
orientations and treatm ents of objects; how they display their  
understandings of objects in the course of their activities.
Moreover, it will examine how individuals, if  only momentarily, achieve 
and display some 'shared' understanding of an object w ith others. 
Participants publicly display their understandings of objects to their 
interlocutors within sequences of interaction. Therefore these orientations 
are also available to the analyst. In such a way, the thesis will consider 
the very 'constitution' of objects in interaction, where 'constitution' refers 
to the ways in which participants (literally) make sense of objects with  
others; how they produce (the occasioned sense of) an object. ^
Thirdly, it will treat the sense of objects as reflexive to the practices in 
which they feature. This ethnomethodological notion of endogenous 
reflexivity (Pollner, 1991) is invoked to make the point that the sense of an 
object is a local matter, it is not determined a priori. Common-sense or 
taken-for-granted notions of the world are used by members as resources 
to constitute the world as it is, here and now, in the light of the situation  
at hand. A number of scholars have examined how the 'location' or 
'profession' involved influences the sense made of an object. However, this 
thesis will adopt a more radical notion of the 'situation'. It will suggest 
that the constitution of objects is ongoing; that each and every action 
within interaction, and with regard to an object, (re)produces the sense of 
that object.
Certain ethnomethodologically-informed studies of interaction have begun 
to adopt this approach to incorporate objects into their analyses of social 
action (e.g. Goodwin, 1981b; Heath, 1986; Suchman, 1987; Heath et al,
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1995). However, their principal concerns lie elsewhere. They have not 
focused explicitly on the ways in which individuals interactionally  
constitute some 'shared' sense of an object and how that sense contributes 
to the emerging activity. Nevertheless, they provide insight into certain 
aspects of the issues at hand and provide a solid foundation from which to 
develop these issues.
It has already been noted that objects recurrently feature in numerous 
ways within a host of collaborative activities. So, to engage with these 
concerns, the thesis will focus upon one particular kind of occasion in 
which objects feature. Indeed, it will explore some of the most explicit 
occasions in which objects are oriented towards, nam ely when co­
participants visually attend to an object during some collaborative 
activity. These occasions will be termed collaborative viewings and the 
thesis will investigate their organisation.
The kinds of objects that will be considered are workplace artefacts - a 
variety of texts, tools and technologies. The workplace that the study will 
focus on is the Restoration Control Office (RCO) based w ithin BT's 
Worldwide Network Management Centre. Essentially the personnel in 
the RCO organise the setting-up of new telecommunications routes to 
temporarily replace failed circuits. To support this activity they use a 
large variety of artefacts, such as information technologies, documents, 
telephones and the like. Moreover, as the personnel work side-by-side and 
in shifts, they recurrently need to update one another about ongoing or 
prospective problems. To do this they often refer to the artefacts at hand. 
Therefore, the RCO provides an ideal environment in which to investigate 
collaborative viewings of objects.
To explore the organisation of these collaborative viewings, the study will 
draw on a range of methodological resources. The visual nature of objects 
requires the capture of the very details of the interaction and the visible 
resources available to the participants. So, the data used are audio-visual 
recordings of naturally-occurring interaction in the work setting. To deal 
with these m aterials, the study primarily draws on the analytic  
orientation of Conversation Analysis. However, the video materials are 
augm ented by ethnographic field observations to texture the  
understanding of the activities in which the participants are engaged.
Given the focus on the organisation of collaborative viewings, the analysis 
will address a range of interrelated questions:
• how do individuals encourage others to look at an object with them?
• what resources are available to co-participants to locate the object that 
has been pointed out to them?
• how are two or more individuals able to establish (or continue to 
assume) that they are looking at the 'same' object for all practical 
purposes?
• what resources are available to co-participants to recognise and repair 
misunderstandings or misapprehensions about the relevant object?
• how does the showing of an object relate to, feature in or otherwise 
'mediate' the ongoing actions and activities of co-participants?
These analytic questions furnish a discussion of the main concerns of the 
thesis. Clearly, the main theme is the local, interactional constitution of 
objects. However, two sub-themes emerge.
Firstly, the findings will contribute to understandings of the practical and 
interactional foundations to the problem of intersubjectivity. In 
particular, they will be used to explore the ways in which individuals 
achieve some intersubjective understanding of an object and the resources 
that they utilise to accomplish this. Indeed, the thesis will also examine 
the troubles that arise when these resources, that are relied on in co­
present interaction, are denied them. This will be accomplished by an 
analysis of interaction in a 'virtual workplace' - Rank Xerox's MTVII 
media space - where two participants are located in distinct spatial 
environments linked by video and audio channels.
Secondly, the study will examine the ways in which objects feature within  
particular workplace activities. It will consider how the constitution of the 
shared sense of an object is both embedded within and contributes to an 
emerging activity. Thus, the study will delineate some of the ways in  
which collaborative viewings of objects 'mediate' collaborative work.
The thesis will proceed as follows.
Chapter 2:
This chapter elaborates the rationale for, and nature of, the thesis' 
approach to the study of the object. It draws on two fields of work which 
raise particularly interesting and useful questions about the study of the 
object - Actor-Network Theory and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. 
It then highlights the key ways in which the fundam entally  
ethnomethodological and interactional approach adopted in this thesis 
departs from these studies. Finally, it suggests that other interactional 
studies drawing on ethnomethodology have begun to address some of the 
issues raised in this thesis. However, they have not yet provided a full 
and explicit investigation of the local, interactional constitution of objects.
Chapter 3:
This chapter details the methodological orientation adopted by the study. 
It shows how it stands in relation to other developments within the 
ethnomethodological program. It also reveals the analytic resources, 
drawn primarily from Conversation Analysis, that will be used to deal 
with the data. For instance, the recognition of the sequential organisation 
of interaction provides a particular approach to 'context' and 'evidence' in 
analysis. These discussions are illustrated with data extracts from a 
university tutorial setting. A particular issue raised is that the study 
utilises video materials, still a relatively rare phenomenon w ithin  
sociological work. Interestingly, studies of language and talk w ithin  
sociology have burgeoned over recent years, particularly in terms of the 
numerous manifestations of 'discourse analysis' (e.g. Gilbert & Mulkay, 
1984; Silverman, 1987). Many of these studies focus explicitly on the 
details of audio recordings of talk in a variety of settings. However, the 
study of embodied actions (talk and  visual conduct) captured on video, has 
yet to become so mainstream. Nevertheless, this chapter argues for the 
critical importance of using video data to address the study of the object in 
interaction.
Chapter 4:
Chapter 4 introduces the principal research setting - BT's Restoration 
Control Office (RCO). This ethnographic context is valuable for the later 
empirical chapters, because the RCO is a complex organisational 
environment, so many of the tasks that the personnel are engaged in will
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be unfamiliar. Also, their jargon requires some introduction and the tools 
and technologies they refer to need to be introduced. Furthermore, the 
chapter describes some of the issues and problems that are raised in 
collecting and analysing video materials in this kind of organisational 
setting. Moreover, the presentation of video materials in traditional paper 
documents raises a number of practical and ethical concerns.
Chapter 5:
The key concern of this chapter is to introduce the phenomenon at hand - 
collaborative viewings. It provides a detailed empirical definition of the 
kinds of interactional encounters that will be discussed throughout the 
subsequent chapters. In doing so, it introduces the key analytic issues 
that are addressed in the thesis and shows how an attention to 'sequence' 
and 'activity' will be critical aspects of that analysis. Also, it begins to 
explain how participants encourage others to look at an object with them. 
In such a way, it shows how collaborative viewings of objects are initiated. 
It turns out that the nature of the 'initiation' is critical to the subsequent 
development of the collaborative viewing. More generally it reveals how 
collaborative viewings of objects are a recurrent and fundamental aspect of 
work in the RCO.
Chapter 6:
This chapter focuses on how individuals present or show an object to 
another. In particular, it examines the resources that are available to co­
participants such that they can unproblematically find and see the 
relevant object. In doing so, it draws on a range of work on reference to be 
found in linguistic studies of deixis and considers how those studies could 
be enriched by an attention to the embodied nature of referential practice. 
Once again notions of sequence are used along with the consideration of 
talk and visual conduct to reveal how co-participants can find the relevant 
object in the artefact-rich environment of the RCO and how they discover 
the appropriate sense of that object out of the many potentially  
attributable.
Chapter 7:
Chapter 7 discusses how the collaborative viewing develops after an object 
has been shown to the other. In particular, it reveals how co-participants 
'respond' to the object and how they display their understanding of that 
object. Further, it discusses the ways in which individuals can establish
7
that their co-participant has found the relevant object and found the 
appropriate sense of it. Therefore, it looks at how participants establish 
(or can continue to assume) that they are treating the same object in the 
same way. This, in turn, reveals how co-participants can discover if  they 
are not looking at the same object and subsequently how they can address 
or 'repair' this problem. These issues facilitate a consideration of the 
problem of intersubjectivity. In particular, the discussion draws on 
Schutz's (1970) general thesis of reciprocal perspectives.
Chapter 8:
This chapter introduces some different ways in which collaborative 
viewings can be configured. Many instances discussed in previous 
chapters, for example, depict an individual pointing to an object and 
encouraging another to look at that object. This chapter however, shows 
how participants can, for example, ask for some object to be pointed out to 
them. This provides the basis for a broader consideration of the relations 
between objects and action. The chapter discusses how the constitution of 
objects is embedded in activities and, further, how such constitution  
facilitates the development of those activities.
Chapter 9:
Chapter 9 considers the problems that arise when individuals are denied 
resources that they rely on in co-present interaction. To do this, data are 
drawn firom some experiments carried out by Rank Xerox on an innovative 
media space called MTVII. MTVII is designed to support collaborative 
working between colleagues situated in different physical locations. Many 
current media space systems merely provide a head and shoulders video 
view of the other. However, it has been found that these do not provide 
adequate support for working with documents and other artefacts. MTVII 
was designed to provide more flexible support for such activities. 
Therefore, three views of the other are sim ultaneously available. 
However, the system fails. The interest here is in how and why it fails. 
An understanding of the failure is drawn from findings from previous 
chapters coupled with reference to the work of Schütz. Sim ilarly, 
understanding why it fails reveals much about the workings of 
collaborative viewings in co-present interaction.
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Chapter 10;
The final chapter reviews the main themes emerging from the study. In 
particular, it discusses the links between the local interactional 
constitution of objects; the problem of inter subjectivity; the relations 
between objects and action; and the ways in which objects somehow 
'mediate' workplace activities. It also shows how these findings can 
contribute to debates w ithin the study of gesture in non-verbal 
communication and suggests ways in which systems can provide more 
robust support for object-focused activities in 'virtual workplaces'.
Finally, it is worth noting that although the thesis focuses upon two 
empirical studies, which consider the RCO and the MTVII media space, 
the analysis has been informed by a wider body of studies of the 
workplace. In particular, analyses of data in the following settings have 
contributed to the themes explored in the thesis: City Dealing Rooms; 
London Underground Station Control Rooms; hospital anaesthetic rooms; 
and police station control rooms (indeed one fragment from this last 
setting is briefly presented in Chapter 7).
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C hapter 2
The Object in Sociology
10
The slowly awakening interest in formal verstehende sociology brings 
with it the problem of the object as a constituted object. And while 
much has been done with the determined object in the disciplines of 
formal logic and mathematics, httle has been done with the problem by 
or for sociologists.
Garfinkel, 1952, p. 296.
2.1 In troduction
Recent years have witnessed a convergence of interest in the object, across 
the range of social and cognitive sciences. Indeed, scholars have 
increasingly drawn objects and artefacts into their studies of social action 
and activity. The 'objects' in question are 'physical' or inanimate features 
of the world, rather than cultural 'objects', such as language or concepts, of 
which much has been written. However, beyond this preliminary  
distinction, the definition of 'objects' to be adopted within this study will 
act as a gloss for a whole host of worldly 'things'. Therefore, the 'objects' 
that will be discussed include all kinds of artefacts that individuals invoke 
and otherwise attend to while engaged in their everyday affairs. Even a 
cursory consideration of any activity reveals the dominant presence of a 
range of documents, tools, technologies, materials and the like. More 
specifically, these include computer systems, VDU displays, paper records, 
diagrams, x-rays, charts, telephone handsets, computer icons, texts and 
many more. It has been realised that these 'objects' can enhance our 
understanding of social activity. Therefore, rather than draw a bubble 
around the human actors, many scholars are examining how actions are 
embedded within and sensitive to inanimate objects.
To provide a sense of this development it may be worth briefly mentioning 
a few (sub)disciplines that have brought the object into their studies of 
social life. Consider the broad range of research into technology in society. 
For example, studies have described how the production of technologies is 
'shaped' by particular social forces, such as patriarchy and market 
dominance (see MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985). Furtherm ore, 
developments within cognitive psychology have come to consider how 
cognitive skills, such as navigational calculations, are not merely situated 
in the human brain, but also distributed into artefacts such as the 
compass (e.g. Hutchins, 1995). The multi-disciplinary fields of Human- 
Computer Interaction (HCI) and Computer-Supported Cooperative Work 
(CSCW) have examined how objects (mainly technologies) variously  
'mediate' collaborative work in the workplace (e.g. Bannon & Bpdker,
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1991; Harper et al, in press). Even the media dreams of 'virtual worlds' 
and 'cybertechnologies' have received a startling amount of sociological 
attention (e.g. Featherstone & Burrows, 1996; Shields, 1996; Barnatt, 
1995).
Further, a variety of semiotic analyses have considered the meaning of 
cultural artefacts, such as the "new Citroën car" (Barthes, 1972) or the 
wristwatch (Freake, 1995). Within the field of non-verbal communication, 
scholars are beginning to examine how objects feature w ithin the  
production of gestures in interaction (e.g. Streeck, 1993b; LeBaron, n.d.). 
Moreover, there is a growing sociological interest in the nature of visual 
representations (and objects), such as paintings and billboard  
advertisements. These studies have begun to consider both how these  
representations reflect aspects of social structure and also the ways in 
which they are created within particular social environments (e.g. Berger, 
1972; Chaplin, 1994; Fyfe & Law, 1988). Broadening the definition of 
'objects' even further, there are scholars who have considered how the 
body is at times constituted as an object (e.g. Emerson, 1970; Heath, 
1986).
Clearly, this (by no means exhaustive) list displays a broad concern to 
explore the nature of the object. However, this chapter will argue that 
despite this increased concern, there is still much to be learnt about the 
constituted object and its relation to social action. As a result, it will 
argue the case for a distinctive approach to the sociological study of the 
object. There are three interrelated features of this approach.
Firstly, it prioritises members' own orientations to the sense of objects. 
Rather than making a priori assessments of the character of objects, it 
attempts to show how participants themselves make sense of them, and 
thereby constitute them, within the course of their activities. Indeed, the 
use of the category 'object' is necessary to group together the huge range of 
visible phenomena that participants invoke in their everyday affairs. No 
single term would be wholly adequate, but 'object' will suffice. Secondly, it 
examines how objects feature in sequences of interaction. In such a way, 
it considers how the shared sense of an object is constituted by co­
participants. It therefore highlights how intersubjective alignment toward 
those objects is achieved. Thirdly, it assumes that the sense of objects is 
reflexively constituted within the interactional practices in which they
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feature. Thus, the sense of an object is treated as an inherently local 
matter, where it is literally made sense of (constituted) in and through the 
activities in which it features. This leads to a flexible notion of the object. 
Indeed, what may in analytic isolation be treated as a 'computer', can be 
seen in situ to be oriented to as a 'brand name', a 'line of text' or 
'something bad'.
Although many studies have considered one or more of the three aspects 
outlined above, the chapter will argue that this approach as a whole is 
distinctive.
To argue the distinctiveness of this approach, the chapter will focus upon 
two particular strands of work that may be seen under the umbrella 
definition of the emerging sociology of the object. Indeed, it will consider 
arguably two of the more interesting and radical approaches to the study 
of objects within the social sciences. These are Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT) and studies of scientific phenomena in the Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge (SSK). This discussion will highlight the contributions of these 
approaches and contrast them with the approach to be adopted within this 
study.
The chapter will then turn to studies of interaction informed by 
ethnomethodology to show how the approach can be operationalised. It 
will demonstrate the common ground between two strands of such work 
and argue the case for bringing them closer together. Firstly, it will 
outline work on co-orientation to objects in face-to-face interaction  
(Goodwin, 1981b; Heath, 1986; Wootton, 1994). Secondly, it will introduce 
an emerging body of 'workplace studies' which explore the coordination of 
workplace activity. Many of these have shown how objects can be seen to 
'mediate' collaborative activities (e.g. Suchman, 1987; Whalen, 1995; 
Heath et al, 1995; Heath & Nichols, in press). Despite the promise of both 
strands of work, however, neither has fully explored the nature of the 
interactional constitution of objects. This is mainly because their concerns 
lie elsewhere - the organisation of face-to-face interaction with the former 
and the coordination of workplace activity with the latter. However, it will 
be argued that they provide a sound platform from which the study can 
develop.
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2.2 A ctor-N etw ork Theory
Pioneered by a group of (primarily) French scholars, and most notably 
Bruno Latour, Actor-Network Theory (ANT) has attracted much attention 
and a growing body of admirers. Essentially, it makes a challenge to the 
anthropocentric heart of sociology. The challenge is to accord non-humans 
the same powers of agency as humans. Their case is founded on a 
recognition that objects can be seen as the "missing masses" of sociology. 
This term is derived from cosmology, where experts who claim that the 
universe is expanding are struggling to explain where the extra mass is 
coming from. Similarly, Latour suggests that sociologists are constantly 
looking for social links "sturdy enough" to tie individuals together and that 
objects can be seen to form the resolution of this search. Therefore, he and 
his colleagues suggest a new vision of sociology which gives voice to these 
"hidden and despised social masses":
To balance our accounts of society, we simply have to turn our exclusive 
attention away from humans and look at non-humans. Here they are, 
the hidden and despised social masses who make up our morality. They 
knock at the door of sociology, requesting a place in the accounts of 
society as stubbornly as the human masses did in the nineteenth 
century.
Latour, 1992, p. 227.
So, for actor-network theory, objects are an essential element of the fabric 
of society. They are as much involved in the accomplishment of social 
action as humans are.
One aspect of their new approach to the understanding of social activity is 
the transformation of the analytic language^. For example, they adopt a 
radical notion of 'symmetry'. Through the notion of 'symmetry', Bloor 
(1976) suggested that ostensibly true and false knowledge should be 
subject to the same kinds of sociological explanation. Actor-network 
theorists extend this notion to treat all such dichotomies as constructed 
boundaries. Therefore, they call for a breaking down of the false, 
according to actor-network theory, dichotomy of human and non-human. 
The term 'actant', taken from sem iotics, is used to m ark th is  
epistemological shift and replaces traditional terms such as actor. Instead
^See Akrich & Latour (1992) for a listing and description of the main of terms adopted by 
Actor-Network Theory.
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of referring to human actors, each component agent, human and non­
human, in the 'network' of an activity is given the equal status of 'actant'.
ANT studies have focused upon a wide variety of phenomena. Indeed, 
their theoretical argument is founded upon a concern for the introduction 
of all kinds of 'non-humans' into analytic accounts. Recent studies have 
included discussions of car seat belts (Latour, 1992), keys (Latour, 1992), 
metered dose inhalers used by asthmatics (Prout, 1996), and scallops 
(Gallon, 1986). To give a sense of the thrust of these studies, it may be 
worth describing one, in which Latour examines the 'sociology of an 
automatic door-closer' (Latour, 1988, 1992).
Latour claims that the act of closing the door is 'delegated' from human to 
non-human. In effect the task of overcoming the forgetfulness and 
incompetence of humans who often left the door open is delegated to a 
non-human, the automatic door-closer. Moreover, Latour stresses the 
'relentless' moral agency of such an object. For instance, for a hydraulic 
door-closer to work, it needs to be pushed with a certain degree of force, 
such that it can accumulate enough energy to subsequently shut the door. 
This requires the force of an able-bodied adult. The door will, therefore, 
discriminate against very little and very old people, and refuse them  
passage without help from others. Similarly, it discriminates against 
"...everyone with packages, which usually means in our late capitalist 
society, working- or lower-middle-class employees" (Latour, 1992, p. 234). 
In such a way, Latour claims that the door-closer acts to discriminate 
against particular social groupings just as humans might.
So, actor-network theorists have been particularly vociferous in calling for 
social scientists to recognise the relevance of objects to social action. 
Indeed, their studies powerfully demonstrate how many material features 
of society can be seen to be involved in the production of social activity. 
However, their studies have also received a great deal of critical attention. 
Two concerns are of particular relevance here.
Firstly, there has been some debate surrounding the use of radical 
symmetry. In particular, it has been claimed that it is somewhat unclear 
whether humans and non-humans are, or ever could be, discussed equally 
within the analytic accounts of actor-network theory (Collins & Yearley, 
1992a). In many ANT studies, the actions of non-humans are simply
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created from the descriptions and accounts of humans (whether analysts 
or participants). Further, and unlike the "human masses" of the 
nineteenth century to which they are likened by Latour, objects do not 
share a common language with analysts with which they could describe 
their situation. Moreover, as Collins & Yearley suggest:
It is clear that the interpretive method is unusable, since doors have no
social life in which we could participate ... we are all strangers in the
world of things.
Collins & Yearley, 1992a, p. 318.
Maybe as a result, Latour prioritises his own analytic agenda. Within the 
study of the door-closer, for example, the 'agency' of the door-closer is 
generated by the analyst to support an argument. There are many ways 
in which the door-closer could have been described, but Latour chose to 
impose agency, morals and social relations. In this way, he provides his 
own interpretation of events, rather than giving credence to participants' 
own orientations. He, as the analyst, attributes meaning to action - an 
opportunity he does not afford to the participants them selves. The 
analyst, in isolation, makes sense of the characteristics of an object, rather 
than the members.
A second issue concerns the way in which ANT accounts are framed. The 
theoretical writings claim to recognise the integral importance of objects in 
the understanding of social action. However, it is very unclear how actor- 
network theorists generate the networks of actants to address their 
analytic concerns. As Button suggests, "Any list of 'actors' in their sense is 
likely to be only a very short and - given their approach - quite arbitrary 
selection from the effectively infinite list of actors involved" (Button, 1993, 
p. 23). Sometimes, it would seem that rather than incorporating the 
relevant material features of society into accounts of human activities, 
these studies generate contexts in which the objects of interest may be 
seen to feature (and be seen to be central). Whatever, it would seem that 
the concerns of the human analyst are prioritised, as no other can decide 
upon the actants included. So, once again the way participants 
themselves make sense of (constitute) objects is ignored.
So, whilst this study would like to concur with the cogent arguments 
provided by Latour and his colleagues to embed objects firmly within our 
studies of social activity, it does have some reservations about the analytic
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resources used to accomplish this. Actor-network theory is one of the key 
reasons for the increased recognition of the object and its relevance for 
understanding of social action. However, these studies ignore 
participants' own orientations toward objects. They do not examine how 
participants make sense of objects within specific activities. It is 
impossible for actor-network theorists to allow objects to speak in their 
analyses, as those objects have no voice. Therefore, actor-network theory 
must rely upon the analyst to describe and attribute properties to the 
actants in their analyses. The analyst constructs the meaning of objects 
and builds networks of actants to which they can be seen to relate. This 
study would rather attempt to see how participants make sense of objects; 
how they display to others that sense of an object and how they thereby 
constitute some shared sense of an object. It would rather prioritise 
members' own understanding of objects.
One area of sociological inquiry, which has begun some interesting  
research into these issues, is within studies of scientific k n ow led ge^ . 
These studies have begun to consider the ways in which the social activity 
of science is accomplished and, in doing so, have begun to examine how the 
sense of scientific phenomena (objects) is produced. More particularly, 
they have examined how artefacts, such as charts and samples, are made 
sense of by groups of scientists.
2.3 Socio logy  o f S cien tific  K now ledge
The recent investigation of 'physical' scientific phenomena within science 
studies, has developed from a interest in the practical accomplishment of 
science. Following the work of Kuhn (1970) and others w ithin the 
philosophy of science, there emerged a critique of fundamentally positivist 
notions which depicted the findings of science as immune from social 
influence. It was increasingly recognised that 'facts' are constituted in  
particular historical and local contexts of action. Thus, scholars began to 
'recast' notions of objectivity, to consider how certain scientific claims are 
produced and seen as 'objective', whereas others are not.
Previously the dominant Mertonian sociology of science had primarily 
been concerned with the 'institutional' organisation of science. It
^Interestingly the genesis of actor-network theory can be traced to Latour's ethnographic 
studies of scientific laboratories (e.g. Latour & Woolgar, 1979).
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exempted scientific knowledge firom study, and was relatively uncritical of 
science's self-image. However, following Kuhn, sociology turned to 
investigate the 'content' of scientific knowledge and practice. Scholars 
began to examine theory acceptance and change and also how scientists 
establish 'agreement' of fact and procedure.
In the main, this was accomplished through a series of powerful and 
detailed ethnographies of science. Scholars observed experim ents, 
interviewed practitioners, tape-recorded lab talk and analysed documents 
(Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Knorr, 1981; Lynch, 1985):
Consequently the traditional focus on the intellectual feats of the great 
men of science has been replaced by an attention to the mundane 
details of practice, the role of technicians in experimentation, and the 
intra- and interorganizational relations that contribute to scientific and 
technological innovation. Considered in this way, the social context of 
scientific practice is not an external "factor" impinging on the 
laboratory, nor is it a surrounding set of institutions; it is a matrix for 
producing facts and artifacts.
Lynch & Bogen, 1997, p. 483.
Following these ethnographies scholars have approached the emprical 
study of scientific knowledge and practice in a range of different ways and 
a number of themes and issues have emerged. One particularly fruitful 
avenue of inquiry has been a consideration of the rhetorical organisation 
of factual discourse (e.g. Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). It was subsequently 
recognised that the focus of scientific debate was often the phenomena 
being scrutinized. Often, of course, the phenomena discussed are 
documents, artefacts, photographs, accounts, chart recordings, samples 
and the like, rather than, for example, the "bleeding rats" which have 
actually been experimented with (Latour, 1990). Scientific treatments of 
these 'representations' (objects) have become a topic of study in their own 
right (see Lynch & Woolgar, 1990b).
The approach of these studies resonate with the issues at hand and, thus, 
for these purposes, it would seem most relevant to consider the rich vein of 
work which has focused upon the ways in which scientists (and others) 
make sense of scientific phenomena or their 'representations'. It should be 
added that these studies adopt various approaches, many of which have 
strong sim ilaritites with the approach to be adopted by this thesis. 
Indeed, they are all, to varying degrees, influenced by ethnomethodology.
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However, it will be argued that this thesis is distinguished hy the radical 
version of reflexivity that it adopts. Before exploring that argument, 
however, consider some examples of this work.
For instance, Goodwin has considered how scientists see certain objects of 
inquiry. He argues the existence of "professional vision" (Goodwin, 1994). 
Building on the notion of discourses specific to each profession, he 
suggests that professionals also view differently specific 'domains of 
scrutiny' - the field upon which the professionals focus their attention. For 
example, he turns his attention to archaeologists' work at a dig and shows 
how a cross-section of the soil is seen with regard to a chart used to 
categorise the colour of the soil. Learning how to categorise the soil is part 
of learning how to be an archaeologist (ibid.). Goodwin elaborates this 
discussion in a paper on collaborative work aboard a scientific research 
vessel (Goodwin, 1995). In particular he describes how three different 
professionals work together to position a probe for a geochemist to take a 
sample. He shows that "...because each actor uses alternative tools to 
organize his or her perception in ways appropriate to complementary 
tasks required for the successful accomplishment of the sampling run, 
each sees the place they are looking at together in a very different way" 
(ibid., p. 237).
Although Goodwin powerfully argues for professional vision throughout 
both of these papers, he does not show the practices in and through which 
co-participants render objects visible to one another. This is not his 
concern, for it would seem unlikely that particular professions have 
unique ways of pointing things out. Therefore, although these studies 
reveal that different features of an object are relevant to different 
scientific disciplines (and professions more generally), they do not 
explicate the practices in and through which colleagues encourage others 
to look at those features or indeed constitute the shared sense of those 
features.
Other studies, however, have examined how individuals make sense of 
visible features of the world. For example, some studies have shown how 
printed materials are used to instruct participants in how to view  
particular phenomena. These studies, although not specifically examining 
'scientists', have been used to contribute to debates about scientific
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practice within SSK^. For example, Law & Lynch (1990) have shown how 
h i r d - w a t c h i n g 4  manuals are used to distinguish different species of hird. 
In particular, they have revealed "... some of the contingencies arising 
within the hermeneutic circle comprised of perceptive 'readings' in a 
wordly field in reference to an authoritative text" (ihid., p. 294). In a 
similar vein, Amerine & Bilmes (1990) considered how children doing 
science experiments make sense of observed phenomena in the light of the 
instructions that they have been given. For instance, they discuss how 
students decide whether or not their experiment can be seen as 
successfully demonstrating a particular aspect of science. They show how 
"... dealing with instructions is at the same time a very situated  
competence in 'viewing the world,' or 'seeing what is there,' according to 
the account of things embodied in the instructions" (ihid., p. 329).
These studies then begin to show how participants them selves orient 
toward and make sense of objects in the world, objects such as soil 
samples, birds and graphs of the sea. Moreover, they show the way in 
which this is accomplished within particular kinds of situation. That is to 
say, the context in which an object is seen is critical to the way it is seen 
(constituted). For example, the activity or profession in which an object is 
encountered is critical to the sense that is made of it - an archaeologist 
sees history in the soil, whereas a park keeper sees an ugly hole. Or, for 
example, the use of a manual shapes how objects are viewed and 
categorised -a s  a specific species of bird, as a successful experiment and so 
forth. Moroever, other science studies consider how the sense of some 
phenomenon is situated in interactional encounters.
For example, scholars have used audio-recording equipment to capture 
actual debates over the nature of scientific phenomena. These studies 
have focused upon the situated accomplishment of experiments and the 
ways in which evidence is "fixated" (Amann & Knorr-Cetina, 1990), that is 
how evidence comes to be accepted as fact.
Amann & Knorr-Cetina (1990) investigated geneticists making sense of 
'data' from an autoradiograph film. These geneticists would talk ahout the
^Indeed, a critical contribution of SSK has been to deconstruct the distinction between 
science and ordinary action.
^The activity of bird-watching is introduced as "prescientific?" (Lynch & Woolgar, 1990a, 
p. 9).
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data in order to make sense of them. Amann & Knorr-Cetina found that it 
is through this talk that the evidence is fixated. More specifically, they 
claim that certain "conversational inference devices", such as asking 
questions about procedures employed and providing formulations and 
counter-formulations of details on the film, are used to fixate the identity 
of features on that film. Therefore, they suggest that seeing what the data 
consist is "interactively accomplished" in the course of lab talk. The sense 
of the data is produced within conversations between colleagues.
A similar conclusion can be drawn from Woolgar's (1990) observation of 
the work of a group of solid state physicists. He shows that what comes to 
be an adequate description of the phenomenon at hand is produced in the 
debate between scientists. For instance, he shows how evidence is fixated 
hy t5dng the presently ambiguous state of affairs to (what is presented as) 
a previously settled objectivity - previous observations, a previous family 
of observations and so forth. These studies of lab talk, therefore, describe 
how scientists work up the very sense of some phenomenon (object) then  
and there, in the course of their everyday work. Rather than the 
ethnographic studies, which revealed the broadly situational contingencies 
of seeing and agreeing features of the world, these laboratory studies 
begin to show the interactional construction of scientific phenomena.
So these studies 'situate' the construction of scientific phenomena in the 
talk between individuals. However, they are dealing with some quite 
intriguing objects. As Amann & Knorr-Cetina (1990) note, these objects 
appear to be "...visually flexible phenomena whose boundaries, extension 
and identifying details are themselves at stake" (ibid., p. 87). They are 
dealing with what, for both scientist and analyst, is the discovery of new  
phenomena, the categorisation of new scientific data. They recognise the 
potentially contentious nature of the scientists' findings. However, there 
is some sense in which, after being discussed at the moment of discovery, 
they are 'fixated', they are agreed upon. So, the meaning of a chart, for 
example, is stabilised for the participants for some time. They suggest 
that individuals build the sense of the phenomenon in interaction, but 
then it is fixated. Rather, it is the contention of this thesis that the sense 
of an object is constituted not only within interaction, hut with each and 
every action within the interaction. In such a way, it will draw on a 
'temporal' notion of situation, such that the object is treated ongoingly, at 
every moment within the course of interaction.
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2.4 T ow ards an  In teraction al Socio logy o f th e  Object...
The foregoing discussion of actor-network theory and science studies leads 
towards a distinctively interactional approach to the study of the object.
Actor-network theory wants to treat objects in the same way as 
sociologists previously treated the human masses of the nineteenth  
century. However, they cannot allow objects to speak when those objects 
have no voice with which to communicate. Therefore, it can he argued 
that actor-network theorists suffer as "... their grand ambitions will be 
subverted in practice or their claims to speak on behalf of things will be 
superficial" (Collins & Yearley, 1992b, p. 385). As a result, ANT studies 
tend to prioritise the analysts' own agenda. They impose agency and 
power on objects; they speak for the actants in their study.
However, one obstacle that faces the analyst looking to describe (the 
properties of) an object and its position and relevance within an activity, is 
characterised by the etcetera problem:
How is the scientific requirement of literal description to be achieved in 
the face of the fact, widely recognized by researchers, that a description 
even of a particular 'concrete object' can never be complete? That is, 
how is a description to be warranted when, however long or intensive it 
be, it may nonetheless be infinitely extended? We call this 'the etcetera 
problem' to note: to any description of a concrete object (or event, or 
course of action, or etc.), however long, the researcher must add an 
etcetera clause to permit the description to be brought to a close.
Sacks, 1963, p. 10.
The analyst is left, then, with the problem of relevance to assess which 
characterisation to provide of an object (prior to the 'etcetera'). Actor- 
network theorists seem to prioritise their own agendas, hut as Sacks 
noted:
How could one, then, by simply reading a variety of descriptions, decide 
which had a better correspondence, i.e. which was 'more sociological'? ...
It is obviously no solution to use 'the author's purpose' or for that 
matter the reader's purpose in reading the paper to decide adequacy of 
description. That merely shifts the questions of using correspondence to 
establish adequacy from (a) correspondence between description and 
intended object to (b) correspondence between purpose, description and 
intended object. We still face a problem of reconciliation. Only now we 
are saying that somebody's satisfaction constitutes adequate grounds 
for his colleague's satisfaction. Or perhaps, one's colleague's 
satisfaction constitutes adequate grounds for one's own satisfaction.
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Sacks, 1963, p. 13.
Ethnomethodologists have suggested that rather than rely upon an 
analyst's 'satisfaction', this problem can be addressed by focusing 
participants' own orientations and concerns. They argue that, whatever 
else, their descriptions attempt to reveal how the participants are treating 
the occasion, action or, in the case at hand, object. A description is then  
warranted as at least relevant for members in the production of their 
activities. Indeed, this would seem a particularly pertinent solution given 
Garfinkel's comments on the object^. He suggested that although there 
are a huge catalogue of descriptive terms associated with any object, 
individuals experience objects with reference to only particular features - 
for Husserl, the "essence" of an object. He elaborates thus:
Though it is the case that all the possible ways in which an object may 
be treated are constituent to the object as a unit of meaning, 
nevertheless it is a pecularity of the action frame that for a given 
moment or sequence of moments of activity that it does not engage the 
notion of "wider knowledge," but involves the treatment of the object 
according to terms that are relevant to the actor's interpretive scheme 
at hand. Hence, the exhaustive listing of possible specifications is the 
task of the person who seeks an ontological cataloguing of a world of 
objects, in principle both an unnecessary and impossible task.
Garfinkel, 1952, p. 301.
So, Garfinkel suggested that although many 'meanings' are attributable to 
an object, on any occasion it is encountered by participants with regard to 
particular, local concerns. This is not to say that participants are seeing a 
version of some 'real' object, rather the object is what they see. Following 
what Garfinkel (1960) calls the "congruence theory of reality", members' 
treatment of an object is that object (for that occasion):
The leading premise of the "congruence" theory of reality is that the 
perceived object of the "outer world" is the concrete object, and that the 
two terms, "perceived object" and "concrete object" are synonymous and 
interchangeable terms. Rather than there being a world of concrete 
objects which a theory cuts this way and that, the view holds that the 
cake is constituted in the very act of cutting. No cutting, no cake, there 
being no reality out there that is approximated since the world in this 
view is just as it appears. To use a phrase common to the conversations 
of phenomenologists, "There is nothing behind it".
Garfinkel, 1960, p. 2.
^Garfinkel has a broader notion of the 'object' than is used within this thesis. He does 
include inanimate objects, but also more general cultural objects, such as language.
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It is possible then to narrow the field of investigation to consider what 
sense is made of an object on particular occasions of its production. As the 
thesis is interested in how objects feature in, and are relevant to, activities 
and individuals interact in the production of those activities, it would 
seem appropriate to consider what objects, and what sense or descriptions 
or treatments of those objects, they display as relevant to (the production 
of the) activity. The problem of warranting one description over another, 
then, can be overcome by showing how participants them selves are 
making sense of the world and displaying their understandings of that 
world on that occasion. Therefore, rather than prioritise analytic  
assumptions, this thesis will consider how individuals display and make 
sense of objects in the course of their everyday affairs.
Many of the authors of the science studies that have been discussed, have 
similarly engaged with this distinctively ethnomethodological response to 
the problem of relevance. They have revealed, in various ways, how the 
constitution of objects is 'situated'; how participants treat objects with  
respect to particular contexts of action.
This notion of 'situation' includes for example how an individual's 
professional concerns shape their perception of an object; or, for example, 
how the use of instruction manuals informs the way objects are seen. 
These science studies reveal a further notion of 'situated', when they show 
how the sense of an object is constituted within the interaction of 
individual scientists. They have described the ways in which evidence is 
'fixated' w ithin the course of collaborative work; how experim ental 
materials are made sense of (constituted) during laboratory debate. They 
have recognised, then, that participants display their orientations to 
objects in the course of interaction. However, in some ways, there remains 
an implication in some of their work that when scientific evidence is 
'fixated', so is the sense of that phenomenon (object). Once debated in the 
lab talk, the phenomenon (object) achieves some stable sense. So, even 
these more radical approaches which seem to treat the meanings of objects 
and the like as flexible, and fundamentally situated, still maintain some 
stable sense of those objects, if  only for the duration of an encounter. 
There would seem to be a 'moment of interpretative closure'.
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Rather, this thesis will adopt a more radical notion of 'situation'. It will 
consider how the sense of objects is constituted at each and every moment 
of its invocation. That is to say, the constitution or production of the 
occasioned sense of some object is a fundamentally local achievement, 
where 'local' refers even to a moment in interaction. Some of those in 
science studies do make the ethnomethodological point, that the sense of 
these objects (in their case scientific phenomena) is reflexive to the very 
activities in and through which they are constituted (e.g. Lynch & 
Woolgar, 1990a). This thesis concurs with that, but takes it a step further. 
It argues that the occasioned sense of the object is ongoingly updated and 
constituted at each and every moment of its invocation. Science studies do 
consider the situational contexts of production and the practical 
contingencies of seeing a particular phenomenon on a certain occasion. 
Yet, they do not explicate the temporal organisation of the sense of objects 
within sequences of interaction. They are not concerned with the moment- 
to-moment production of the interaction, such that each and every action 
can he seen to ongoingly display the participants' treatment of the object.
This more radical treatment of the constituted object is however emerging 
w ith in  ethnom ethodologically-inform ed stud ies o f in teraction . 
Conversation Analytic studies have, of course, a powerful history of 
exploring how participants ongoingly display their orientations toward the 
activity at hand on a turn-hy-turn basis. For example, scholars have 
shown how categories of membership are oriented to over sequences of 
turns (Sacks, 1966) or how mutual understandings of the activity at hand 
can, more generally, be maintained (Schegloff & Sacks, 1974). However, 
few such studies have addressed their analytic attention to the ways in  
which the object features in interaction. Nevertheless, two strands of 
work do touch on the issues at hand and can be brought together to huild a 
framework from which this study develops.
2.5 O bjects in  E thnom ethodologically-in form ed  S tu d ies o f  
In teraction
The provenance of the approach adopted hy this project can he seen to lie 
squarely between two 'strands' of ethnomethodological work that have 
developed within recent years. The first, which will be termed 'studies of 
co-orientation', has examined how participants achieve co-regard or joint 
gaze towards features of the world. Building from research on mutual
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gaze, these studies have examined how individuals manage to 
collaboratively align toward objects. The second strand of research, has 
come to be know as 'workplace studies'. 'Workplace studies' are mainly 
published within the field of Computer-Supported Cooperative Work 
(CSCW) and essentially explore the organisation of collaborative work in 
complex technological environments. It is to be argued that the concerns 
of these two strands of ethnomethodological work overlap and yet little  
research has addressed that overlap. This thesis will attempt to do just 
that.
2,5,1 Studies o f  Co-orientation
These studies have developed from a concern to explicate the nature of 
face-to-face interaction from a distinctively Conversation Analytic 
perspective. Whereas studies of non-verbal communication had been 
mainly psychological, and CA studies had primarily focused on talk, these 
studies have brought the two together.
Many of the earlier studies had considered when and how mutual gaze 
between co-participants is established. Then, Goodwin (1981b) and Heath 
(1986) began to examine the practices in and through which co­
participants establish some co-orientation toward features of the local 
milieu. That is to say, their interest lay in how people establish a joint 
focus of visual attention. This concern developed from studies which  
examined how face-to-face orientation (mutual gaze) is achieved in 
conversation (e.g. Goodwin, 1981a). In particular, their work builds from 
findings by Goodwin (1981a) on how re-starts and phrasal breaks in  
ordinary conversation often attract the gaze of a hearer to the speaker's 
face, thereby achieving mutual gaze. Goodwin (1981b) and Heath (1986) 
hoth note how, at times within encounters, participants also achieve some 
mutual orientation toward phenomena in the local environment.
Both Goodwin and Heath found that re-starts and phrasal breaks could 
also engender some shifting orientation of the hearer to the speaker's 
domain of scrutiny. Goodwin studied ordinary conversation primarily in  
an art gallery and, thus, how speakers could encourage others to look at 
an art exhibit for example. Heath, in his examination of medical 
consultations, showed how patients encouraged doctors to look at the
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bodily site of the visible features of their ailment. Therefore, as Goodwin 
notes with regard to re-starts:
... in attending to restarts hearers do not simply move mechanically 
toward speakers, but rather analyze what would constitute an 
appropriate locus for gaze in terms of the specific tasks they are then 
being set by the details of the talk.
Goodwin, 1981b, p. 4.
Both studies showed how the perturbations in talk would attract the 
hearer's gaze to the face of the speaker. However, they would then find 
that speaker looking at some object. So, the hearer would use the line of 
regard of the speaker (and sometimes associated pointing gestures) to 
establish the "appropriate locus for gaze".
These studies, therefore, begin to explore the ways in which co-orientation 
to objects is achieved in interaction (although these issues w ill be 
developed further in Chapters 4 and 5). However they do not then discuss 
in any great detail how the sequence develops, such that some shared 
sense of the object is constituted.
More recently, however, Wootton (1994) studied child-parent interaction. 
Once again he is not primarily concerned with the object as a constituted 
object, but rather examines how a pre-verbal child communicates requests 
to he passed a particular object. His analysis reveals the practices 
through which the child displays that an unwanted object has been passed 
to her and "These means consist of her re-requesting what she originally 
wanted and employing ways of dealing with the unwanted object" (ibid., p. 
560). Although his paper is primarily concerned with aspects of child 
development, it also reveals how some intersubjective alignm ent is 
achieved with regard to what object has actually been requested. 
However, the observations mainly begin at the point an object has been 
offered to the child, they do not consider the initial request or how the 
child encourages her mother to look at something.
These studies, in different ways, consider how two people come to focus on 
a single object in the world. Given of course the variety of objects and 
artefacts that surround any interaction, the practices which support this 
are clearly powerful. The studies show how a single object can be 
rendered visible. However, they do not tend to explore the ways in which
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those objects are constituted and made sense of as the interaction  
progresses. Therefore, this thesis will attempt to advance this continuing 
tradition of research by examining this issue.
2,5,2 Workplace Studies
With very different concerns at hand a further strand of work has also 
begun to consider the relations between objects and action. They have 
come to be known as 'workplace studies'. In particular, they are 
investigating the ways in which objects can be seen to 'mediate' the 
organisation of collaborative work. Moreover, many of these studies have 
focused on these issues at the interactional 'level' of organisation. These 
particular studies show how objects can be seen to contribute to the 
organisation and co-ordination of work tasks w ithin sequences of 
interaction. As they tend to focus on complex technological environments, 
the objects which feature in the studies are computers, paper documents, 
electronic diagrams and so forth. However, once again their concern is not 
explicitly with how the object is constituted in interaction.
Workplace studies did not originate within sociology, but rather within the 
study of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI). Lucy Suchman pioneered 
these studies by bringing an ethnomethodological approach to HCI. In 
particular, she provided a powerful critique of HCI's dominant plan-based 
notions of human conduct, through a description of how people operate 
and reason ahout their use of photocopiers (Suchman, 1987). Rather than 
presenting 'plans' as rigid guides to action, she showed how 'plans' are 
routinely modified in the face of emerging contingencies. Furthermore, 
she revealed the ways in which these plans are used as a resource hy 
participants to rationalise their actions after the event. This seminal 
work can he seen to owe much to the writings of Garfinkel and it is a 
testament to the success of her critique within systems design research 
that many computer scientists have the notion that sociology is all about 
naturalistic studies of human conduct (and moreover, that sociology and 
ethnomethodology are one in the same).
Suchman's success led to a range of'workplace studies'. These studies are 
published pre-dominantly w ithin the field of Computer-Supported 
Cooperative Work (CSCW). This is a multi-disciplinary field drawing 
primarily on computer scientists, sociologists, psychologists, management
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analysts and linguists. Whereas HCI could he characterised as 
harbouring individualistic notions of technology use, CSCW recognises the 
fundamentally social or collaborative nature of work. It argues that even 
stereotypically individual actions can be seen to have interactional or 
social elements to them (see Greatbatch et al, 1993 for a discussion of 
typing for example). CSCW studies tend to address two key concerns. 
Firstly, they explore the nature and coordination of collaborative work. 
Therefore, they examine a range of issues surrounding the nature of group 
dynamics, the impact of the wider organisational structure on the 
production of work and so forth. Secondly, their findings have 
implications for the design, development or implementation of new  
technologies. This may be in terms of direct implications for a technology 
in a particular work domain, but they also tend to have more widespread 
im plications for the design of generic technologies or design  
methodologies.
These concerns are not directed purely at work in traditional co-present 
work environments. Indeed, a major feature of CSCW research is a focus 
on the potential technological support for physically-distributed  
collaborative work. That is to say, many CSCW designs attem pt to 
provide support for work which involves colleagues located in separate 
geographical domains. As a result, many of the studies consider the 
nature of collaborative authoring systems, video conferencing and the 
potential uses of collaborative virtual environments.
Within this hroad field, workplace studies examine the in situ production 
and organisation of collaborative activities in work environments. They 
tend to involve general ethnography, hut many also utilise audio or audio­
visual recordings of workplace interaction. As for the case of CSCW more 
generally, workplace studies are used to inform systems design for co­
present working, but are also keen to suggest ways of supporting 
physically-distributed work.
There are certain benefits of such studies over other methods. For 
example, more structured interviewing techniques rely upon those aspects 
of work that individuals are readily cognizant. On the other hand, 
workplace studies have proved particularly successful at revealing the 
'tacit' features of everyday work critical to understanding the ways in
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which work is interactionally organised®. Indeed, it is argued that 
sensitivity to current working practices within a domain would seem to 
provide a firmer foundation from which to develop and implement new  
technologies'^.
Workplace studies have investigated numerous workplaces. Many of them  
can be classed as "Centers of Coordination" (Suchman, in press), such as 
Airport Traffic Control (Harper & Hughes 1993; Harper et al, in press), 
emergency service call-takers (Whalen, 1995) and London Underground 
Control Rooms (Heath & Luff, 1992a, 1997). However studies have also 
been carried out, and are increasingly being carried out, in a diverse range 
of other settings, such as news agencies (Heath & Nicholls, in press), 
medical consultations (Greatbatch et al, 1993) and lawyers' offices 
(Suchman, forthcoming).
®Tacit knowledge is that which is not easily recognised or put into words, for instance, 
the kind of knowledge that the wet nurse tries to convey in Patrick Süskind’s novel 
Perfume:
'But what does a baby smell like, is what I want to know?'
The wet nurse hesitated. She knew very well how babies smell, she 
knew precisely - after all she had fed, tended, cradled and kissed dozens 
of them ... She could find them at night with her nose. Why, right at 
that moment she bore that baby smell clearly in her nose. But never 
until now had she described it in words.
Süskind, Perfume.
Tacit knowledge is not only that which is hard to put into words or that we do not have a 
vocabulary for, but it also refers to features of action and interaction that we tend not to 
consider. For example, how we tie our shoelaces or how we coordinate turns at talk in a 
conversation. They are activities that we do, but which we do not tend to examine as we 
are doing them.
^This has been leamt from recent major system failures. For instance, a few years ago, 
the London Ambulance Service attempted to introduce a new Computer Aided Dispatch 
system (CAD), which would automatically identity the nearest ambulance to the scene of 
an incident and provide the relevant crew with the details of that incident. However, 
within hours of its introduction, the system failed spectacularly. Responses to 
emergencies were delayed enormously as callers were put in call queues for up to 30 
minutes and inappropriate ambulances were dispatched to the scene. In sum, the system 
began to put lives in jeopardy. Although, the LAS Inquiry report catalogues a string of 
organisational and technical errors and mistakes, they also highlight the fact that those 
in charge of the development were extremely insensitive to the working practices already 
in place:
...satisfactory implementation of the system would require changes to a 
number of existing working practices. Senior management believed that 
implementation of the system would, in itself, bring about these 
changes. In fact many staff found it to be an operational 'straight jacket' 
within which they still tried to operate local flexibility. This caused 
further confusion within the system...
Report of the Inquiry into the London Ambulance Service, 1993, p. 5.
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Given the joint concerns of explicating the organisation of work and 
considering the design of technology, many of these studies consider how 
workplace artefacts feature in the organisation of work. Studies have thus 
examined the variety of ways in which texts, tools and technologies are 
used to organise the production of workplace activities. This general 
approach to the study of technology at work is characterised by Button in 
his introduction to a collection of these studies:
...technology is socially achieved in the social practices through which 
people recognisably and accountably orientate to technology in the 
course of its design, construction, development, implementation, its use, 
and in talking and writing about it, as these matters are accountably 
located in the specifics of their achievement in the local circumstances 
of their display.
Button, 1993, p. 25.
This focus on participants' orientations to technology (and workplace 
artefacts more generally), can be seen to resonate with the concerns of the 
thesis. Some examples of workplace studies reveal how this approach 
works in practice.
Harper et al (in press) have shown how paper tickets are critical to the 
organisation of tasks in Air Traffic Control. Their movement through the 
control centre is used to mark the position of the plane in the air and, 
moreover, physically display which controller has responsibility for it. 
Each controller in the room is in charge of a section of airspace. So, when 
a paper ticket representing a particular plane is passed between  
controllers, the plane is shown to be moving between sections of airspace 
as well as between those persons responsible for it.
Other studies have focused more explicitly on how objects feature in 
sequences of interaction. For example, Greatbatch et al (1993) have 
examined those moments at which patients in a medical consultation  
produce an unsolicited turn at talk. It was found that patients routinely 
produced the onset of these turns at the moment a doctor pressed the 
return key to end a stage of inputting into the computer. Similarly, in 
their study of city dealing rooms. Heath et al (1995) examined how 
colleagues began new conversations or activities. They showed how  
individuals introduced those new activities when their colleagues could be 
seen to be ending or pausing in the course of another activity. Junctures
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in these activities were witnessable, for example, by the ripping of a deal 
ticket out of a book, or pausing in the course of typing on a computer. So, 
these two studies show, in various ways, how participants orient to 
another's use of a technology (or other workplace artefact) as marking 
their availability for some new activity. The routine of an activity is then 
often available in an individual's manipulation of an artefact, such as a 
computer or a document.
These studies, then, can be seen to reveal various ways in which objects, 
such as technologies and paper documents, mediate workplace activities. 
Their physical position within space can publicly reveal a division of 
labour, such as in the ATC example. Also, ongoing orientations toward, 
and manipulations of, artefacts can be used by individuals to assess the 
current availability of a co-participant, as in medical consultations and 
city dealing rooms. In such ways, these findings describe the socio­
interactional foundation to the use of technology.
These two strands of ethnomethodological work can be seen to 
complement each other in certain ways. For example, the studies of co­
orientation do begin to reveal some of the practices through which  
participants encourage others to look at an object with them. However, 
they do not tend to show how that co-orientation then contributes to the 
development and organisation of the activity. The workplace studies on 
the other hand focus on how objects mediate particular activities, but 
rarely explicate the ways in which colleagues are encouraged to look at 
objects with others.
This thesis will bring these concerns together. The objects which will form 
the focus of the study are workplace artefacts, indeed, the same objects 
that many workplace studies have focused on in complex technological 
environments: computers, telephones, paper documents, and the like. It 
will follow the trail of workplace studies that consider how these objects 
feature in the work. However, it will also consider the interactional 
practices which encourage participants to look at objects together, thereby 
building on the studies of co-orientation. Moreover, it will combine these 
strands of work to facilitate the study of a further issue: how some shared 
sense of an object is displayed and constituted within the course of the 
activity.
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2.6 D iscu ssion
It has been argued within this chapter, that the inanimate object has 
become of increasing interest to a variety of disciplines across the social 
and cognitive sciences. In various ways, these studies have recognised the 
critical relevance of objects to accounts of social activity. Their interest 
has been to examine the ways in which objects feature within and stand in 
relation to action and activity. Furthermore, many studies have examined 
the meaning of objects or how the object is constructed in social action. 
These are the very issues that this thesis will investigate. However, the 
chapter has also argued for a distinctive approach to address them - a 
fundamentally ethnomethodological approach.
Numerous studies have attempted to describe the meaning of objects, or 
more generally, have implied the meaning of objects within the course of 
their analyses of social action. This study will adopt another way of 
investigating the sense of objects. Rather than prioritising the accounts of 
analysts who define the existential meaning of objects, it will consider how 
participants themselves (literally) make sense of objects. Thus, it will 
prioritise participants' orientations to objects.
This is the ethnomethodological 'solution' to the problem of analytic 
relevance. The question is how can one description of an object be 
prioritised over another. When analysts use their own intuition to build a 
description, the only way of assessing that description is their own or their 
colleagues' satisfaction. By turning to uncover members' orientations to 
(or descriptions of) objects, the analyst can at least say that, whatever 
else, the participants themselves treated this account or description as 
relevant in the course of their actions and activities.
A number of studies have also considered how participants make sense of 
objects or 'construct' the meaning of objects. The discussion of SSK  
provided an example of the kinds of issues that have been raised. For 
example, studies have addressed, in various ways, how participants make 
sense of objects with regard to the practical purposes at hand. The 
profession or activity in which an individual is engaged effects the ways in 
which the object is viewed, as is evidenced by Goodwin's discussion of 
personnel on a scientific research vessel. There are also other ways in
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which the 'situation' shapes the viewing of objects. Law & Lynch, for 
example, discuss how the practical contingencies of using a bird-watching 
manual have consequences for the identification of particular species of 
bird. Moreover, studies have shown how conversations between scientists 
are the sites in which the sense of some phenomena is made; how debates 
between those individuals shapes the construction of the phenomena.
However, a number of these science studies seem to retain a notion of 
interpretive closure, in which the sense of an object is stabilised, if  only for 
the duration of an encounter. For example, even in the studies of lab talk, 
there is the implication that some scientific phenomenon is discussed and 
debated, but towards the end of the interaction the sense of that 
phenomenon is "fixated". However, an objective of the empirical sections 
of this thesis will be to demonstrate the momentary and occasioned 
sensibility of objects; that is to say, the ways in which the displayed and 
shared orientation towards an object is assembled over moments in the 
course of sequences of interaction. As such, this thesis will adopt a more 
radical notion of reflexivity. It will consider the sense of an object as 
ongoingly constituted in each and every action with regard to an object, 
throughout an encounter. As such it w ill examine the temporal 
organisation of treatments of objects within interaction. To accomplish 
this the thesis must draw on the analytic apparatus of Conversation 
Analysis. This will facilitate a sensitive and rigorous consideration of 
momentary seeings of objects.
So, there are three key features of the approach this study will take to 
investigate the local constitution of objects. Firstly, it prioritises 
participants' own orientations to objects, rather than that of the analyst. 
Secondly, it examines how objects feature within sequences of interaction, 
rather than more generally within a profession or location. Thirdly, it will 
treat the constitution of objects as an ongoing and m om entary  
achievement. Indeed, it is suggested that each and every action w ith  
regard to an object (re)produces that object.
To adopt this approach, the study will develop from and bring together two 
strands of ethnomethodological work: studies of co-orientation and 
workplace studies. Each strand of work has begun to seriously consider 
how objects feature in social action. However, this has been accomplished 
in very different ways. The studies of co-orientation have revealed some of
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the ways in which participants encourage others to look at an object with 
them. Workplace studies have examined how objects variously 'mediate' 
the organisation and co-ordination of tasks in the workplace. 
Interestingly, despite this solid foundation to the study of the object in 
interaction, few ethnomethodological studies have directly addressed the 
issue of the 'constituted object'. Indeed, although studies have brought 
objects into their analyses, the key issues have tended to lie elsewhere - 
either in the organisation of co-orientation or the nature of collaborative 
work. This thesis will examine how mutual orientation is achieved within 
the workplace. Moreover, it will consider how the occasioned sense of an 
object is constituted and how that contributes to the ongoing production of 
work.
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C h a p ter  3
Methodological Orientation
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3.1 In troduction
The previous chapter introduced the issues to be addressed within the 
study. In particular, it revealed that the thesis will investigate the 
interactional constitution of objects and how those objects relate to the 
organisation of workplace activities. Chapter 2 also argued for a 
distinctively interactional approach to these issues. In particular, it was 
suggested that this approach essentially derives from work and findings 
within ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis (CA). Although some 
of these findings were described, the background to ethnomethodology and 
CA was not elaborated. This chapter, therefore, w ill specify the 
methodological orientation, informed by ethnomethodology, which will be 
taken to this study of objects in interaction.
In particular, it will highlight the key methodological resources that will 
be used. It will discuss the critical benefits of studying recordings of 
naturally-occurring interaction. In this case, those recordings will be 
audio-visual materials collected in a complex organisational environment 
and they will facilitate the close examination of participants' changing 
orientations to objects over moments in time. Further, it will show how 
the analysis rests upon the recognition of embodied action (talk and visual 
conduct) as sequentially organised. This provides a way of evidencing 
claims about members' own orientations to ongoing actions. In order to 
illustrate the discussion, the chapter will make reference to example 
analyses of recorded data.
3.2 E thnom ethodology!
A curious fact becomes apparent if you look at the first paragraph - it 
may occur in the third paragraph - of reportedly revolutionary treatises 
back to the pre-Socratics and extending up to at least Freud. You find 
that they all begin by saying something like this: 'About what I am 
going to talk about, people think they know but they don't. 
Furthermore if you tell them it doesn't change anything. They still 
walk round like they know although they are walking around in a 
dream world.' ... What we are interested in is, what is it that people 
seem to know and use? Here what people know and use is not to be 
mapped for each area onto what it is that science turns out to know, but 
is to be investigated itself.
Sacks [verbal quote in Hill & Crittenden, 1968, p. 13].
!ln  this short space, it would be quite impossible to do justice to the rich and detailed 
nature of the development and form of the ethnomethodological program. However, good 
introductions, overviews and discussions may be found in Garfinkel, 1967, 1996; Lynch, 
1993; Button, 1991; and Heritage, 1984a.
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Harold Garfinkel began a program of studies in the 1950s which formed a 
fundamental respecification of the classical sociological concern with the 
nature of social order. Garfinkel was keen to demonstrate the 'artful 
practices' in and through which participants produce and m aintain  
orderly, mutual intelligible social encounters; how they produce and 
maintain the very social structures taken as given within classical 
sociology. So, instead of asking why in principle social order is as it is (or 
is claimed to be), he proposed examining how particular manifestations of 
social order are achieved and worked into being (Garfinkel, 1967). Order 
is not assumed, but it is discovered and systematically described.
Ethnomethodological studies take Durkheim's suggestion that sociology's 
fundamental principle is the objective reality of social facts and instead  
treats as a prevailing topic the "endless, ongoing, contingent 
accomplishment" (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 1) of such 'objective reality'; the very 
practices in and through which reality is (re)produced; the taken-for- 
granted and tacit features of everyday activities. So, for example, 
Atkinson (1978) reconsidered the assumptions which form the foundation 
of Durkheim's classic Suicide  (1952). He problematized (in terms of 
treating as a problem for participants themselves) the very concept of 
'suicide' and described the coroner's practical reasoning in working up a 
verdict of 'suicide', as opposed to 'accidental death' for instance. In such a 
way, Atkinson demonstrated how a seemingly objective 'social fact', which 
forms the unquestioned cornerstone of Durkheim's thesis, is situatedly 
accomplished and worked into being an objective social fact by 
participants themselves.
Garfinkel's own approach to the study (and description) of the tacit, taken- 
for-granted features of everyday activities included a series of (quite 
extraordinary) student experim ents - known as the 'breaching 
experiments'. These experiments (reported in Garfinkel, 1967) were 
designed to make observably available features of the very structure and 
foundation of interpersonal relationships, which Schütz had previously 
described. In them, Garfinkel would ask his (rather unfortunate) students 
to do such things as acting like boarders within their own household; or 
insist on repeated clarifications of commonplace remarks. These would 
often lead students into quite heated situations with extremely confused 
friends and family. Whatever the social repercussions for the individual
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students, these experiments did work to reveal many of the common sense 
and taken-as-given features of everyday social interaction; indeed the 
assumptions through which we can go about orderly, intelligible, even 
parsimonious, activities.
Garfinkel notes a particular element of the nature of these taken-for- 
granted, seen-but-unnoticed, common understandings. Rather than treat 
them as somehow regulating action in certain scenes, he sees them as a 
resource with which members produce and recognise actions and activities 
and as a means to ongoingly constitute the intelligibility of a scene:
With respect to the problematic character of practical actions and to the 
practical adequacy of their inquiries, members take for granted that a 
member must at the outset "know" the setting in which he is to operate 
if his practices are to serve as measures to bring particular, located 
features of these settings to recognizable account ... Members know, 
require, count on, and make use of this reflexivity to produce, 
accomplish, recognize, or demonstrate rational-adequacy-for-all- 
practical-purposes of their procedures and findings.
Garfinkel, 1967, p. 8.
This particular notion of reflexivity is foundational to ethnomethodological 
work, as it focuses analytic attention on the achieved character of events 
and the methodological foundations of, or members' methods for, the 
accomplishment of practical action (Heath, 1997).
A second strand of his work involved extensive ethnographic research, 
examining the work of jurors, the achievement of sex status in an 
intersexed person and how case records are used in medical clinics (all 
reported in Garfinkel, 1967). All of these studies treated as the primary 
concern, the activities in and through which "settings of organized  
everyday affairs" are produced and maintained and moreover, the ways in 
which they are "accountable", or "observable-and-reportable" (Garfinkel, 
1967):
Ethnomethodological studies analyze everyday activities as members' 
methods for making those same activities visibly-rational-and- 
reportable-for-all-practical-purposes, i.e ., "accountable," as 
organizations of commonplace activities.
Garfinkel, 1967, p. vii
Since the 1967 publication of Garfinkel's classic  S tu d ie s  in 
Ethnomethodology, his groundbreaking initiatives have stimulated a large
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and ever growing corpus of ethnomethodological work. These have tended, 
however, to develop his ethnographic research stream rather than  
inventing further breaching experiments - and for that, undergraduates 
around the world may be truly grateful! Although some studies are 
theoretical respecifications of concepts previously, and extensively, used in 
classic studies of (what Garfinkel calls) Formal Analysis (for example 
Coulter, 1979, 1989), more generally, ethnom ethodologists have  
investigated a wide variety of settings and the activities that constitute 
(features of) those settings. They have covered subjects such as how 
people organise walking in public places (Ryave & Schenkein, 1974); the 
learning of jazz piano (Sudnow, 1978); and the nature of the informal 
'rules' oriented to by prisoners - the 'convict code' (Wieder, 1974). A 
particularly rich seam of ethnomethodological work has focused on the 
organisation of work in the natural and mathematical sciences (see, for 
example. Lynch, 1985; Garfinkel et al, 1981; Bjelic and Lynch, 1992; 
Livingston, 1986).
This study will adopt an ethnomethodological concern to explicate the 
practices in and through which participants produce and maintain orderly, 
mutual intelligible orientations toward features of the 'physical' world; 
indeed how they inter subjectively constitute, at least for all practical 
purposes, material realities. It will draw particularly on methodological 
resources from a third approach which developed as a direct result of 
Garfinkel's respecification of the problem of social order: Conversation 
Analysis.
3.3 C onversation  A nalysis
Harvey Sacks was deeply influenced by the seminal work of Garfinkel, 
which provided the foundation to his own intellectual project(s). Along 
with his colleagues Gail Jefferson and Emanuel Schegloff, Sacks pioneered 
Conversation Analysis (CA) and began to examine the nature of 
conversation's organisation:
This work is part of a program of work undertaken several years ago to 
explore the possibility of achieving a naturalistic observational 
discipline that could deal with the details of social action(s) rigorously, 
empirically and formally ... Our analysis has sought to explicate the 
ways in which the materials (records of natural conversations) are 
produced by members in orderly ways that exhibit their orderliness and 
have their orderliness appreciated and used, and have that appreciation 
displayed and treated as the basis for subsequent action.
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Schegloff & Sacks, 1974, p. 233.
They treated conversation as an activity like any other and recognised 
that social order in its very detail is contained w ithin ordinary 
conversation. They also realised that talk is the principal means through 
which participants produce and recognise actions and activities. This 
focus on talk is of particular interest because the social world can be seen 
as a pervasively conversational one in which spoken interaction accounts 
for much of the world's business and 'ordinary' conversation is both the 
predominant medium of interaction and the primary tool of socialisation 
(Heritage, 1989).
They took as their data, recorded materials of naturally occurring, 
everyday interaction. Some of the most influential studies of interaction 
outside of CA, have drawn conclusions from experimental situations or 
from introspection. However, naturally-occurring interaction is available 
for direct observation and analysis. Given that often their concern is to 
reflect upon and explicate naturally-occurring interaction, it would seem  
quite bizarre not to use this opportunity. It is particularly strange given 
the fact that real sequences of interaction recurrently produce patterns 
and forms of social intercourse that surely could not be imagined:
The myriad ways in which specific contexts ... are talked into being and
oriented to in interaction vastly exceed the comparatively limited, and
overwhelmingly typified, powers of imaginative intuition.
Heritage, 1984a, p. 237.
This does not only inhibit those who draw on imagined accounts of 
interaction, but also those who wish to replicate or construct controlled 
situations within the human laboratory. To control the multitude of 
factors at work within any moment of interaction is quite a momentous 
task, most especially when the analyst must decide a priori which factors 
are of most relevance. Given that these studies are often designed to 
explicate the nature of everyday interaction, at best the analyses can 
generate hypotheses to be tested later in the 'real world'. So, it would 
seem somewhat perverse not to exploit, and exploit in the first instance, 
the rich seam of readily available and naturally-occurring interaction, 
without prior recourse to imaginary or artificial scenarios of action.
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Sacks and his colleagues initially worked on tape-recordings of telephone 
calls. However, as CA developed, so the variety of data sources expanded 
to include audio and audio-visual recordings of face-to-face encounters in 
both mundane and institutional settings.
CA has been extremely successful at generating rich and interesting  
findings about the practical organisation of talk. Studies have focused on 
the organisation and co-ordination of turn-taking (Sacks et al, 1974), 
repair (Schegloff et al, 1977), conversational openings (Schegloff, 1968), 
the structural features of troubles telling (Jefferson & Lee, 1980), the 
display of agreement and disagreement (Pomerantz, 1984) and the 
interactional production of categorisation (Sacks, 1966). Furthermore, 
they have considered how institutional talk differs from ordinary 
conversation, in order to understand the broader activities in which 
participants are engaged. They have been used to explicate the particular 
features of talk evident within domains such as classrooms (Mehan, 1979; 
McHoul, 1978, 1985), medical consultations (Heath, 1986), news 
interviews (Heritage & Greatbatch, 1991), talk radio (Hutchby, 1996), 
courtrooms (Atkinson & Drew, 1979), offices (Boden, 1991) and police 
interrogations (Watson, 1990). Numerous introductions to CA discuss in 
detail the nature of the findings firom this range of studies. However, it is 
the way that they deal with the analysis of recorded materials that is of 
particular relevance here.
To outline the nature of the CA enterprise, consider how CA approaches 
three key notions: Context, Evidence and Relevance.
Philosophers and linguists refer to particular terms and expressions as 
indexical; those which can only be made sense of with respect to the 
physical surroundings or whatever - for instance "what's that?", where 
"that" is some feature of the local milieu. However, ethnomethodologists 
(and Conversation Analysts) have a more radical concept of indexicality, 
which suggests that all social actions (including expressions, turns and 
utterances) achieve their sense in the context of their production. They 
are not produced in 'isolation', but spoken in interaction. Therefore they  
are designed and oriented toward the context of their very production. To 
analyse the organisation of social interaction, then, the analyst m ust 
consider any expression, turn or utterance in, and with regard to, the 
context in which it is produced.
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Although the notion of context adopted by CA does include traditional 
notions associated with the term (setting, activity, participants etc.), a far 
more radical notion of context is also invoked. Indexicality highlights the 
essential uniqueness of any action or event. Indeed, for CA, context is an 
inherently local matter. For instance, any turn at talk is considered in the 
light of the immediately prior actions, indeed the immediately prior turn. 
As actions are produced, designed and sensitive to the actions (of others) 
in the prior turn, they must be considered with reference to that prior. 
Furthermore, any action or turn at talk is seen as "doubly contextual" 
(Heritage, 1984a, p. 242), in that it is both context shaped and context 
renewing. Any turn at talk both intimately attends to the prior turn and 
projects the nature of appropriate or relevant next actions:
... 'context' is treated as both the project and product of the participants' 
own actions and therefore as inherently locally produced and 
transformable at any moment.
Heritage & Greatbatch, 1991, p. 63.
So any turn at talk is part of the ongoing and emergent development of a 
sequence of actions. The recognition of this sequential organisation of 
interaction is a foundational element of the CA approach, as it also 
supports a distinctive view of evidence in analysis:
... it is a systematic consequence of the turn-taking organization of 
conversation that it obliges its participants to display to each other, in a 
turn's talk, their understanding of the other turn's talk. More generally, 
a turn's talk will be heard as directed to a prior turn's talk, unless 
special techniques are used to locate some other talk to which it is 
directed. Regularly, then, a turn's talk will display its speaker's 
understanding of a prior turn's talk, and whatever other talk it makes 
itself as directed to.
Sacks et al, 1974, p. 35.
Within the unfolding course of sequences of interaction then, participants 
build an "architecture of inter subjectivity" (Heritage, 1984a, p. 254) in  
which they display their ongoing and ever-updating orientations towards 
the business at hand and the emerging turns at talk. This can be used as 
a resource by the analyst. As a consequence of displaying understanding 
of a prior action to their co-participant, that understanding is also made 
available to the analyst (or indeed any competent member). Therefore, the 
analyst is able to utilise participants' own understandings of prior actions,
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rather than imposing their own interpretations to make sense of those 
actions:
... in order to make claims as to the job performed by a turn it is 
incumbent on the analyst to demonstrate that the person occupying 
next turn reveals, through the design of his/her action, an analysis of 
the prior turn which is consistent with that being proposed by the 
analyst.
Wootton, 1989, p. 247.
So, the analyst prioritises members' own orientations. The use of the term 
of evidence, however, does not imply that an analyst can somehow access 
the 'true' meaning of an utterance, but at least they can provide some 
grounding for assertions made which can be discussed and demonstrated 
as oriented-to phenomena. For CA, there are no formalised procedures or 
techniques that can be carried out on data in order to churn out a result or 
findings, but instead the approach to context and evidence provides for a 
particular methodological orientation which can be taken to the data. 
This is not to say that the analyst does not have to interpret what is going 
on to produce a description of some sequence of interaction, but that they 
are sensitive to participants' own understandings and that they have some 
means to reveal them and evidence to support those claims.
This possibility of revealing participants' displayed orientations is 
therefore central to the way in which CA deals with the notion of analytic 
relevance introduced in Chapter 2. In fact, w ith in  the  
ethnomethodological program of work, most researchers maintain what 
has been called 'ethnomethodological indifference'. That is to say, 
ethnomethodological descriptions of everyday activities abstain "...from all 
judgements of their adequacy, value, importance, necessity, practicality, 
success, or consequentiality" (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970, p. 345). This 
position has become a basis for criticisms of ethnomethodology^, yet as 
Lynch notes:
Ethnomethodologists are not oblivious to politics, and like others they 
are capable of discussing and taking strong positions on contentious 
matters of the day. For the most part, however, they do not try to use 
their investigations as instruments for advancing one or another 
popular cause, remedial program, or normative policy. Nor do they 
endeavour to lend "scientific" authority to their own political
^See Lynch (1993) for a lucid account of the main criticisms that tend to be directed at 
ethnomethodology.
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commitments. This has nothing to do with a personal indifference to 
such matters. The desire for an authoritative critique of power can be 
overwhelming and understandable, but all too often it encourages a 
principled (and sometimes unprincipled) effort to pursue the unrealized 
dreams of transcendental analysis.
Lynch, 1993, p. 34.
It is suggested therefore, that research which is occasioned by a concern to 
investigate 'injustice' of whatever form (power, patriarchy, class, etc.) is, 
immediately, pervasively and in potentially unrecognisable ways, affected 
in terms of how the analyst makes sense of the data. Further, if analysts 
assume a priori that a particular injustice exists, what criteria do they  
have to suggest that that one factor, such as gender, race, hair colour or 
whatever is the reason for some observed behaviour? What evidence is 
there that one factor is of paramount relevance to the business at hand, 
when multiple factors could be invoked and used to explain some 
behaviour? Therefore, the analytic framework of CA is designed to 
prioritise members' own orientations toward actions. In such a way, it 
provides some foundation for analytic claims; that whatever else, they are 
of relevance to participants themselves in the production and organisation 
of social actions. Indeed, even when analysts draw on wider notions of 
context, such as setting, it is argued that they should be shown to be 
oriented to by the participants themselves in their talk (Schegloff, 1992a).
3.4 A nalytic P ractice
The foregoing discussion has outlined the methodological orientation  
provided by ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis. Now, the 
chapter will turn to the practicalities of analysing data using this 
approach. In the first instance, recorded activities are transcribed by the 
analyst according to a standard orthography. This orthography was 
primarily developed by Jefferson (1984), and like any transcription system  
it reflects the nature of the concerns and interests of the analyst. So, for 
instance, the transcript is designed so as to map the sequential 
organisation of talk - thus the talk runs down the page and pauses in talk  
are charted to the nearest 0.2 of a second. These pauses are not usually 
timed with a stopwatch, but instead an old photographers’ trick is used: 
saying "one one thousand" is used to measure a whole second; stopping at 
"one" represents around 0.3 of a second; "one one", around 0.5; and "one 
one thou" represents around 0.8. Such a measuring 'device' is accurate to 
around 0.2 of a second, which is sufficient for the needs of the analysis.
45
Indeed, Jefferson (1988) carried out an experiment in which she re­
measured the pauses in some of her transcripts using a stopwatch. 
However, it made virtually no difference to either her transcript or her 
analysis. Similarly, there is no call for the minutiae of speech production 
to be recorded in the way that some linguistic or speech therapy analyses 
would necessitate.
This standardised orthography assists analysts to map out the activities in 
which participants are engaged. It also facilitates the distribution and 
publication of anonymised transcripts (in paper form) to the academic 
community, such that 'findings' may be assessed by others with reference 
to the transcript. They provide a sense of the data, when the distribution 
of the raw tapes is either impractical or prohibited. However, the 
transcript should not be seen as a replacement for the recorded data. A 
real sense of the nature of the interaction can only be gleaned from the 
actual tapes and, furthermore, it is not that this record of events 
represents a single 'reality', but that it does provide one representation of 
what occurred:
The tape-recorded materials constituted a "good enough" record of what
happened. Other things, to be sure, happened, but at least what was on
the tape had happened.
Sacks, 1984, p. 26.
In order to introduce the CA approach to data analysis, it would seem  
appropriate to present some materials and outline ways of analysing the 
talk. The data come from a set of recordings of university geography 
tutorials^. These data will be used to avoid introducing the thesis' main 
research setting at this stage. The setting to be discussed later is 
extremely complex and will require a lengthy introduction, however, the 
tutorial situation will be familiar to many (especially if  considered broadly 
as formal instruction), so little introduction is required. Also, although 
much CA work reveals generic patterns or recurrent sequences of 
interaction across a large number of cases, for these purposes it will be 
sufficient to focus on a single case to demonstrate the richness and detail 
of information available in even a short stretch of talk - this fragment runs
^The data were collected as part of my MSc project in 1992. This particular fragment is 
also discussed in that dissertation (Hindmarsh, 1992).
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for less than a minute in total. See the Appendix for a description of the 
transcription notation used.
During this tutorial the participants have been discussing Japanese social 
geography. Immediately prior to the onset of the fragment, the tutor 
suggested that the problems faced by Tokyo in recent periods of 
substantial economic growth differ notably from, for instance, the 
problems currently facing older industrial cities in Britain and Western 
Europe. Outlined below is the sequence of actions and activities that 
develops when the tutor asks what key problems Tokyo might be facing. 
As we join the action, the tutor starts to repeat her question:
F r a g m e n t  3 . 1 :  T T / A l / 4 5 : 5 0
1 T: what do you thinrk'^ (.) you'd null out, highlight
2 there : as being the main'^ : =
3 S2 : =°unemr)lovment. °
4 (1.8)
5 T: unemployment?
6 (0.4)
7 S2 : hheh heh[hh
8 T: [(hhh) here?
9 (0.2)
10 S2 : oh-he [re?
11 T: [oh no  ^ (.) in toky[o^
12 S2 : [yeah=
13 T: =unemployment ' s [ a problem?
14 S3: [er: : : motivation.=
15 T: =moti- (.) [what about?
16 S3: [not-not a problem but : (.) a good point.
17 (0.8)
18 T: yeah we, those-those are, what are:. I'm
19 thinking about what are the::, th-the classic
20 problems that they have to cope with, >now
21 louise and james< did start talking about this
22 at the end:.
23 (2.0)
24 S3: I think they've goter:: a lack of self-respect.
25 (0.2)
26 T: no : I'm not talking about the:, not not in
27 terms of their soci:ety, and their social sort
28 of thing, but the urban
29 (1.0)
30 S5 : its just [a big spraw:l'^
31 S2: [the si :ze.
32 (0.2)
33 T: yeah, the'' ss : , how you control and regulate
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34 growth and development is basically the issue
35 they're grappling with:.
It should be clear from even a cursory reading of this transcript that there 
is a detail of interaction which would be difficult to imagine or replicate in 
hypothetical examples. Some of the utterances are almost peculiar in 
form and content (especially when we are used to the typified textual 
representations of talk presented in novels, for example) and yet the 
participants themselves would seem quite able over the course of the 
minute or so to make sense of one another's actions. Even though the 
tutor struggles to elicit the sought-for answer, all the participants 
unproblematically make sense of utterances as questions, candidate 
answers and so forth.
Note that it would seem that usually one person talks at a time although 
speakers do change through the course of the sequence. Further the 
pauses between utterances seem short, yet there are few examples of 
extensively overlapping talk; that is to say the co-ordination of turns at 
talk would seem fairly orderly. One concern for conversation analysts 
may then be 'how is it that such order is achieved?' and indeed one of the 
foundational CA publications deals entirely, rigorously and systematically 
with that concern (Sacks et al, 1974). However, it is not just a concern for 
analysts, but also participants them selves as a way of organising  
conversational participation. Avoiding talking over one another facilitates 
the parsimonious accomplishment of the business at hand - exchanging 
information, debating or whatever.
It was claimed earlier that the sequential organisation of talk provides for 
an architecture of inter subjectivity, in that participants in next turn may 
display their orientation to a prior. For example, consider lines 3-14, in 
which a first answer to the tutor's question is being discussed. The 
student (S2) has suggested "unemployment" as a candidate answer. 
Following a pause of 1.8 seconds, the tutor repeats that utterance with a 
questioning intonation ("unemployment?") and then asks if  the student is 
talking about unemployment as a problem in Britain rather than in Tokyo 
("here?"). In expressing surprise at this ("oh here?"), S2 displays that his 
prior answer actually referred to Tokyo. Then the tutor makes explicit 
that Tokyo is indeed the place that she initially asked the question about. 
Once they have established that, the tutor again queries why
48
unemployment is being suggested as a problem for Tokyo. Before S2 can 
respond an alternative candidate answer is provided by S3.
The questions that face the analyst include how this confusion arises (and 
indeed how it is resolved). It would seem that the tutor goes to some 
lengths to make sense of S2's answer, for instance, by asking whether he 
was talking about Britain rather than Japan. Further, it would not seem  
that the tutor is asking for more information as an implicit confirmation of 
"unemployment" as an appropriate answer, but is instead displaying 
certain difficulties with it. Indeed, a fellow student (S3) displays an 
orientation to the tutor's turn as a disconfirmation of S2's candidate 
answer, by providing an alternative before 82 can account for it (line 14). 
That is to say, the offer of an alternative comes in the light of a perceived 
problem with the prior (the prior being "unemployment"). Such a 
sensitivity to turn shape, makes available resources to participants about 
potentially upcoming activities - for instance, what it looks like when 
someone is about to disagree.
Indeed, in this data corpus more generally it is clear that confirmations of 
student candidate answers receive a structurally blunt and quick "yes" 
(although usually receive further elaboration) - see line 33 for instance. 
Disconfirmations, on the other hand, are accomplished quite delicately in 
comparison with the structurally blunt confirmations exhibited both here 
and throughout the larger corpus. Even in line 26, when a "no" prefaces 
the tutor's comment turn, that is not directed at the prior answer but 
characterised in terms of a confusion over what the tutor is asking; i.e. the 
answer is instead framed as inappropriate for this case. Within the space 
of this brief discussion it would be quite premature to develop the kinds of 
issues that may be associated with such features of tutorial talk (or 
instructional sequences more generally). Pomerantz (1984) found similar 
patterns for agreement and disagreement in conversation more generally. 
However, these details of talk may reveal much about the nature of the 
interactional activities at hand - for example, why it is that 'wrong' 
answers are so delicately managed.
So then, even short stretches of talk reveal much that could be discussed 
with regard to the organisation of social interaction and interpersonal 
communication more generally. Furthermore, CA works to reveal an 
analysis which is simultaneously context free and context sensitive. That
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is to say, the analysis explicates both generic patterns or sequences of 
interaction observable in any conversation. Yet, at the same time, CA 
attempts to consider the ways in which such generic properties are used 
with regard to the local relevancies of situated activities (whether those 
activities be instructional sequences, troubles tellings, expressions of pain, 
or whatever). Finally, rather than relying on the analysts' intuition about 
the sense of an utterance, the recognition of the sequential organisation of 
interaction makes available the participants' own treatm ent of the 
utterance in next turn^.
3.5 A nalysin g  Face-to-Face In teraction
It is really intolerable that we can only say one thing at a time; for 
social behavior displays many features at the same time, and so in 
taking them up one by one we necessarily do outrage to its rich, dark, 
organic unity.
Homans, 1961, p. 114.
Much of the seminal work within CA was developed through the analysis 
of tape-recorded telephone conversations^. Thus, although not able to see 
the individual domains in which the distributed participants were based, 
the analyst had access to what was commonly available to both 
participants - the talk on the telephone. However, when co-present 
interaction becomes a focus for study, the communicative resources 
common to the participants are greatly increased. Now the analyst 
concerned with the ways in which intelligible interaction is maintained 
must consider the whole gamut of embodied actions, not just talk, but 
gaze, posture, gesture, movements and so forth, because participants 
themselves can and do. That is not to say that interesting findings are 
unavailable through recourse to talk alone, but that a number of questions 
remain unanswered (and unanswerable) when access to both talk and 
visual conduct is denied.
This study is explicitly concerned with visible phenomena - objects. 
Furthermore, a central question will be to consider how co-participants 
establish mutual orientation towards those objects. Some of the key
'^However, Lynch (1993) has argued that recent analyses have begun to merely impose 
previous CA findings on data, rather than consider from the outset the fundametnally 
local production of action.
^Although Sudnow (1972) and, to a certain extent. Sacks (1992) do discuss the 
interactional organisation of visual conduct.
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resources that they use to co-ordinate their orientations to those objects 
are visible, such as pointing gestures, line of regard and so forth. 
Therefore, this study must be able to deal rigorously with the details of the 
full range of embodied actions. This demands that talk, visual conduct 
and the objects themselves are recorded, which in turn demands the 
collection of audio-visual materials.
As long ago as the turn of the century, anthropologists pioneered the use 
of film cameras to capture native rituals and then used these ethnographic 
films for later, more detailed study®. There is also a tradition of 
'interaction analysis' within social anthropology that draws on naturalistic 
recordings of human conduct:
It emerged in the early 1950s in Palo Alto through the pioneering work
of Bateson and Mead and others including McQuown, Hockett and
Ruesch, and led to extraordinary studies undertaken by Birdwhistell...
Scheflen... and others.
Heath, 1997, p. 183.
Kendon developed this tradition, inspired also by the work of Goffman, by 
adopting the use of video materials to study various topics such as the 
spatial organisation of interaction and the functions of the face in periods 
of kissing (Kendon, 1990). Generally however, sociologists have been 
much slower to recognise the potential use of video recordings, which 
capture (versions of) the organisation of the social world as it happens. 
Indeed, film and video are marginal forms of data or description within  
sociology.
Nevertheless, video has a series of benefits over standard observational 
data. For example, video accesses details of interaction that would be 
unattainable through ethnography. To hear and see participants to the 
degree captured on film, they would have to stand so close as to become 
part of the activity itself. Moreover, they could not possibly record the 
details of those activities in anything like as much detail as the camera. 
While noting down one utterance or gesture, for example, the next would 
come and go. In such a way, video records in detail a version of an activity 
that is then available to the analyst for repeated scrutiny. It provides a
®In fact, the HADDON project, based at the University of Oxford, is currently engaged in 
cataloguing and making available such early archival ethnographic film footage: 
<http://www.rsl.ox.ac.uk/isca/haddon/HADDhome.html>
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stable data source that can be analysed and re-analysed in more and more 
detail or even with different concerns at hand. As such it acts as an 
extrasomatic memory to maintain some sense of a domain and the 
activities therein.
One potential reason why sociology has generally failed to exploit the use 
of video in research is because the epistemology associated w ith the 
majority of mainstream sociology was developed in an environment 
without access to contemporary recording technologies. Thus, the level of 
detail that is made available by video technology is not a level of detail 
that many perspectives are interested in or know how to deal with. 
However, developments within ethnomethodology and Conversation 
Analysis over the last 40 years or so has made possible the rigorous, 
systematic and close analysis of the details of interaction captured on 
video.
However, the consideration of both talk and body movement adds 
numerous layers of complexity and, therefore, calls for a development of 
the CA approach. For instance, whereas turns at talk in telephone 
conversations are relatively discrete, research within co-present settings 
reveals that many 'layers' of action constitute a turn at interaction. To 
illustrate this, consider again one small part of the previously discussed 
transcript. The university tutorial is an example of co-present interaction 
between a numbers of persons. It was videoed and thus facilitates a more 
elaborate consideration of the activities at hand and the ways in which 
participants make sense of each other's actions. This example will focus 
on the activities of the tutor in lines 28 and 29:
F r a g m e n t  3 . 1 . 1
26 T: no: I'm not talking about the:, not not in
27 terms of their soci:ety, and their social sort
■ > 2 8  of thing, but the urban
-> 29 (1.0)
30 S5: its just [a big soraw:1^
31 S2: [the si :ze.
From this initial transcript of the talk, the reader has no access to the 
non-verbal actions in which the participants are simultaneously engaged. 
Therefore, a key issue regards the ways in which features of individuals' 
bodily actions visible to their co-participants are transcribed for both
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analysis and presentation. For telephone talk, a standard CA transcript 
gives fellow researchers a relevant version of the participants actions - 
certainly enough to begin an assessment of the analysis based solely on 
the transcript. Unfortunately the same is not true for analyses that are 
based on both the visual and vocal conduct of participants. Accordingly, 
the text-based orthography has been extended to include gaze and other 
body movements (Goodwin, 1981a; Heath, 1986). Aversion of this may be 
seen below for the activities of the tutor as she reformulates her question 
following the disconfirmation of three candidate answers. The transcript 
charts her gaze (g) and the movements of her left hand (Ih) and her right 
hand (rh). They are laid out immediately above, and in relation to, her 
talk and the subsequent talk of her co-participants (see the Appendix for 
further details of the transcription conventions).
F r a g m e n t  3 . 1 . 2
g S3_________________________ ,S5______ ,S2____ ,S5___ ,
Ih [sweeps 1][r][ 1 ]
rh [down] [sweeps r][1][ r ]
T: but the urban ----------
S5: its just [a big sprawjJjl
S2: [the si :ze.
During this few seconds, the tutor sweeps her hands as if  doing the breast 
stroke for two strokes and then desists. At the same time she looks at a 
number of her co-participants. The transcript relates each juncture in 
these actions to the ongoing talk. It would seem that a number of points 
may be remarked upon. Firstly, the gaze of the tutor seems tightly co­
ordinated with the participants who contribute turns at talk. Her gaze 
moves away from S3 only when a contribution or candidate answer begins 
to be provided by 85 and then only momentarily shifts to (the louder) 82 
before returning to 85. Secondly, following the tutor's shift of gaze to 82, 
85 makes his utterance louder and longer and the tutor's gaze returns. 
Thirdly, her gesture desists upon the production of the appropriate 
answer; in fact, even the second 'sweep' of the gesture starts to relax or 
'fade out' as soon as the suggestions are forthcoming. Fourthly, the 
gesture would almost seem to embody the very words or concepts that she 
is attempting to elicit - the vastness of the gesture almost symbolises the 
urban growth of Tokyo.
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It would seem then that our bodily activities are co-ordinated with regard 
to the activities of others and that similarly our talk can be organised with 
regard to the bodily activities of others. Indeed, many scholars have 
charted this intimate interdependency of talk and body movement within 
the course of interaction (e.g. Goodwin, 1981a; Heath, 1986; Streeck, 
1993a).
So, there are various ways in which certain aspects of the CA approach is 
brought to the study of face-to-face interaction. Firstly, rather than purely 
considering turns at talk as action or trying to separate analyses of 'talk' 
and 'body movement', analysts examine sequences of 'embodied actions', 
which include both talk and visual conduct simultaneously. Analysts 
consider how they work together and mutually elaborate one another to 
produce intelligible action. This is because participants them selves 
experience the actions of other's as an 'organic unity', rather than  
separately. On occasion certain actions may be rendered explicitly  
relevant (such as the arm movements of the tutor in Fragment 3.1.2), but 
this is not assumed a priori.
Secondly, the importance of sequence is retained within studies of co­
present interaction. The analyst continues to focus upon the ways in  
which participants display their orientation toward prior actions, but 
those displays and so forth are not simply expressed verbally. It should be 
noted however, that it is often far more problematic for an analyst to 
establish the orientation of a participant through their visual conduct 
alone. Turns at talk would seem to more straight forwardly reveal to the 
analyst how an individual has treated a prior turn. Body movements and 
the like are often far more difficult to characterise. For example, it is 
particularly hard to establish how one body movement is (if at all) 
'responsive' to some prior movement or gesture by another. The analyst 
must attempt to convince the reader through text, transcripts and images, 
yet the inability to present the actual video fragments makes it more 
difficult to clarify the warrant for particular characterisations.
Thirdly, the notion of indexicality is retained within studies of embodied 
interaction. For example, the tutor's gesture is made sense of in and with  
regard to the activity in which it is produced. It is seen in terms of the 
question asked and the answers it helps engender.
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Although in the example the participants do not reference or manipulate 
any objects, the example does begin to reveal the methodological resources 
that will be critical to the thesis. In particular, the sequential 
organisation of interaction provides a way of revealing participants' own 
understandings of objects. In the course of the emergent interaction, 
participants display to one another their treatment of objects that are 
rendered visible. At the same time, this makes available their treatment 
of the object to the 'overhearing' analyst. Moreover, over a sequence of 
turns the emerging and developing orientations of co-participants to an 
object will be revealed.
The level of complexity involved in interactional studies is greatly  
increased for face-to-face interaction as opposed to purely telephone talk. 
This particular study is further complicated as it primarily focuses upon 
activities within a complex technological and organisational environment 
(to be discussed at length in Chapters 4 to 8). Within studies of ordinary 
conversation, the analyst is a competent member in understanding the 
kinds of activities in which the participants are engaging. However, 
within complex organisational settings, the participants have a range of 
expertise which may be unavailable to the analyst from the video 
materials alone. In particular, the participants are engaged in a variety of 
expert tasks and are co-ordinating these tasks with regard to specialist 
information sources and technologies. The analyst cannot make sense of 
the activities on the video without having some sense of this expertise. 
Therefore, ethnographic field work is necessary to augment the recorded 
data. Indeed, even within studies of institutional talk (e.g. Drew & 
Heritage, 1992), analysts tend to draw on ethnographic m aterials to 
support their analyses.
In this study, the field work involved general observation within the 
research setting and the collection of relevant documents, but more 
importantly, informal interviews with personnel. This allowed the 
researcher/analyst to collect a variety of information regarding the nature 
of the work tasks being engaged in, the kinds of jargon that feature within 
the organisational setting and the various technologies at hand. As this 
study is particularly concerned with the ways in which participants use, 
discuss and invoke artefacts in the workplace, the analyst requires some 
sense of what those artefacts are and how they may contribute to the 
ongoing work. Therefore, many of the questions asked related to these
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artefacts. For example, the researcher sought to discover how information 
is organised on computer screens and how it may be interpreted; what 
workplace tasks involve the use of which artefacts; and the ways in which 
certain artefacts feature in those activities.
There is, however, some debate about the extent to which ethnographic 
materials may be invoked in Conversation Analysis (see, for example, the 
contrasting articles by Schegloff, 1992a and Cicourel, 1992). In some ways 
a pragmatic solution is necessary. If the talk cannot be understood (either 
by analyst or reader) without drawing on discussions with participants 
about the jargon they employ, then that data source must be invoked. 
However, a line always has to be drawn with regard to the amount, and 
kinds, of ethnographic material invoked in the course of an analysis. 
There could be an infinite amount of such information brought in to the 
analysis and, yet, the analyst is concerned to maintain some warrant for 
the (relevance of) assertions made. In this case, the analysis is concerned 
primarily with 'practices' rather than 'perspectives' and thus the feelings 
of participants about their jobs or about their colleagues often does not 
contribute to our understanding of how they establish some shared sense 
of an object. Rather, the analyst seeks to identify what is made relevant 
by the participants themselves in the course of their conduct. Often that 
will require the analyst to draw on ethnographic information, but, 
following Schegloff, only where the participants themselves can be seen to 
orient towards that information.
3.6 D iscu ssion
This chapter has revealed how the thesis w ill attend to particular 
ethnomethodological concerns. It has discussed how Garfinkel founded a 
program of work which respecifies the central concern of sociology - the 
nature of social order - to examine how participants themselves produce 
and recognise actions and activities in their everyday affairs. This 
provides a framework within which to view this study of the object. It is 
concerned with participants' own orientations to objects in the course of 
their everyday interactions. Therefore, it will not assume a priori that 
particular objects exist and have certain existential qualities. Rather, it 
will consider how participants themselves display their understandings of 
objects with, and to, their co-participants. More specifically, it  w ill
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consider the interactional practices in and through which the constitution 
of the occasioned sense of an object is routinely accomplished.
To address this concern, the thesis w ill draw upon certain key  
methodological resources from Conversation Analysis. In particular, it 
has highlighted the critical importance of recordings of naturally-occurring 
interaction. In this case, video (rather than merely audio) is essential to 
the study as objects are visible phenomena and to co-ordinate co­
orientation participants rely on visible features of the other's conduct 
(gesture, gaze, etc.). To make sense of the local constitution of objects, 
then, the analyst must also have access to these resources.
Following CA, the talk and body movement will be seen together as 
accomplishing social action. They will be made sense of in concert, 
because that is the way participants themselves experience them. They do 
not simply hear an utterance and see a gesture, but rather they orient to 
some action as a "rich, dark organic unity".
Moreover, the sense of these embodied actions will be treated as indexical. 
That is to say, they achieve their sense in the context of their production. 
By removing them from their local context, their sense is transformed. So, 
each action will be analysed in, and in reation to, the surrounding context 
of actions.
It was also shown how the participants' own orientations will be attended 
to by the analyst. Each action can be seen to be both intimately attending 
to the prior and as intimately attended to in the next. Therefore, 
participants 'ongoingly' display their orientations and understandings to 
one another. The recognition of this sequential organisation of action 
m eans that recorded m aterials also make these orientations and 
understandings available to the analyst. These 'displays' of 
understandings (of objects) in 'next position' form the evidence for claims 
made within the study.
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C hapter 4
The R esearch Setting: Introduction, Data 
Collection and Data H andling
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4.1 In troduction
Chapter 3 provided the methodological framework within which this study 
may be positioned. It revealed how video data will be used to examine the 
ways in which objects feature within sequences of action and interaction 
and how its analysis will be informed by methodological resources 
principally drawn from Conversation Analysis. The data primarily used to 
carry out this study was collected within a complex technological and 
organisational environment. Specifically, the thesis focuses upon a range 
of activities conducted within BT's Restoration Control Office (RCO). This 
chapter will, in the first instance, introduce the nature of, and activities 
that take place within, the RCO. It will then discuss the particular 
problems and issues associated w ith the collection, analysis and 
presentation of video materials drawn from this kind of workplace.
4.2 The R estoration  C ontrol O ffice (RCO)
The Restoration Control Office (RCO) is situated within BT's Worldwide 
Network Management Centre (WNMC), which is a multi-functional 
organisational centre reminiscent of the stereotypical image of a NASA 
control room. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, it consists of numerous hi-tech 
consoles facing a huge media screen that stretches along one wall.
Figure 4.1: Worldwide Network Management Centre
r.T stiA -'t ,
Most of the media wall displays maps of the British Isles and other parts 
of Europe with superimposed coloured lines to indicate problems on the
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telecommunications network relevant to BT. There are also a number of 
digital clocks and several television images displayed.
There are twelve desks or consoles facing the media wall and the RCO has 
two desks to the front and right of the WNMC, as shown in Figure 4.2. 
The two desks essentially demarcate technologies which refer to the 
digital telecommunications network and the analogue telecommunications 
network. Personnel are not designated to a particular desk, but move 
between them. However they spend most of their time working on the 
'digital desk', because, as one member of staff explained: "the digital 
network is always breaking down". Therefore, this study focuses upon the 
activities surrounding the digital desk and, thus, primarily work 
associated with the digital network.
Figure 4.2: Location of the RCO
Media Wall
1 Diqital I
RCO
1 Analogue 1
ROO
Bookcase
RCO Wallboards
The main function of the RCO is to co-ordinate and monitor the restoration 
of failed circuits on the international telecommunications transmission  
network. In practice, restoration involves the organisation of alternative 
dedicated transmission lines when the normal transmission routes are, for 
whatever reason, out of service. As these alternative routes are only 
temporary measures - while the normative circuits are under repair or 
undergoing planned works - personnel routinely refer to them as m ake­
goods. In order to illustrate the kind of work that they do, consider the 
following hypothetical example. Imagine that a trawler were to 
accidentally pull up a telecommunications cable in the English Channel.
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The RCO would have to organise for the restoration of a number of circuits 
that run along that cable. Take, for instance, one of the transmission  
routes that runs between London and Paris, via 'coast stations' on either 
side of the Channel. If the circuit was broken between the two coast 
stations (i.e. under the channel), then the RCO could organise a make­
good via Brussels:
Figure 4.3: Example Route Diagram
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As the digital transmission network has no system to initialise such re- 
routings automatically, the RCO must contact the relevant switching  
points and control centres to arrange for the appropriate switchings to 
take place along the new route. In practice, personnel at each switching 
point are instructed to physically pull out a cable from one socket and 
insert it into another. As soon as all the links in the new route are 
connected, telecommunications traffic (phone calls, electronic transfer, 
etc.) can begin to be routed straight through. The make-goods are used 
until the normative circuits are repaired, at which point the make-good is 
dismantled.
For planned works, the RCO are informed in advance that a make-good 
will be required for a certain duration, so the personnel can organise the 
appropriate alternative in good time. However, they also have a number 
of technologies and lines of communication to inform them when an 
unexpected failure occurs. The technologies based on the 'digital desk' are 
presented in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4; Technologies on the ’Digital Desk'
\  /  
A l a r m  S y s t e m s I C A R U S
The two alarm systems on the 'digital desk' display real time indications 
of transmission failures at four of the five International Repeater Stations 
(1RS). Any faults on cables would first be indicated by a loss of 
transmission into one of the 1RS, so these alarm systems act as a valuable 
initial warning signal for the RCO. The information is colour coded so 
that, for instance, new failures are indicated by red text.
Figure 4.5: An Alarm Screen
i ;
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However, the information presented on these screens is sometimes an 
artefact of some other activity, so they do not always present accurate 
data. This can only be assessed within the relevant 1RS. Therefore, RCO 
personnel primarily rely upon verbal confirmation of failures from staff in 
that 1RS.
They communicate with them using their touch screen telephone systems, 
into which staff can plug either a telephone headset or a standard  
handset. Although they can use the system to dial out in the normal 
fashion, they also display pre-coded icons. By pressing the appropriate 
icon, they can ring directly through to the relevant station. When that 
same icon flashes, it indicates an incoming call from that station. Thus,
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staff can often see at a glance who is ringing them. However, they also 
have more general icons which do not reveal who is phoning in. 
Furthermore, there are only a small number of specific relevance for them, 
as there are a range of other icons displayed on their screens designated to 
other parts of the WNMC.
In the case of any identified failure, RCO personnel can consult plans 
detailing the steps required to organise the appropriate make-good. All 
the relevant European administrations negotiate and formulate plans for 
restoration routes in the event of any failure or planned works. The 
numerous paper files that constitute this Universal Restoration Manual 
(URM) are contained in the RCO bookcase (see Figure 4.2) and each co­
ordination centre and switching point that they contact will have access to 
similar plans. They include information about which 'spare' cables (those 
cables that are kept aside for the event of failures) should be used to carry 
the traffic from each failed circuit, the order in which the different stages 
of a restoration should be carried out and so forth. This information is 
presented in dense textual form, however, the plans have been annotated 
by members of staff to include simple graphical representations (very 
similar to Figure 4.3) of the relevant restorations.
If an agreed plan includes the use of a 'spare' which is actually being used 
for some other purpose, the RCO has to organise an ad hoc restoration 
path. In other words they have to negotiate on the spot with the relevant 
international administrations (in effect their counterparts in other 
countries) to be allowed to use other spare transm ission capacity. 
Although in theory international restoration takes precedence over any 
domestic use of a designated 'spare', in practice administrations may be 
very reluctant to re-route their own traffic to make way for 'foreign' traffic.
The RCO has a number of other information resources, which can aid the 
planning of such ad hoc make-goods. For instance, ICARUS (see Figure 
4.4) provides a database of the 'static' or normative telecommunications 
network, so that personnel can search to find circuits which might have 
some spare capacity for use in a make-good. The RCO did not have any 
computer support that presents 'dynamic' systems information when the
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data collection occurred 1 (i.e. which cables are currently under repair and 
which designated 'spares' are in use). So, in order to record this data they 
use several 'wallboards'. These wallboards are covered in little paper 
tickets which each represent a different circuit.
Each of the wallboards is associated with a different part of the network 
and tickets symbolising spare cables are always coloured orange. 
Whenever a circuit is identified as faulty the corresponding ticket is 
moved out of its normative position and it is replaced by the appropriate 
ticket representing the 'spare' cable used to make it good. So, at a glance, 
personnel can assess which cables have failed, which 'spares' are in their 
place and, therefore, what is available for current (and future) restoration 
work. As the control room is also used for public relations work, these 
paper ticket boards are placed to the rear of this hi-tech environment (see 
Figure 4.2). However, this means that staff needing to consult a wallboard 
must walk to the back of the room. Often this demands that they put a 
caller on hold several times to consult the board, before they can deal 
adequately with their query.
Personnel also use a series of paper log books in which they record the 
ongoing course of any particular fault and the phone calls that are 
received during its restoration. In this way they create a local history of 
any fault dealt with. They can then use this information to produce 
required evaluation reports, fault statistics and so forth. The production 
of such reports tends to occur in those periods when staff are not directly 
engaged in the organisation of a make-good. A circuit failure could occur 
at any time of any day (24 hours a day, 365 days of the year) w ith a 
potentially enormous cost to BT, so the RCO is continually staffed with  
between one and four people on duty. However, in practice, as major 
circuit failures do not occur at every moment of the day, time is available 
for the production of these reports.
When a circuit does fail RCO personnel face real time constraints. 
Following a circuit failure, they have a target time of sixty m inutes to 
organise an appropriate make-good. This includes time to identify that a
^Following the original data collection in 1993, various changes occurred within the RCO. 
One such change was the introduction of a system to provide this dynamic network 
information. Also, the physical layout was re-arranged such that the RCO's two desks 
were alongside one another rather than one behind the other.
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fault exists and where it has happened, as well as contacting and co­
ordinating the actions of numerous co-stations. Given that sometimes this 
involves calling out an engineer to an unoccupied coast station (at any  
time of day or night), it is quite impressive that they recurrently meet 
such a target^.
There is no strict division of labour at any particular moment in the RCO, 
so any query concerning a restoration could be dealt with by any of the 
officers on duty, although formally one will have overall responsibility for 
the shift. They are also required to engage in activities that take them  
away from their desks in the control room. This means that they  
continually update one another and discuss possible actions in the light of 
incoming information, in order to plan a make-good, negotiate ad hoc 
divisions of labour and so forth. Given the vast array of technological and 
documentary information sources relevant to the work of restoration, such 
discussions are routinely 'object-focused'. Therefore, the setting afforded 
the collection of a rich source of data, which include numerous instances in 
which personnel worked to sustain a mutual frame of reference w ith  
regard to some feature of the local artefactual terrain. For example, later 
chapters will discuss many instances in which personnel discuss the 
status of a restoration depicted on an alarm screen, the possibilities for re­
routing traffic with reference to ICARUS and so forth. Indeed, achieving 
inter subjective understandings of texts, tools and technologies within this 
workplace can be seen as not only of interest to sociologists, but, more 
crucially, a practical and ongoing concern for the participants themselves.
4.3 D ata  C ollection
The collection of video materials within these kinds of organisational 
settings can be a highly sensitive activity. Indeed, it can prove extremely 
problematic to collect recordings in certain environments; for instance, the 
English legal system does not (at present) allow video cameras into court 
rooms. However, researchers have managed to video in a number of 
extremely sensitive settings, such as City Dealing Rooms (Heath et al, 
1995), medical consultations (Heath, 1986), hospital anaesthetic rooms 
(Hindmarsh et al, 1997), telephone rooms for the emergency services
^However, to put this in context, the U.S. telecommunications network have a centralized 
automatic switching system, so they can routinely make a target time of only a few 
minutes.
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(Whalen, 1995) and nuclear power plant control centres (Conein, 1995). In 
all of these settings, the participants' activities can have enormous 
implications for making money or saving lives, and in their everyday work 
they can be held accountable for mistakes they have made. As these 
recordings could (in theory) be used in evidence against them if  things go 
wrong, it can be difficult to gain full access.
The RCO is no exception. It is BT's central operations unit for organising 
and co-ordinating telecommunications links across the country and 
internationally. Therefore, it is a high security complex. Also, the 
expedient production of working tasks is critical to the ability of BT to 
provide a good service and, ultimately, to generate profits. However, the 
data collection was instigated by BT, so access was initially negotiated 
internally by staff in their research labs. This overcame many of the 
problems associated with gaining access to such a sensitive setting.
The data was collected as part of a study carried out prior to the onset of 
my Ph.D. I was working at Oxford University, within the Centre for 
Requirements and Foundations, on a project funded by BT. BT were 
interested in the development of new methodologies for requirements 
elicitation®. My colleagues at Oxford (Marina Jirotka, Matthew Bickerton 
and Joseph Goguen) were examining the potential use of video analysis for 
this purpose. In order to examine the practicalities of such a methodology, 
I was given access to this key site within BT^. Although, the initial 
analysis focused upon demonstrating the potential of 'video-based 
requirements elicitation' (Jirotka & Hindmarsh, 1993), I was subsequently 
allowed to use the data for my Ph.D. and re-examine it with regard to 
these different concerns.
Although general access to the RCO was negotiated within BT, there is a 
second stage of access, in which the researcher must gain the trust and 
agreement of the participants to be filmed. When researchers enter
^Requirements elicitation or capture or analysis or engineering, as it is variously known, 
is the activity in which developers are attempting to discern what a system will need to 
be able to do in order to be successful (Goguen, 1992): what its functionality should be, 
what specific features it should have and so forth.
^Radmila Mihajlovic of BT Research Labs, Martlesham Heath, pulled off somewhat of a 
coup when she managed to negotiate access into the WNMC, as it proved to be the first 
time filming was allowed there for research purposes. I am very grateful for her efforts to 
secure access to the site.
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workplaces to video activities, the usual response from participants is to 
wonder if  they are carrying out a time and motion study, which could in 
effect threaten their jobs. This concern is exacerbated when access has 
been negotiated at a higher organisational level, such that the researcher 
is often categorised as working on behalf of management. So, prior to the 
beginning of any filming, a period of field work is extremely useful; firstly 
to put the participants' suspicions at rest and secondly, to get an initial 
sense of the work activities in order to decide where to place the camera 
and microphone. These placement decisions are not unmotivated. There 
is no possibility of establishing a single view which captures every feature 
of the work involved, or a clear view of every participant at all times, or 
perfect sound to capture every conversation, or indeed the details of all the 
information sources available to the participants. In fact, although much 
of the work of the RCO is located on two desks in one corner of a large co­
ordination centre, like many other workplaces a significant amount is 
distributed over a larger area. Therefore, an initial consideration of the 
work at hand informs the placement of the camera(s).
For the most part, only one camera was used for this study, although for a 
short period one of the alarm screens was also filmed. There are certain 
problems with using multiple cameras however. Firstly, it becomes more 
and more intrusive as more and more cameras surround a central area. 
Secondly, as more cameras are introduced, they are more likely to prevent 
or inhibit certain aspects of the work of the participants, as they may 
block cupboards, lines of access and so forth. Thirdly, the analysis and co­
ordination of multiple images becomes extremely difficult, so extra 
cameras must be vital to warrant their use.
At the time, I was interested in the organisation of collaborative work 
generally, so the camera was directed toward the 'digital desk' where the 
bulk of the work (and the bulk of the collaborative work) was situated. An 
illustration of the typical recorded view is presented below:
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Figure 4.6
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The materials were recorded using a Sony Hi8 camcorder on a tripod. An 
external, directional microphone was placed in the middle of the desk to 
capture a level of access to the talk of the participants, which use of the in­
built camera microphone would prohibit. The use of Hi8 tapes provides 
excellent (almost broadcast) quality data and each tape lasted 4 hours, 
minimising the extent to which the researchers had to attend to the 
camera.
Standing behind a camera, moving it as the participants move is a 
noticeable activity and does tend to become obtrusive. As a result the 
camera was left to the side and behind the desk. Also, it was not moved, 
but left pointing in the same direction. That is certainly less obtrusive 
than a field researcher would be if  they tried to listen  in on the  
conversations captured by a microphone on the desk and write down the 
activities of the participants. As Goodwin notes with regard to his study of 
the relations between gaze and talk:
The tool that a participant-observer would use to observe the gaze of 
others - his own gaze - is itself a relevant event in the interaction in 
which he is participating ... The camera, though intrusive and perhaps 
disruptive in other ways, does not focus attention on the gaze of either 
party ... and is not itself an oriented-to feature of the process under 
observation.
Goodwin, 1981a, p. 45.
The participants did know the camera and microphone were recording and 
to a certain extent knew what they were recording, as they sometimes 
took a look in the eyepiece. Also, 'visitors' to the RCO would come over
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and, frequently, they would refer to the camera (usually by making a joke 
of some sort). However, because of the demands of their work and the fact 
that the camera was constantly sitting in the corner of the room, the 
participants would, for long periods, go about their business without 
reference to it. Indeed, the camera was left running and untouched 
(except to change tapes) for days at a time. So, in many ways, it became 
part of everyday working life in the RCO and its novelty soon wore off. 
Indeed, one participant was taped while discussing his personal finances 
with his bank and he did not realise.
The filming was completed in two key phases when the researchers^ were 
on site for a week at a time and around sixty hours of video materials were 
collected, depicting the everyday activities in the RCO. These were 
augmented by a number of sweeping 'scene setting' shots of the general 
domain and close-ups of the variety of technologies at hand.
As the tapes lasted up to four hours, the camera required little  
maintenance, leaving ample time for the researchers to collect extensive 
field notes. These notes consisted of general observations and specific 
time recordings of remarkable events which could then be analysed more 
closely on the video at a later stage. However, they primarily consisted of 
detailed descriptions of the nature of the work of the RCO. Extensive 
discussions with the participants allowed some notion of the complexity of 
the work at hand to be formulated. Some of these discussions took place 
within the WNMC, but many took place during coffee and lunch breaks. 
At opportune moments, the staff also took time to explain how particular 
problems were developing and why they were approaching those problems 
in particular ways. They would even tell me when I should have been 
there - "if only you'd stayed a couple of hours longer, then you'd have seen 
some action". Of course, the most infuriating instances occur when the 
workplace seems to be quiet, so the researcher decides to pack up and just 
as they are about to walk out of the door, all kinds of interesting things 
happen.
^Throughout each of the data collection periods, I worked with Dr. Martin Aylett of BT 
Research Labs, Martlesham Heath.
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4.4 D ata H andling
Unlike data collected from periodic encounters (e.g. telephone calls, 
medical consultations, interviews), these data continue for hours and 
hours. Therefore, it would be both impractical and probably relatively 
unhelpful to transcribe all of the talk heard on the tapes, let alone 
information about visual conduct. Thus, when I started work on this 
material, I began to focus on particular sequences of interest; primarily 
object-focused interactional encounters. As I studied the tapes, I picked 
out numerous instances of collaborative activities that involved visual 
reference to artefacts, such as the alarm screens or paper documents. 
These were collated onto a VHS tape, which was then used for more 
detailed analysis. These instances were all initially transcribed for talk 
and then as the analysis progressed more detailed transcripts including 
visual conduct were produced. These more detailed transcripts were used 
to generate a body of observations and issues with regard to individual 
fragments. However, these issues were then refined and developed by 
comparing and contrasting different fragments. In certain cases, 
identifying patterns of action provoked re-examinations of the main corpus 
to search for similar (or deviant) sequences.
It should be noted that the recordings do not pick up the details of all 
conversations that occur on screen, as the microphone often could not 
capture the voices of those facing away firom it or those too far away. Also, 
the referred-to objects were not always visible. However, extensive  
fieldwork and experience of the setting furnished me with the resources to 
establish the nature of the objects under scrutiny and their place within  
the relevant activity.
Furthermore, using one camera angle only allows access to the face of 
those oriented (at least partially) towards the camera. Therefore, the gaze 
of participants could not always be discerned directly, but instead head 
movements were often used as a proxy for gaze shifts. As noted within  
film theory literature, the moving image often allows an audience to 'read 
in' that which is not explicitly available on screen (Jayussi, 1988). 
Therefore, it has been necessary to maintain a pragmatic balance between 
reading too much into the participants' activities and excluding what 
would seem (for a competent member) ludicrous alternatives. With regard
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to the use of head movements to identify gaze shifts, Heath notes during 
his study of medical consultations:
It was repeatedly found that eye movement and changes in the direction 
of a person's looking were accompanied by shifts, however slight, in 
head orientation. As a way of checking this observation, a number of 
consultations were recorded in which we shot closeups, focusing on a 
particular participant to evaluate the correspondence between his or 
her eye behaviour. The correspondence again turned out to be 
extremely high ... As the research developed it became increasingly 
apparent that the interactants themselves relied upon shifts in head 
and eye orientation to infer gaze direction, and over and over again we 
find persons co-ordinating a range of actions, both visual and vocal, 
with these packages of eye and head shifts...
Heath, 1986, p. 177 (n.21).
While conducting the analysis, the raw video data are always available, 
however it is not always possible to use this for presentation purposes, for 
instance when publishing in conventional books and journals. Although 
during analysis the production of the transcript is of great use to delineate 
the concurrent activities produced within the duration of a fragment of the 
video, to a reader it provides very little sense of what could be seen, 
indeed, of what was going on. Therefore, one often has to resort to 
metaphor in order to give sense to the actions being described (e.g. the 
'breast-stroke' gesture referred to in Chapter 3). Furthermore, no 
information is provided about how the participants' bodies are positioned 
in relation to one another and in relation to the room more generally. 
Moreover, the transcript is extremely selective, as information is often 
given about the bodily activities of only certain participants and, further, 
only particular movements. However, to present the transcription of all 
the movements of each of the participants, even for a short stretch of 
interaction, would cover a huge amount of space and would be almost 
unreadable. To even begin to make sense of such a mass of information, 
the reader would have to be extremely patient. Indeed, some of the most 
comprehensive transcripts, such as those developed by Birdwhistell (1970) 
or Kendon (1990), are immensely difficult to make sense of without access 
to the original data. So, it would seem inevitable that, for presentation 
purposes at least, transcripts are very selective and focus upon the actions 
and movements most relevant to the analysis. N evertheless, the 
challenges faced by an analyst wishing to give even a flavour of what 
happened in their data are enormous.
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As a result, analyses of face-to-face interaction require a great deal of 
textual description to give the reader even a sense of the activities under 
investigation. Just as with an object, any fragment can be described in 
numerous ways. There are various characterisations that can be used and 
all sorts of features of the fragment can be discussed. Indeed, there are 
many aspects of each fragment in the corpus that may be of interest to the 
reader. This issue is compounded when one notes the problems of 
adequately describing visual conduct. Therefore, in the interests of 
presenting a parsimonious and coherent analysis, the description of each 
fragment will focus on the critical features of the organisation of the 
discussion, and constitution, of objects. Often this will lead to interesting 
features of the interaction seemingly being 'ignored' and yet this is 
essential to maintain a focused discussion and analysis.
Also, most CA papers that focus exclusively on talk can support findings 
with numerous examples which display an emerging pattern and require 
scant description for the reader to make sense of them. For analyses of 
face-to-face interaction, however, this is more problematic. Therefore, the 
presentation of an analysis often relies upon illustrative examples of only 
one or two instances, even though the corpus may contain many. As such 
the research can be seen as corpus-based research. The analyses reveal 
how generic interactional resources are used within specific courses of 
action. The generic resources to be described can be seen as available in 
all interactional situations and settings. However, the specific instances 
discussed embody the unique features of 'setting'; for instance, how a 
particular object can be seen as uniquely relevant to the ongoing activities 
in the control room. To illustrate the interactional resources available to 
participants in the course of discussing objects, the fragments could almost 
be used interchangeably. However, to consider the practices that 
participants use to accomplish 'showing an object' or 'encouraging another 
to look at an object', they reveal quite different and unique features in 
each case.
To address the problems of represntation, analysts using video have 
recently begun to make use of a variety of new technologies to present 
their findings. For example, Jarmon produced her Ph.D. thesis on CD- 
ROM, so that the actual analysed video clips could be seen alongside both 
the analysis and basic transcripts (Jarmon, 1996). However, in order to 
accomplish this ground-breaking development, she was required to become
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somewhat of an expert in computer programming. Furthermore there are 
relatively few outlets for electronic publications®.
More conservative attempts to work with paper documents have seen  
scholars use single images to 'set the scene' (e.g. Goodwin & Goodwin, 
1997). Also, Heath & Luff have begun to incorporate series of frame- 
grabbed images alongside one another and the transcript in an attempt to 
reflect 'key' junctures in particular sequences of interaction (e.g. Heath & 
Luff, 1997). This study will follow the Heath & Luff model of textual 
presentation. This still does not give unproblematic access to the 
activities in the scene - for that there is no substitute for the video - but at 
least it enriches and enlivens the information in a transcript in ways that 
numerous lines of text could not. One proviso, however, is that often the 
degree of movement that the analyst is concerned with is so small, that 
two still images reveal virtually no change.
Such developments in the presentation of data raise a number of practical 
and ethical concerns. Whereas purely textual transcriptions of talk and 
visual conduct can be made anonymous relatively easily, the use of 
photographs or video clips potentially makes the participants identifiable. 
For Jarmon this was not a problem as she mainly videoed family and 
friends, who gave her permission to publish and distribute as she wished. 
However, in organisational settings this can become a more delicate issue, 
as the data can be extremely sensitive. In medical settings, for example, 
patient anonymity must be maintained. Also, some companies do not 
want rivals to see how they work. Therefore, the broadcast of video clips 
in electronic journals on the World Wide Web is rendered problematic. 
Apart from revealing participants and organisational identities, there is 
no longer control over the ways in which the clips will be used by others. 
Within any corpus of such data there are many fragments in which  
participants are engaged in a potentially sensitive activities. These may 
be fascinating analytically, and if  made anonymous could be a valuable 
contribution to a study, but to present images of the participants could be 
hugely insensitive.
®Although Sociological Research Online <http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline> 
and the Electronic Journal of Sociology <http://olympus.lang.arts.ualberta.ca:8010/> now 
make possible the insertion of video clips in refereed sociological journals.
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Heath faced such an issue during his study of medical consultations 
(Heath, 1986), where maintaining the anonymity of doctor and patient 
was a paramount concern. In order to combat the problem he had an 
artist reproduce the video images as line drawings, thereby hiding the 
identities of individual patients and their bodies. However good the line 
drawing though, this is not as satisfactory as the original clips or images. 
It is, of course, possible to mask or blur parts of the faces on video images, 
but often the gaze of participants is key to this kind of analysis. 
Therefore, this study ensured that participants were happy with small 
images being inserted into the body of the text.
Presentation of the actual videos is an even more sensitive issue. Film  
and video im ages have become extrem ely powerful forms of 
communication and dominate much of contemporary life and social 
documentation, primarily through the medium of television. However, 
unlike television screenings, video data that are collected in the field are 
not scripted or edited prior to being put to analytic use. Thus, workplace 
activities depicted on the video may often be seen by the lay viewer as 
haphazard or unprofessional, even when those on screen are actually 
extremely professionally and expediently dealing with the work at hand. 
The researcher therefore has a duty to those generous, trusting and co­
operative enough to allow the production of the videos, to ensure that they 
are not misrepresented or misused.
Indeed, from the outset and throughout the research process particular 
kinds of agreements were made with those being filmed, which gives them  
some degree of control over (the use of) the data. While filming, the 
participants were informed that at any time they could either ask for the 
camera to be switched off, or, if  a researcher was not available, they could 
switch it off themselves. Also, they could ask for time periods to be wiped 
from the tape, if  they were unable to turn the camera off at that time. 
This meant that if  they faced some stressful incident and/or did not feel 
comfortable with that part of their working day, they were, to some 
degree, in control of what materials could be used. For instance, the 
member of staff who was filmed while dealing with his bank over the 
telephone, asked for that sequence to be edited out, which it duly was. On 
no other occasion did any participant ask either for the camera to be 
switched off or for some section to be removed. Once taken from the site,
74
no raw tapes were presented to anyone other than the research team  
involved.
However, collections of fragments were (and will continue to be) used for 
data sessions with, and public presentations to, a variety of academic 
researchers. It was agreed that these fragments would be cleared with the 
RCO first. No fragment has been rejected by the RCO. Much of the 
reason for this is to do with the trust developed in the course of carrying 
out research. Indeed when I asked one staff member to check some 
instances that I wanted to show elsewhere within BT, he did not want to 
look at them. He just said that they would be fine if  they were okay with 
me. Basically, he trusted me not to misrepresent his actions.
A major problem with the notion of informed consent is that researchers 
can use signatures or other agreements as a get-out clause to use the data 
any way they wish (Homan, 1991), but instead the researcher should be 
continuously sensitive to how the participants may be presented as they 
have made the research possible* .^ Interestingly, when tapes of collected 
fragments have been sent to be checked by the participants, they have put 
them to different use - for instance, staff members have taken tapes to 
show their families where they work, who they work with and so forth. 
For personnel to provide their families such access to this high security 
workplace and to their everyday work would have been impossible prior to 
my study®.
4.5 D iscu ssion
This chapter has introduced the nature of research setting and discussed 
the practicalities of collecting and handling video data.
It has provided a preliminary discussion of the tasks in which the RCO 
personnel are engaged. Their main function is to organise 'make-goods' 
when the normative telecommunication lines have failed. This primarily 
involves the co-ordination of activities in a number of telecommunications
^Note that discussions of research ethics rarely examine the particular case of video, 
where full anonymity is hard to ensure. This is probably because of the underuse of such 
data in sociological studies.
®I was not told until after I had begun the study that the WNMC, as the main 
coordination centre for British international telecommunications, formed a prime 
terrorist target. This accounted for the particularly high level of security at that time.
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centres situated within Britain and elsewhere in Europe. They have 
num erous technologies and documents to support these tasks. 
Furthermore, they have a flexible division of labour in which members of 
staff work together on the organisation of make-goods. Often, therefore, 
colleagues must discuss incoming information or debate appropriate 
actions with regard to their numerous technologies and other artefacts. 
As a result, this setting provides an ideal environment in which to study 
how objects feature in sequences of interaction.
This introduction to the setting, however, only provides a gloss for the 
activities in which RCO personnel routinely engage. The next chapter will 
turn in more detail to the ways in which their work is produced and co­
ordinated with regard to the range of artefacts they have available. In 
particular, it will highlight the relevance of object-focused discussions, or 
'collaborative viewings', to the work at hand.
The chapter has also outlined certain key issues relevant to the data 
collection, and subsequent analysis and presentation of the video 
materials. Around sixty hours of video materials were collected, which 
depict everyday work in the RCO. However, the power of the (video) 
image has both costs and benefits in research. For example, a benefit is 
the quality of rich data that can be quickly collected. However, a cost is 
that participants can be afraid that they will be misrepresented. This may 
result in difficulties of access.
Also, of course, there are certain problems of adequately representing 
what is happening on the materials to the reader. In particular, 
presentation on traditional paper documents inhibits the extent to which a 
meaningful account of the fragments can be produced. Nevertheless, 
Chaplin has called on sociologists to incorporate 'the visual' into their 
work more generally and suggested that sociology "...should make more 
use of visual depictions, unconventional typography and page layout in its 
analysis" (Chaplin, 1994, p. 2). This study will certainly take up this 
challenge by incorporating numerous images to support the discussion of 
each fragment.
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C hapter 5
Collaborative V iewings in  the Work of the  
Restoration Control Office
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5.1 In troduction
The previous chapter provided an introduction to the principal research 
setting, namely the RCO. Moreover, it described the work which is 
undertaken w ithin this environment. However, this description  
necessarily glossed over the actual details of the production of the 
activities through which that work is accomplished. It only attempted to 
provide a fairly broad understanding of the nature of the work. This 
chapter will begin to consider how specific sequences of workplace 
activities are organised and produced within the RCO. This will facilitate 
the empirical investigation of issues highlighted in Chapter 2. That is to 
say, it will start to reveal how objects feature, and are constituted, within 
workplace interaction. Furthermore, it will lay out and provide a 
framework for the critical questions and issues that are to be explored in 
later chapters.
The overall concern with objects in interaction provides a broad remit for 
the study. However, it would be extremely difficult to examine (or even 
identify) all of those moments in which an individual uses a workplace 
artefact when engaged in work with another. Often, for example, 
technologies and the like are used in quite subtle ways, maybe even a 
glance at a monitor can constitute its 'use'. Therefore, a principal concern 
of th is chapter is to delineate the particular phenom ena under 
investigation.
One issue that was raised in earlier chapters was the problem of analytic 
relevance. That is to say, the analyst faces the problem of warranting the 
relevance of their particular description of an action, event or, in this case, 
object. Therefore, this thesis focuses on occasions when the sense of an 
object can be seen to be of explicit relevance to participants within the 
course of producing and organising their actions and activities. It then  
considers participants' own orientations and actions towards those objects 
and how they display their understandings of those objects to their co- 
participant(s). In such a way, the thesis considers the treatment of objects 
relevant to members them selves in producing and co-ordinating  
interaction in the workplace.
Specifically, then, the study will investigate those moments at which co­
participants look at and discuss, or otherwise attend to, objects during the
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course of collaborative tasks. This is not, of course, an 'activity' peculiar to 
the RCO. Consider, for instance, how surgeons collaboratively plan 
forthcoming operations with direct reference to an X-ray or a medical 
record; or, for example, how journalists might debate the layout of the 
front page by manipulating text on a computer screen. Indeed, this is an 
activity common to most kinds of workplace. The chapter will, therefore, 
begin by defining and describing the specific nature of these collaborative 
viewings of objects.
It will then begin to unravel the organisation of collaborative viewings by 
firstly examining the ways in which they are initiated. It will show how 
individuals encourage others to look at an object with them by engaging 
them in particular activities, such as attending to a workplace query. 
These activities provide the 'reason' for their co-participants to turn and 
look at an object with them.
It will also suggest how collaborative viewings feature within, and are 
critical to the production of, a variety of everyday working tasks. In such 
a way, it will contribute to the body of knowledge generated by the 
ethnomethodologically-informed 'workplace studies' introduced in Chapter 
2. As has been suggested, 'workplace studies' are enriching our 
understanding of how collaborative work is locally organised and 
accomplished. Furthermore, they have begun to delineate the ways in 
which artefacts, ranging from screen and paper based documents through 
to models, tools and other technologies, 'mediate' work practice amongst 
colleagues (see for example. Harper et al, in press; Heath et al, 1995). The 
contribution of this study is to consider a further way in which objects are 
used to accomplish particular activities, namely through collaborative 
viewings.
These concerns will provide a platform from which to generate the critical 
issues to be addressed in greater detail over the course of the subsequent 
three chapters.
5.2 The N ature o f C ollaborative V iew ings
Objects and artefacts are a pervasive feature of everyday work within the 
RCO. As Chapter 4 suggested, the RCO is a complex technological 
environment, in which personnel are aided in the production of certain
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tasks by a range of documents and information technologies. It has also 
been suggested that this thesis focuses on those moments at which 
personnel interactionally constitute (features of) these objects. In 
particular, the study focuses on shared orientations toward objects and 
how participants display their understandings of objects to others. The 
study does not simply consider when people seem to be looking in the 
same direction but rather considers moments in which colleagues attend 
to the same object in the production of (workplace) activities. The 
empirical chapters focus on these collaborative viewings. To clarify the 
nature of these phenomena, it may be appropriate to describe a couple of 
simple instances. Consider the next fragment for example.
Chris 1 is working on one of the computer systems (ICARUS), when Ron, 
who works elsewhere in the building, approaches (see image i). Now, 
Chris is consulting this system as part of a discussion with a colleague 
over the phone. However, he is wearing headphones and, as Ron 
approaches, he is not talking. Therefore, there is no visible or audible sign 
that he is engaged in a phone call. So, when Ron taps him on the 
shoulder, thrusts a document in front of him and asks if  he has read "one 
of these muwers", Ron presumably does not know that he is 'interrupting' 
a phone conversation^. Nevertheless, Chris turns towards the document 
and after a moment says that he has not seen a document like it. He then  
resumes his call and Ron drifts off (see image iii).
^Note that the names of personnel have been changed to try to preserve the anonymity of 
all participants.
^It is interesting to note that troubles regularly develop when participants use telephone 
headphones, as they are often left on the head for long periods, even when they are not 
'on the phone'. This is quite unlike the handset which is only near the ear when a phone 
call is in progress. Even subtle shifts in the position of the handset around the face can 
display certain aspects of the status of a call. For instance, if the mouthpiece of the 
receiver is dropped a distance away from the jaw it can display that a call is on hold or 
that a conversation has otherwise been interrupted or forestalled. Headphones, however, 
do not so easily mark whether a call is in progress or not. This often leads to the wearer 
of a headset being explicitly asked if they are available, as their colleague cannot 
unproblematically see if they are engaged in a call.
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F r a g m e n t  5 . 1 :  R C O l O / 5 / 9 3  1 1 : 0 1 : 4 5
R  C
— T '.— r.'’rrr'
- ' t -  '
i
y  r y r
WP
X I
1/'^  '/'. :y:\ . . .
R: read one of these muwers ?
( 0 . 8 )
C: *(hello) Ron,* no I haven"
(0.5)
C: ((on phone)) err:;m" well
they're not spare...
X X X
As Ron asks "read one of these muwers?", he pushes a paper document in 
front of Chris. He is showing him a document and asking a question about 
it. Chris looks at the document and answers ("no I haven"), before 
returning to the demands of the ongoing call. This is a very simple 
example of a collaborative viewing where an individual shows an object, in 
this case a document, to a co-participant who then looks at that same 
object. It may be worth highlighting certain distinctive features of 
collaborative viewings with illustrative reference to this fragment.
Firstly, the two participants establish co-regard towards the document 
that Ron is holding. In this instance, Ron initiates the view ing by 
somehow encouraging Chris to turn away from the computer screen before 
him and towards the document. Chris could configure any number of 
orientations in the room and yet, at that moment, he is encouraged to look 
at the document. In such a way, Ron can be seen to explicitly initiate a 
collaborative viewing. However, as will be shown, there are many ways
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such viewings emerge and, indeed, the organisation of the initiation turns 
out to be critical to the development of the viewing.
Secondly, Ron provides the resources for Chris to establish where it is 
relevant for him to look. He simultaneously shows both what the relevant 
object is, in this case a document, and where it is situated. Indeed, in this 
case, Chris sees the document by simply turning his head. The 
participants seamlessly accomplish this co-orientation, even though they 
are located within a complex technological setting full of different visible 
(and potentially relevant) phenomena. Therefore, the range of resources 
which help Chris to, so unproblematically, locate the document are 
extremely powerful interactional resources indeed.
Thirdly, Chris is provided with the resources to assess how to 
appropriately view the document. This is a critical issue, because the 
document, as with any object, has many properties attributable to it. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the catalogue of potential meanings associated 
with any object is infinite and the task of cataloguing would be both 
onerous and impractical. This document, as with any person, object, 
article, event, location or whatever, can be described in myriad ways (see 
Schegloff, 1972). Yet at any particular moment, the document is treated 
only with regard to particular ones. Indeed it has a huge list of properties 
and uses and senses that could be attributed to it in analytic isolation. 
Yet, Chris is provided with the resources to encounter one particular sense 
of the document. He is 'instructed' to see it in a particular way.
In this case, it would seem that the document stands as a representative 
of a class of documents, "one of these muwers". So, Chris is not asked if  
he has specifically read this document, but rather if  he has read a 
document somewhat like this. Furthermore, the use of the term "one of 
these muwers" provides further characterisation of the document, 
"muwers" would seem to be a more polite version of the slang  
"motherfuckers". As such, it can be seen to be a somewhat derogatroy 
characterisation of this class of documents and this will shape the way the 
document is viewed in this situation. Indeed, with all of the fragments 
that will be discussed, terms such as 'screen' or 'document' or 'log book' or 
even 'line of text' or 'word' gloss the characteristics invoked within the 
course of a showing.
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So, the study considers how it is that the "essence" of an object is produced 
in interaction. For Garfinkel, Husserl's notion of "essence" is similar to 
reification, where, for Garfinkel, to reify is to name or to "thingify" 
(Garfinkel, 1952, p.292):
...to reify and to "essentialize" refer to the same facts of experience,
namely, that ordering of experiences involves a selective emphasis and
making relevant to each other of certain specifications while excluding
others ... No reification, no object; no reification, no action.
Garfinkel, 1952, p. 293.
Often within collaborative viewings, one of the participants provides the 
framework within which the object is to be seen; they initiate an activity 
in and with regard to which the object is perceived. The thesis will 
therefore describe the resources available to the recipient of a showing, 
such that they unproblematically find and see the appropriate sense of the 
relevant object.
Fourthly, and relatedly, Chris is provided with the resources to establish 
what to do having seen the object. He is provided with the resources to 
appropriately 'respond' to the object. There is some 'reasoning' involved in 
invoking objects, such that individuals point out objects at particular 
moments to accomplish and engage in particular activities, such as 
dealing with workplace queries. Therefore, the 'recipient' is provided with  
some sense of why that object is being pointed out at this moment in time 
and what actions are subsequently relevant.
In Fragment 5.1, Ron can be seen to explicitly initiate the collaborative 
viewing. However, as the next fragment will reveal, there are more subtle 
ways in which collaborative viewings may be initiated or can be seen to 
emerge in the course of some ongoing activity. The encounter depicted has 
been occasioned because Nancy has delivered a document to Chris in the 
RCO. During the ensuing conversation, she explains to Chris that she is 
about to move to a different part of the organisation. While they are 
talking, a call flashes up on the two telephone touch screens, at which 
point both participants, in turn, shift their gaze towards the left-hand 
screen. Then Nancy just walks away (see image iv), while Chris answers 
the incoming call ("duty officer").
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The fragment begins when Chris asks what Nancy's new job brings with it 
(presumably in terms of responsibility, organisational rewards and so 
forth).
F r a g m e n t  5 . 2 :  R C 0 1 2 / 2 / 9 3  1 0 ; 1 1 ; 1 0  
N  C
I lESiiS C: so what-what does that carry withit? (0.2) any[thing?] nothing?=
N: [dunno.]
C : =oh''
( 0 . 2 )
N : I'll tell you when I've
started it.
(0.5)
C: oh right''
. (1 . 0 )
N: bu' I need a change Chris.
‘ -r'j;: •
XX
( 1 . 8 )
( (Chris then Nancy turn toward the 
left-hand Telephone Touch Screen))
N: I've done this for too long,
(4.0)
X X X
X V
C: ((on 'phone)) duty officer'
Nancy ordinarily works in a room adjacent to the main control room, so 
her encounters with Chris are episodic. However, it is interesting that 
unlike most episodic encounters, there is no 'formal' ending to the
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sequence. Neither says 'goodbye' nor in any other way do they  
acknowledge the termination of their conversation; it seems to just finish. 
Within many episodic encounters, if  one person walked away without a 
leave-taking remark, it could be treated as problematic. In this case, 
however, there does not seem to be a problem. The fact that they both 
look at the left-hand telephone touch screen (see image ii) helps to explain 
the seam less movement out of their conversation and, for Chris, into 
dealing with the incoming telephone call.
The sequence of particular interest concerns the last few moments of their 
conversation, after Nancy notes that she needs a change from her current 
job ("but I need a change Chris"). In the pause that follows, Chris re­
orientates away from the right-hand touch screen and turns to look at the 
left-hand screen. Immediately after his re-orientation, Nancy follows his 
changing line of regard to focus upon the very same screen:
F r a g m e n t  5 . 2 . 1
.TTS_______
N: bu' I need a change Chris.----------/--------
C: ,,TTS________
(TTS = Left-hand telephone touch screen)
They both continue to look at this screen as Nancy begins her next 
utterance in which she explains why she welcomes the forthcoming change 
("I've done this for too long."). In the middle of this utterance, Chris turns 
away from the touch screen and begins to move his hands towards the 
headset resting around his neck. Nancy continues to focus upon the touch 
screen as she ends her utterance, which bearably trails off. During her 
last word ("long") she steps back from the console and walks away:
F r a g m e n t  5 . 2 . 2
[backs off...
TTS__________________________
N: I've done this for too long.
C:__TTS________ , ,
[raises hands to headset...
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Seconds later, Chris lifts the headset onto his head, presses the flashing 
light (which immediately stops flashing) and answers the call, "duty 
officer"®.
It has been noted that the ending to this conversation is not marked in 
any way, Nancy just seems to wander off, while Chris answers a call. 
During the course of their conversation, Chris notices the flashing icon on 
the right-hand touch screen and then turns his head to see it on the left- 
hand screen. Although both touch screens ordinarily display the same 
incoming calls, each screen is connected to a different telephone socket 
buried in the desk itself. A headset or standard handset can be plugged 
into either socket to take a call. However only one headset/handset can be 
plugged into a socket, so that only one call can be made or taken from each 
touch screen.
In this case, the headset hanging around Chris' neck is already connected 
to the left-hand screen. He turns to look at that screen. As he turns, 
Nancy follows his changing orientation. In such a way, Nancy is able to 
see what he is looking at. Therefore, they establish 'co-orientation' toward 
that telephone touch screen, indeed, towards that flashing icon. This 
provides Nancy with a framework with which to interpret his subsequent 
actions.
When Chris begins to lift the telephone headset onto his head, she is able 
to tell that he is about to answer the call. She will know that the flashing 
icon represents an incoming call, but she may or may not be able to read it 
as specifically relevant for Chris. A flashing icon on one of their screens 
does not automatically reveal a call of relevance to the RCO. It requires 
an expert reading of the screen to establish whether it is relevant for 
them, as many of the icons are designated for colleagues elsewhere in the 
control room.
When Chris begins to raise his hands towards the headset, however, 
Nancy can see that he has treated it as relevant. This works such that
^Different calls are answered with different identification terms - sometimes they even 
use the name of the person they know  is ringing. As mentioned in Chapter 4, icons 
sometimes reveal who (or, at least, which location) is calling. The ability to answer calls 
in different ways, therefore, displays an expert reading of the flashing icon to determine 
who is at the other end of the line.
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Chris' subsequent actions simultaneously reveal the relevance of the 
flashing icon, just as his orientation to the flashing icon provides a 
framework within which to make sense of his subsequent actions.
So, Nancy is able to see that Chris is about to answer a call. Indeed, 
incoming telephone calls place certain demands on participants to answer, 
particularly in the workplace. The demands that are placed upon Chris 
having noticed the call, are orientated to by Nancy as sufficient for her to 
end her utterance, turn and leave without a parting gesture. She slips 
away, thereby removing the interactional obligations for him to attend to 
their conversation. She leaves and Chris immediately deals with the new 
and more pressing (i.e. work critical) demands of the incoming telephone 
call. Therefore, the fragment not only reveals the importance of their co­
orientation toward that flashing icon, but also their orientation towards 
the relative importance or status of different workplace activities. In this 
case, the ringing phone takes precedence over the ongoing conversation.
So, Chris notices something of relevance to his work - a flashing icon 
which indicates an incoming call. In and due to the course of his noticing, 
Nancy looks at the very same thing. This allows her to make sense of her 
colleague's (subsequent) activities, recognise the demands of the call and 
end their conversation so that he can answer it without further ado. So, 
the above fragment displays a way in which the collaborative viewing that 
emerges provides a resource with which to co-ordinate workplace activity, 
and to seamlessly move in and out of particular kinds of engagement. 
Although the participants do not 'discuss' it, they can both be seen to 
attend to the relevance of, and demands marked by, the flashing icon - 
Nancy walks off so that Chris can deal with the call. In such a way, the 
'object' (the flashing icon) somehow 'mediates' the work at hand. 
Moreover, a particular sense of the flashing icon is also established - it is 
treated as an incoming call immediately relevant to Chris' work.
So, collaborative viewings are not simply characterised by two individuals 
looking in the same direction at the same time, although that is often one 
of their features. Collaborative viewings specifically refer to situations in 
which individuals establish co-regard towards an object in order to engage 
in some collaborative activity. The two fragments have shown how the 
initiation of collaborative viewings can be more or less explicit. The 
empirical chapters of the thesis more generally will focus upon the more
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explicit 'showings', somewhat akin to Fragment 6.1. In these instances, 
individuals tend to more obviously provide the resources (or, indeed, 
'instruction') for the other to find that object and how to look at it, indeed 
what sense to make of it. Thus, the treatment of the object can be 
captured more clearly by the analyst.
Interestingly, the initiation of these sequences turns out to be critical to 
the organisation of all the other aspects of collaborative viewings 
mentioned above. Therefore, understanding how the initiation is 
accomplished is an important first step to understanding the organisation 
of collaborative viewings more generally.
5.3 In itia tin g  C ollaborative V iew ings
Collaborative viewings feature within all sorts of activities. For example, 
in the course of the thesis, fragments include viewings that occur as (part 
of) jokes, directives and debates. However, one of the most common kinds 
of activity discussed are workplace queries. In particular, they feature one 
person asking a question of another with direct reference to a local, visible 
artefact which leads to the collaborative viewing of that artefact. This 
section will consider the organisation of such workplace queries as a 
specific example to explore the initiation of collaborative viewings more 
generally. In particular, it will ask how individuals encourage a co­
participant to look at an object at which they themselves are looking. As a 
basis from which to examine this issue, consider the following fragment.
Just prior to the beginning of the transcript, Chris is sitting at one end of 
the console reading the log book, while Steven is standing toward the 
middle of the desk (see image i). They have not been discussing anything 
for some moments when Chris asks a question regarding the status of a 
time recorded in their log book. More specifically, he asks whether or not 
that time refers to British Summer Time or Greenwich Mean Time. As 
the control room deals with both British and European telecoms stations 
this can be useful information when establishing exactly when some action 
has been taken. The log book lies open on the desk and as Chris asks "is 
that B.S.T:, or M.G:?", he simultaneously points with his finger to one part 
of that document. The finger comes to rest as he utters the "T" of "BST" 
(the course of the pointing gesture is marked on the transcript above 
Chris' utterance).
88
F r a g m e n t  5 . 3 :  R C O l l / 5 / 9 3 - 1 2 ; 1 6 ; 3 0
C  S
52SSSF®
Tyr- 'Tor— —  V
:. f e s
I X
((C points at document))
C: ..is that B.S.T:, or M.G:?
(1.7)
S : I dunno : , I didn ' t take that
call.
Although Steven looks into Chris' domain of scrutiny (see image ii), his 
colleague has seemingly not made any explicit request for him to do so. 
He does not command or even ask him to look at the log hook and yet, he 
quite plainly does encourage him to look. In this sense it is very similar to 
Fragment 5.1. The concern here is how such encouragem ent is 
accomplished; what it is about Chris' activities that engender a 
collaborative viewing?
As discussed in Chapter 2, studies by Goodwin (1981a; 1981b) and Heath 
(1986) revealed some of the interactional activities which elicit mutual 
gaze and also mutual orientation towards an artefact. For instance, in his 
study of speakers and hearers, Goodwin (1981a) revealed how hearers 
would recurrently direct their gaze towards the face of the speaker 
following phrasal breaks, re-started utterances and the like. He found 
that similar 'devices' would work to encourage hearers to look at an object 
w ith the speaker (Goodwin, 1981b). Heath's study of m edical 
consultations detailed the ways in which patients encouraged doctors to 
focus their attention toward parts of their bodies, usually where visible 
features of an ailment were located. Once again, phrasal breaks, re-starts 
and so forth, would encourage doctors to look up from their notes to the 
patient's face. However, they would not find the speaker looking back at 
them, but instead would find them fixedly staring at some part of their
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own body, a bruise on their leg or whatever. This (som etim es 
accompanied by a gesture) would then encourage them to examine (or at 
least look at) the patient's domain of scrutiny.
However, within this corpus of data, this is not the main means through 
which participants are encouraged to look at the focus of another's 
attention. Many simple showings (indeed the majority) are successfully 
accomplished without re-starts or phrasal breaks, for example. This 
fragment is a case in point.
It would seem that the question Chris asks, his line of regard and the 
pointing gesture that he produces onto the page all work together to 
encourage Steven to look at the log book. Firstly, consider the question 
that he asks.
When Chris asks "is that BST or MG?", he does not explicitly identify the 
referent. Although he provides two alternative characterisations of the 
text, "BST" or "MG", his verbal utterance leaves the location and specific 
identity of "that" ambiguous. One feature of questions is that, in certain 
ways, they constrain (or project) the potential range of next actions by the 
hearer. As such, questions are one example of what Conversation 
Analysts call 'adjacency pairs' or 'paired actions'. The concept of the 
adjacency pair refers to those sequences of two utterances, produced by 
different speakers, which are ordered as a first part and second part, so 
that a first part requires a particular second (or range of second parts). 
Examples include greeting-greeting, invitation-accept/decline and, most 
importantly for the discussion of this fragment, question-answer:
Given the utterance by utterance organization of turn-taking, unless 
close ordering is attempted there can be no methodic assurance that a 
more or less eventually aimed-for successive utterance or utterance type 
will ever be produced ... The adjacency pair technique, in providing a 
determinate 'when' for it to happen, i.e. 'next', has then means for 
handling the close order problem, where that problem has its import via 
its control of the assurance that some relevant event will be made to 
occur.
Schegloff & Sacks, 1974, p. 239-240.
The first pair part of an adjacency pair therefore projects what should 
(expectably) happen 'next' in an encounter. In such a way, a first pair part 
sets up a particular 'sequential environment' in which certain actions are
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encouraged to happen 'next'. More specifically for the question-answer 
adjacency pair, questions provide for a 'sequential environment' in which 
an answer to that question (or an account for its absence) is an 
appropriate, expectable or relevant next turn. Further, the absence of an 
answer following a question may warrantably be treated as 'officially 
absent' (Schegloff, 1968) and, moreover, morally accountable. In this 
fragment, therefore, there are certain interactional demands on Steven to 
provide, or at least try to provide, an appropriate answer to Chris' 
question.
However, in order to attend to the question appropriately and attempt to 
answer Chris' query, Steven must identify the referent; he must find 
"that". He cannot answer without understanding what "that" refers to. As 
has been noted, Chris' utterance does not explicitly describe the relevant 
object, so the verbal information which Steven is provided with does not 
turn out to he, nor is it designed to be, sufficient for him to answer the 
question. In such a way the utterance itself is 'stripped of detail' and 
encourages Steven to locate the referent elsewhere - i.e. in the local, 
visible world. This is not to suggest that the verbal description is 
somehow insufficient or that all referential utterances 'normally' contain 
some detailed description of the referent. Rather, the phrase 'stripped of 
detail' is merely adopted to contrast a purely linguistic analysis with the 
practical resources available in everyday referential practice. If the only 
resources available to the recipients were the talk, they would be unable to 
discover the nature of the referent and make sense of the question - 
further details would be required. So, if the analysis purely focused on the 
talk, the description could be seen as 'stripped of detail'. However, it can 
be seen in this instance (and with many others throughout the study) that 
a full description of the referent is absent in the talk, yet distributed 
through the embodied action as a whole. This highlights that in their 
practical and everyday affairs, individuals have a range of referential 
resources available to them.
Chris' concomitant bodily orientation provides the very resources with  
which Steven can locate the referent. Both his line of regard and his hand 
movement, point toward a specific item on a page in the log book. Indeed, 
Steven is immediately able to turn to look at the relevant part of the log 
book (the "that") and produce an answer to the question ("I dunno").
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Furthermore, he accounts for why he does not know whether the time is 
recorded in "BST or MG" ("I didn't take that call").
The onset of the utterance is not marked with a turn towards Steven, 
which tends to occur at the beginning of new conversations in order to 
identify the intended recipient. Rather Chris continues to look at the 
document, and furthermore points at it, somehow displaying its  
(upcoming) relevance to Steven. Steven then looks at the log book.
Seeing the time in its recorded context may help Steven to establish its 
status. The collection and ordering of entries on a page provides a visible 
context in which that entry is located. Each new entry is written below 
the last. So, Steven may remember it with regard to its situation within 
the visible history of log book entries. However, the entry itse lf also 
displays the handwriting of the author. From this Steven is able to 
establish that he "didn't take that call".
Often reports of events (circuit failures, completed make-goods, repaired 
circuits and so forth) are called in and these are noted in the RCO log 
book. Those calling in reports, usually provide an associated time at 
which the event occurred. Further, as the control room deals with both 
British and European telecoms stations, times reported to them are 
variously presented in terms of British Summer Time or Greenwich Mean 
Time. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the RCO staff have a 60 minute target 
time in which to get a make-good (a temporary replacement for a failed 
circuit) operational. Often, however, the attempt to get a make-good set 
up can take longer than is required for others to actually repair the failed 
circuit. So, it is important to understand exactly when a failure occurred 
to thereby establish how long they have been trying to organise the make­
good. This is also important when they later transform information 
recorded in the log-book into reports on different restorations. Given the 
potential discrepancy between British Summer Time or Greenwich Mean 
Time, it could make some difference to the length of time a make-good has 
been dealt with. In this case, Chris recruits Steven to help him discern 
how this particular time has been recorded.
Chris encourages Steven to look at the log book by engaging him in an 
activity, the activity of attending to a workplace query. Moreover, Steven 
is supplied with the resources to find the relevant recorded time in the log
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book. It would seem, then, that without explicitly requesting someone to 
look at an object with them, speakers can exploit the demands placed on a 
hearer when asked a question and encourage them to inspect a feature of 
their common surroundings. In such a way, the question provides for a 
'sequential environment' in which the co-participant is in some sense 
obliged to at least attempt to find an appropriate answer. As the question 
is stripped of much detail ahout the exact identity of the referent ("that"), 
Steven is therefore encouraged to look at the referent. In this way, Chris 
encourages his colleague to engage in a collaborative viewing by engaging 
him in an attempt to solve a work-related problem.
The large majority of instances in the data corpus are similar to Fragment 
5.3, in that showings take the form of questions and other activities in 
which a referent is only minimally described (for example by the use of a 
demonstrative such as "this" or "that"), but which is indicated by 
concomitant bodily orientation (pointing gestures, line of regard and so 
forth). In such a way, co-participants are encouraged to take a look at the 
object or artefact in order to engage in and attend to the developing 
activity. That commitment to attending to the activity at hand provides 
an interactional reason for looking at the referent and is demonstrated in 
and through that looking.
However, questions which result in collaborative viewings are not always 
'stripped' of detail such that a looking would seem necessary a priori in 
order to answer it. Rather than encouraging others to look, participants 
can merely provide the resources for others to find the referent if  they 
need to. For instance, consider the next example in which a question is 
asked by Phil which does not, a priori, seem to require that Chris turn to 
look at any object in order to answer it. Therefore, it does not seem  
designed to demand a collaborative viewing - there is certainly no 
demonstrative which, in some way, masks the identity of the referent. 
However, Chris does subsequently turn to engage in a collaborative 
viewing of a document on the desk with Phil.
For some time prior to the onset of the transcript, Phil has been studying a 
document on the desk before him. As he does this, Chris walks over to an 
area directly behind him, bends over and begins to search for an apple in 
the bottom of a carrier bag (see images i and ii). So, as the fragment 
begins, Phil and Chris are back-to-back, Phil sitting at the console looking
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at a document and Chris bending over behind him searching through a 
bag. It is at this moment that Phil asks his colleague about the meaning 
of an acronym that he has come across in the document ("(Chris?) what's
a.l.n.d.?"). During the production of his initial question, he places a finger 
on a particular part of the document (see image iii).
F r a g m e n t  5 . 4 :  R C O l l / 5 / 9 3  1 3 : 3 1 ; 0 1  
C  P
I TTïïæW ^.
’. -if ^  .-'îî
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XI
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I
! ...
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P: (Chris?) what's a.l.n.d.?
(0.4)
C : hitiinm?
(0.4)
P : a.l.n.d.?
( 6 . 2 )
94
c : dunno.
Following the question asked by Phil, "what’s a.l.n.d.?", Chris does not 
immediately provide an answer. First, he says "hmmm?", which elicits a 
slower and more pronounced repetition of the acronym. Following that, 
and within the course of the 6.2 second pause, he turns and examines the 
text in the context of the document in which it resides. Only then does he 
say that he does not know ("dunno").
The question asked by Phil contains no demonstrative and Chris, with his 
back to him, cannot see the pointing gesture his colleague has constructed 
on the document. However, Chris does turn around and does view the 
document prior to producing an answer. So, this case is different from 
Fragment 5.3, in that the question does not mask the referent in any way 
and yet Chris still turns to engage in a collaborative viewing with Phil.
It is unclear whether Chris is already aware of the existence of a referent 
within visible reach and is turning to see it or whether it is, in turning to 
discuss the matter further, that Chris finds his colleague fixedly staring at 
the document which he then moves to look at. It is likely the former as 
Phil shifts his gaze between looking at the document and looking at Chris 
during his turns at talk. These actions may well enable Chris to hear the 
shifting orientation of his colleague to something away from himself. In 
such a way, Phil's bodily orientation may not be visible, but it could, in 
some sense, be audible, which may reveal to Chris a visible referent, or at 
least an alternate (and potentially relevant) locus of activity other than  
himself.
If Chris had immediately known what A.L.N.D. stands for, he may not 
have needed to look at the document. The question is not built to 
explicitly elicit Chris' gaze. It works in such a way as to allow for both an 
immediate answer or, as actually occurs, for a longer sequence in which 
his co-participant turns to look at the text. It is up to Chris to decide
95
whether he needs to look^. Nevertheless, Chris is in a position where he is 
in some sense obliged to attempt to answer the question. He discovers 
that he needs to turn around to find further resources with which to 
answer, or at least check his answer to, the question.
It would not (necessarily) be inappropriate to answer without looking, in 
that a co-participant may well be able to answer such a question without 
looking at the referent. They may straight forwardly know what A.L.N.D. 
stands for. If they do not know the answer immediately however, some 
further discussion (probably leading to a collaborative viewing) would be 
likely to develop, as the hearer attempts to answer the question.
It seems then that a distinction can be drawn between these two 
fragments about the activities in which such collaborative viewings 
emerge or develop. In both fragments a question is asked, which places 
certain interactional constraints upon one participant to provide an 
answer or at least account for the inability to provide an answer (such as 
saying that you do not know). However, in Fragment 5.3, the question is 
designed such that it is stripped of a certain degree of detail about the 
referent. Therefore, the co-participant must look at the document to be 
able to attend to the question. In Fragment 5.4, on the other hand, the 
question is designed such that it could be answered immediately without 
recourse to some visible feature of the local environment. However, Chris 
decides to turn to look at the referent before providing an answer. 
Although, the interactional demands on the hearer are stronger for the 
first, for both examples, there is some reason for looking - to attend (and to 
display an attention) to the question at hand.
The objects discussed (features of documents in the examples given) are 
central to accomplishing the activity at hand. The questions cannot (at 
least initially) be answered without participants heing ahle to examine 
those objects. Therefore the reason or encouragement is embedded within 
the practical demands the activity at hand; in these cases, attending to a 
workplace query. So, the activities of the speaker develop an interactional 
environment in which co-participants are encouraged to look at a relevant 
artefact. For instance, one participant asks a question which constrains
'^However, Phil's pointing gesture suggests his sensitivity to the potentially upcoming 
need for Chris to find and examine "a.l.n.d." in the context of the document more 
generally.
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the next actions of the other, such that they are, to various degrees 
required to examine or merely look at an object in the world - in order to 
attend to the question. We can then begin to see the nature of the 
sequential environment in which an object might be encountered; that is, 
the relevancies with which individuals experience objects and artefacts. 
They look at objects and configure collaborative viewings to attend to the 
demands of workplace activities.
5.4 D iscu ssion
This chapter has started to explore particular ways in which objects 
feature within sequences of collaborative work within the RCO. Indeed, 
even from this preliminary discussion, it can begin to be seen how objects 
stand in relation to, and are critical to the organisation of, certain 
activities.
Fragment 5.2 displayed how noticing what a colleague has noticed can be 
used to make sense of their actions. In the fragment discussed, noticing 
that Chris had seen a flashing icon and that he subsequently began to 
raise his headphones onto his head, allowed Nancy to decide that it was 
appropriate to end the conversation and let him attend to the demands of 
an incoming call. Personnel are, therefore, sensitive to the orientations of 
colleagues to and through the local milieu, such that they are able to 
assess the (potential) relevance of these for their own work (for related 
discussions, see Heath et al, 1995; Heath & Hindmarsh, forthcoming). 
Therefore, the sense made of an object in these instances can be seen to be 
tied to the practical demands of the work. A similarity can he drawn with  
Merleau-Ponty's discussion of how footballer's perceive their surroundings. 
As Crossley summarises:
Footballers don't ordinarily contemplate the pitch and the game at the 
time of playing, he notes ... They read the game and no more notice the 
figures and 'objects' on the pitch than readers notice the shapes of 
letters in the words and sentences which they read. They see openings, 
passes, off-sides, goals; that is, specific meaningful events which are 
appropriate to the game of football. Furthermore, the significance of 
these sights is not reflective but practical. They call forth responses 
from players which must be immediate and 'without thinking'.
Crossley, 1996, p. 28.
The football pitch can be treated as no different from the organisation of 
any multi-party collaborative work setting. The pitch is like any office or
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physically-located workplace, such that the physical movement of the ball 
and team-mates are discerned with regard to the practical purposes at 
hand, just as workplace artefacts and the actions of others within the local 
milieu are used in work settings such as the RCO. So, the flashing icon is 
treated as an incoming call and has particular import for Chris and 
Nancy. For Chris, it is treated as demanding an answer. For Nancy, it is 
treated as relevant for her to leave Chris, such that he can attend to the 
demands of the call. They do not see a flashing light, they see an incoming 
call and all that goes with it.
The chapter has also provided a definition of 'collaborative viewings' of 
objects. Rather than instances in which two people are merely looking in 
the same direction at the same time, collaborative viewings are those 
occasions in which co-participants look at and discuss, or otherwise attend 
to, an object during the course of some collaborative activity. It is the 
organisation of these collaborative viewings that forms the substantive 
focus for the thesis.
The examples of collaborative viewings that have been given, display 
different kinds of relevance for understanding the work of the RCO. The 
collaborative viewing of objects, such as documents, seem to be presented 
by participants as critical to the successful accomplishment of the activity 
at hand.
Showing an object seems to have some benefits over describing or 
otherwise invoking objects. Seeing the very object that another is asking 
about or discussing may well provide more information than a description. 
For instance, seeing that object within the complex of objects which 
surround it may bring out certain features that would require a great deal 
of description. So, for example, seeing some text in the context of a 
document and in relation to surroundng text may be critical to attending 
to a query. For instance, finding and making sense of 'A.L.N.D.' may be 
facilitated by inspecting it within its natural habitat (a certain document). 
Alternatively, the object itself may reveal particular features which would 
be hard to describe. Consider for example Fragment 5.3, in which Chris 
asks Steven whether a particular entry in their log book is recorded 
according to "BST or MG". From seeing the handwriting of the entry and 
its position on the page, Steven can establish that he did not write it and 
therefore that he did not take the call.
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This then has implications for the initial introduction to the work of the 
RCO. It does not undermine the earlier description. Rather it elaborates 
that description. The fragments that have been discussed reveal the ways 
in which the broader 'function' of the RCO is accomplished in its very 
detail through sequences of interaction such as collaborative viewings. 
Furthermore, they begin to show how the artefacts in the workplace are 
used in practice and how those objects are encountered in the course of 
specific activities. They are used by colleagues to solve workplace queries 
and so forth.
When considering how collaborative viewings are initiated and organised, 
it is clear that they are embedded in, or rather subsumed by activities, 
such as dealing with queries. Individuals encourage others to look at 
objects within them by engaging them in those activities. Asking a 
question of another, for instance, demands attention and projects a range 
of potential next actions (including an answer). Often, questions can be 
asked which in themselves do not reveal the nature of the referent. 
However, that referent can be found in the local milieu. Therefore, the 
other is encouraged to look at it in order to be able to attend to the 
demands of the question. Thus, speakers can place certain sequential 
demands (and moral obligations) on their co-participants, to encourage 
them to look at an object.
Although the examples given in this chapter have been predominantly 
related to queries, over the following few chapters, examples will be given 
of a variety of other workplace activities, such as the telling of jokes, 
distributing work and searches for information. In each case, being able to 
attend to the activity appropriately forms the reason for looking at an 
object with another. The accomplishment of showings themselves, then, 
can be seen to be embedded within and experienced as part of the broader 
business at hand, where the business at hand might be something like 
attending to a question.
The analytic orientation to 'sequence' and 'activity' that has been  
highlighted in this chapter will continue to resonate throughout the study, 
as both are key to understanding the interactional organisation of 
collaborative viewings. Indeed, the analysis focuses on the production and 
recognition of actions and activities by participants themselves and uses
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these as key methodological resources. In the production of their actions, 
members display their orientations to 'setting', 'activity at hand' and the 
relevant 'object(s)' while reflexively constituting their sense at that 
moment. As the participants publicly display their orientations to their 
interlocutor(s), the analytic gaze uses these actions to reveal the 
orientations of those participants. In such a way, descriptions of the sense 
of objects can be warranted as relevant to participants in the course of 
their activities.
It has already been shown how the sequential environment can encourage 
an individual to look at and attend to an object, for example, in order to 
attend to the demands of a question. Furthermore, it will be shown how 
the intiation of a collaborative viewing is critical to understanding other 
(subsequent) features of that viewing. These other features were briefly 
introduced earlier in the chapter. However, it may be useful to re­
formulate them as them as analytic questions to be addresed in the next 
few chapters:
• having encouraged another to look at an object, what interactional 
resources do participants have to find that object? This is particularly 
pertinent given the artefact-rich nature of the workplace and the fact 
that many features of the setting are in close proximity (for instance, 
lists of failed circuits recorded on a computer screen) and numerous 
features are potentially relevant for a number of activities.
• given that individuals are attending to a particular sense or 
characterisation of an object, what resources do their co-participants 
have to establish or discover that particular sense?
• having found the object and identified the relevant sense of that object, 
what resources do participants have to know what to do next - how 
should they 'respond' to the object?
• finally, when a person points some object out to another, how can they 
determine that, or assess whether, their co-participant has found the 
relevant object and determined the relevant sense of that object?
These questions are firmly interrelated, yet do lay out the key issues that 
will be addressed over the next two chapters. Specifically, the first two 
questions will be addressed in Chapter 6 and the second two will be 
discussed in Chapter 7.
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C h a p ter  6
The Body in Referential Practice
1 0 1
6.1 In troduction
The previous chapter defined the 'collaborative viewings' that form the 
focus of the thesis. This chapter will consider two main issues relating to 
the organisation of these collaborative viewings.
Firstly, it will examine the resources which are available to individuals 
such that they can locate an object being drawn to their attention. This 
issue resonates to a certain degree with the study of 'deixis' in linguists. 
'Deixis' (a Greek word meaning 'pointing' or 'indicating') has been used by 
linguists to refer to "... the ways in which languages encode or 
grammaticalize features of the context of utterance or speech event, and 
thus also concerns the ways in which the interpretation of utterances 
depends on the analysis of that context of utterance" (Levinson, 1983, p. 
54). Deixis is by no means limited to reference to visible objects, as 
studies consider reference in novels for example, or reference to people not 
engaged in the conversation, and so forth. However, many of the 
collaborative viewings discussed in this thesis involve "deixis at its purest" 
(Lyons, 1977), "... where the utterance is accompanied by some 
extralinguistic gesture" (Green, 1995, p. 15). Almost all of the fi-agments 
discussed involve reference to visible phenomena.
Linguistic studies of deixis are primarily concerned with the organisation 
of deictic terms used in referential utterances and only recently have such 
studies begun to consider embodied action more generally. However, it 
will be argued that when exploring reference to objects in face-to-face 
interaction, the bodily orientation of the speaker is a critical resource for 
the other to locate a referred-to object. So, it w ill suggest that 
understanding how reference is practically accomplished, demands a 
sensitivity to the whole gamut of embodied actions. Thus, it will highlight 
the importance for participants of the interplay of talk and body 
movement within referential practice.
The chapter will also consider the resources that enable co-participants to 
establish the 'way of seeing' an object. This is to suggest that in  
collaborative viewings, participants do not just locate objects, but inspect 
the object in a particular way. Thus it is concerned with how an object is 
presented with regard to a specific characterisation, for the specific 
moment in time. It will be argued that individuals somehow 'instruct'
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others in how to relevantly view an object. In Chapter 2, it was suggested 
that when encountered in sequences of interaction, objects are treated in 
specific ways, with regard to particular characteristics. Seeing an object 
in a particular way, out of the many potentially attributable, is not an 
issue for participants; they just see the object as it is. Nevertheless, it is 
intriguing to consider how it is that an object is treated as it is within the 
course of a specific sequence of activity. Therefore, the chapter will 
examine how objects are presented to others, such that they are seen in a 
particular way.
Belatedly, the chapter will discuss how the practices in and through which 
individuals 'instruct' another's viewing are produced with an intimate 
sensitivity to the emerging actions of that other. Indeed, it would seem  
that even referential gestures (such as a pointing gesture), involved in 
pointing things out, are designed with intimate regard to the actions of a 
co-participant. Therefore, it will show how 'instruction' is interactionally 
produced.
In general terms, then, the chapter will consider the resources that enable 
a participant to locate an object and, further, that enable them to see it in 
terms of particular characteristics. Once again, these issues will highlight 
the critical significance of the sequential context in which objects are 
encountered. Specifically, a participants' attention to the relevant object 
is configured in terms of the (unique) way in which the view ing is 
initiated.
6.2 R esou rces to  L ocate th e  R elevant Object
The previous chapter began to explicate the practices in and through 
which participants are encouraged to look at an artefact with another. 
The discussion was illustrated, in part, by a fragment in which one 
participant asked another "is that BST or MG?". It was argued that the 
question produced a sequential environment in which the co-participant 
was somehow 'constrained' to produce (or otherwise account for the 
absence of) an answer. Furthermore, it was argued that the question was 
somehow stripped of detail such that the referent, "that", must he sought 
in the local environment in order to be able to attend to the question in 
next turn. So, the use of the demonstrative ("that") somehow helped to
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encourage the co-participant to find the referent in the local environment. 
It somehow suggested where the referent is located.
The linguists Halliday & Hasan (1976) have termed such use of 
demonstrative pronouns "exophoric reference". They say an exophoric 
item "...is one which does not name anything; it signals that reference 
must be made to the context of situation" (ibid., p. 33). Actually, it could 
be argued that all kinds of reference are essentially embedded and 
understood in the "context of situation", where the notion of context is 
broadened to include the activity at hand and so forth. However, it is 
interesting to note that certain utterances can only be fully explicated 
with visible regard to the specific context of the physical surroundings. 
This begs the question of how the physical surroundings are presented 
such that the demonstrative (e.g. "that"), and the utterance more 
generally, can be made sense of.
Linguists have long been interested in deictic expressions, such as "this", 
"that", "here" and "there". Generally, their concern has been to examine 
the ways in which language makes statements about an objective reality 
that exists apart from speech. So, when we turn to the reference of 
objects, linguists discuss how deictic terms "act as pointers" (Duranti & 
Goodwin, 1992, p. 43):
The term deictic in traditional grammar designates (roughly) linguistic 
elements which specify the identity or placement in space or time of 
individuated objects relative to the participemts in a verbal interaction.
English 'this', for instance, in one of its central uses, identifies a specific 
object given in the immediate spatial proximity of the speaker who 
utters the form.
Hanks, 1990, p. 5.
However, with regard to actual instances of referential practice, how such 
terms "act as pointers" or "specify... the placem ent in space... of 
individuated objects" is left relatively opaque. This would seem  a 
particularly important issue within complex technological environments 
(such as the RCO), in which it can be argued that the setting is 'artefact- 
rich'. Indeed, "the immediate spatial proximity of the speaker" does not 
really help to pin down the placement of the referent, given the amount of 
documents, monitors and other artefacts even on the desk in the RCO. 
Green (1995, p. 22) has implied that "In a one-to-one exchange between 
participants where the objects referred to are present in the situation of
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utterance", the referent is "the most salient" object. Yet, the resources 
available to a co-participant to establish which object is "most salient" out 
of the abundance of objects in the environment remain unexplicated and 
underexplored. However, the resources that enable a co-participant to 
find an object referred to by a deictic term unproblematically, would seem  
fundamental to an interest in the practical accomplishment of reference.
Deictic terms, such as "this", are used routinely to refer to different objects 
on different occasions. Therefore, there is nothing intrinsic in the term to 
identify the referent.
In Chapter 5, it was shown how deictic terms can be used to encourage 
another to look at an object, but they do not direct that looking alone - 
rather the talk must be seen together with the visual conduct of the 
speaker. It is an aspect which does not seem to be considered an issue in 
many studies of referential practice. Most linguists do seem to note that 
referential gestures are sometimes used with referential utterances. 
However, very few consider how  such gestures work with the talk. 
Moreover, they do not tend to recognise the relevance of body movement 
and orientation more generally. In such a way, the importance of the body 
in referential practice is downgraded.
Linguistic anthropologists such as Hanks (1990) and Havilland (1992), 
acknowledge the relevance of embodied actions (the fundam ental 
interrelationship between talk and body movement in face-to-face 
interaction). However, they would seem to have a more general interest in 
how verbal reference is produced with regard to the position of the body in  
space or how gestures indicate remote (and therefore not directly visible) 
locations. They do not, for example, examine the production of gestures 
within the course of utterances referencing local artefacts. So, there would 
seem little work within studies of deixis that examines the interplay of 
talk and visual conduct in the accomplishment of reference to objects in co­
present interaction. Yet, it will be argued that the interplay of talk and 
bodily orientation is a critical resource for participants themselves. To 
illustrate this, consider Fragment 6.1 in which Tom points out part of a 
document to Chris.
Tom recently started work in the RCO and has been discussing certain 
documentary procedures with his more experienced colleague (Chris). In
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the run-up to the fragment, Tom has queried which events (such as the 
details of telephone calls) hastily written on one piece of paper would be 
transferred into the more formal log hook. As the fragment begins, Tom 
continues this discussion by asking Chris whether a specific incident was 
later recorded into the log book. As Tom begins his utterance, he 
simultaneously produces a pointing gesture onto the document placed on 
the desk before him (note his left arm, which is not visible in image i, 
appears on the desk in image ii).
F r a g m e n t  6 . 1 ;  R C 0 1 2 / 2 / 9 3 - 1 3 ; 4 2 ; 3 0
X I
X XX
that one there: (.) Chris, that's 
one- you- decided no'to- (.) 
bother- putting in the log, is(n) 
it, (now).=
C : =yeah thats right
i f
The talk bearably projects a question and encourages Chris to attend to it. 
However, the demonstrative expression ("that one there") does not make 
explicit any particular object. So, in order to attend to the question, Chris 
must find "that one there". And he does. He quite unproblematically 
moves closer to see the document and subsequently answer the question. 
Therefore, locating "that one there" cannot be seen as a problem for Chris. 
He does not ask for further information on where "that one there" is 
situated or display any other difficulty with the question. So, there must
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be certain (quite powerful) resources available to Chris such that he can so 
unproblematically find the relevant object within the local artefact-rich 
environment of the control centre. This section will explore the nature of 
these resources.
In particular, although "that one there" provides scant information about 
the referent, Tom's concomitant bodily orientation works w ith the 
utterance to both encourage and direct Chris' looking. He is provided with 
a reason to find the referent (in order to attend to the question) and the 
bodily orientation at that moment is key to finding it.
Tom's gaze focuses on the document on the desk, and, further, he sculpts a 
pointing gesture with his arm and finger which leads into and comes to 
rest on one part of that document. As Fragment 6.1.1 shows, Tom's hand 
has reached the document during the "there" of "that one there". He shifts 
the position of his hand slightly during "that's", but essentially the domain 
of scrutiny is indicated during the initial deictic expression.
F r a g m e n t  6 . 1 . 1
Ih ,,,,,,,,,, . * steady________ *slide* steady____________________
T: --that one there: (.) Chris, that's: one- you- decided no'to-
Thus, when Chris begins to move closer (during "decided"), he has the 
resources to discern unproblematically the relevant artefact under 
discussion.
The body movement, which is co-occurring with the talk, is seen with  
regard to the talk and similarly the talk is heard with regard to the bodily 
orientation. They are seen together as part of the same action. That is to 
say, the deictic expression encourages Chris to look at something, and that 
something is indicated by the bodily orientation at that very moment. The 
gesture indicates where to look at the very moment the deictic expression 
is produced.
Consider the importance of having the resources to be able to find an 
object at the very moment when that object is invoked. In order to be able 
to answer the question Chris must find the referent ("that one there"). 
Moreover, he is somehow obliged to answer the question in next turn, not 
in five minutes or an hour, but in next turn. Therefore, to appropriately
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answer the question in next turn, he m ust have the resources 
(immediately) to find "that one there". And, of course, he does. Tom's 
hodily orientation at the moment of the deictic expression, provides Chris 
with those resources.
Indeed, this is a recurrent pattern in which deictic gestures are tightly co­
ordinated with deictic expressions. Following an experimental study, 
similar conclusions were drawn by Marslen-Wilson et al (1982). They 
asked students to read a Marvel comic book entitled "Hulk vs. Thing", and 
then tell that story to a fellow student. However, rather than simply read 
it out, they were asked to tell it in their own words. On their lap they had 
a copy of the comic and, at certain junctures, particularly when  
mentioning the main characters, they would point to pictures on the cover. 
Marslen-Wilson et al found that the deictic gestures were 'exactly' co­
ordinated with their associated verbal devices. In their examples, a 
gesture seemed to reach its acme in the middle of the uttered referential 
term.
In this data corpus the pattern is somewhat different however. Although 
the gestures do seem 'co-ordinated' with the deictic term, they tend to 
come to rest on screens and documents late on in the utterance of a 
demonstrative or even just after its production. Consider the following 
three examples.
In the first, Martin withholds the demonstrative until his hand is in a 
position to point at it. Towards the end of "about", he starts to lean over 
toward one of the alarm screens. On the way to it, he presses the 
keyboard ($) to alter the screen image. Then, as his hand reaches the 
screen face, he says "tha" (that). He refines the position of the point 
during and slightly after the uttered demonstrative:
E x a m p l e  6 . 1
rh *slide*steadv
M : what d ' ya know ab'^ ou: :t--------- / tha : .--------
In Example 6.2, Chris begins to move his hand toward a document prior to 
saying "this". However, the hand is still in motion as he says "this". It is 
not until 0.2 of a second later that his hand reaches the document and he 
begins to tap on it:
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E x a m p l e  6 . 2
rh .*taps
C:  this.-------
The final example displays a different kind of 'pointing gesture'. Rather 
than using his finger to point, Chris nods his head toward the alarm  
screen (AS) as he says "there's". It co-occurs with the deictic term. In 
such a way Chris enlivens his line of regard to make explicitly relevant 
where he is looking^:
E x a m p l e  6 . 3
h [ nod ]
g , àS_________________________
C: woaioh'^---------- /--well there ' s Maddley^
Interestingly, then, pointing gestures are recurrently produced alongside 
deictic terms. In such a way, the deictic term does not only encourage a 
co-participant to look at some object, but highlights the very moment at 
which the physical orientation of the speaker becomes particularly 
relevant to find that object. The deictic term, then, marks when the 
resources are available for a co-participant to find the object.
The fact that these gestures seem to occur late on in the production of the 
deictic term shows how tightly these actions are co-ordinated. The gesture 
is usually in motion  at the moment the deictic term is produced. 
Therefore, as the hearer turns toward the speaker, they can see the nature 
of the resources being made available to them - a head nod, a finger 
gesture or whatever. So, they can follow the trajectory of the gesture to 
the referred-to object. They can be 'led' or 'guided' to the referent.
To return to Fragment 6.1, Chris moves to look where Tom is looking, 
because he treats where Tom is looking and pointing as the specific 
location of "that one there". Moreover, and within the wider activity, he
^Learner drivers are often encouraged by their instructors not only to use their rear view 
mirror, but to exaggerate their looking toward it in driving tests to display  to the 
examiner that they are using their rear view mirror. Moreover, in a restaurant, in order 
to attract the attention of the waiter or waitress, one is often required to exaggerate 
looking at them, often quite ludicrously, in order to elicit their attention. In all kinds of 
activities then, individuals actively render their line of regard relevant for the activity at 
hand.
109
treats seeing "that one there" as critical to his ability to attend to Tom's 
query. So, Tom's bodily orientation provides the resources with which 
Chris can locate the "that one there" referred to in the question and seeing 
"that one there" enables Chris to attend to the activity at hand (dealing 
with a workplace query). Similarly, the talk presents the text around the 
pointing finger such that the appropriate 'incident' may be located out of 
the array of incidents on the sheet of paper. Some lines of text may not 
make sense in the light of the question, therefore bringing the recipient's 
attention to the 'most salient' object.
Subsequently (and unproblematically) Chris, having leant over and looked 
at the document, answers the question ("yeah that's right").
It has been suggested, with regard to Fragment 6.1, that the deictic 
expression ("that one there") does not, in and of itself, "act as a pointer" or 
"specify the placement in space of individuated objects". Rather, the 
expression indicates when the resources are available for the other to 
discern the local environment. In such a way, the talk is tightly co­
ordinated with the bodily orientation of the speaker to present an object to 
the other. Interestingly, note how this configuration of bodily activity is 
further designed such that it does not explicitly draw attention to its own 
form and production. It is noticed (and is designed to be noticed) by Chris, 
as it immediately directs his looking toward the document. However, the 
movement of the arm does not attract his gaze toward Tom's body, rather 
the artefact indicated by the extension of his finger. In this case, then, 
"that one there" is seen as a reference to the artefact and not to the body 
movement itself^. This is also accomplished through the talk, which 
presents or 'firames' the body as 'pointing' to the relevant referent.
This collaborative viewing is not only embedded within a question-answer 
sequence, but it can be seen as an example of in situ training. One of the 
organisational procedures in the RCO involves the textual recording of a 
variety of ongoing activities (actions taken, phone calls received, faults
^Research by developmental psychologists has revealed an interesting change that occurs 
in the early months of a human baby's life (Murphy, 1978; Murphy and Messer, 1977). 
The stereotypical way by which copresent humans accomplish showings is to physically 
point at the object of interest. However, at the age of about 4 months, a baby watches the 
movement of the hand when it points. It is not until the age of around nine months that 
babies have established that such a movement, at particular moments, references some 
physically distant 'thing', rather than the hand itself.
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reported and so forth) in a variety of formal (and informal) documents. 
Certain activities must be entered into the log book, whereas other 
activities do not need to he formally recorded. It is part of the nature of 
the work to be able to establish what may be warrantably omitted from 
that record. As discussed in Chapter 2, Goodwin (1994) describes how 
each profession views a scene with a particular set of practical relevancies 
at hand. This way of viewing the world is learnt during collaborative 
viewings such as this, as colleagues can he seen to publicly reveal their 
understandings of visible information sources and the like. In such a way, 
they share their practices of interpretation.
So, talk and body movement are seen and work together to encourage 
another to look at an object and provide the resources for them to see the 
"most salient" object within the immediate physical environment of the 
speaker.
6.3 D istin g u ish in g  th e R elevance o f P o in tin g  G estures
The above discussion highlights how talk and pointing gestures (of various 
kinds) work together in referential practice. It shows how referential 
gestures often provide the resources for others to find the referred-to 
object. However, this section will show how pointing gestures towards 
artefacts do not necessarily encourage another to look in a particular 
direction. That is to say, pointing gestures are not necessarily a resource 
for others to look at an object; not all pointing gestures are designed for 
another to find or indeed look at a referent. Talk and other bodily actions 
frame pointing gestures such that they can he treated in different ways. 
In the following fragment, for instance, differentiations between the 
relevance of pointing gestures are carried out on a turn-by-turn basis.
James, who works in International Traffic Management (ITM), elsewhere 
in the control centre, wanders over to the RCO desk. He asks if  any 
dedicated circuits linking Britain and Italy have failed. After some initial 
workplace banter (much of which has been left out of the transcript - 
marked by the vertical line of three dots), Chris asks "where from James?". 
In essence, he is asking which particular British International Repeater 
Stations (1RS) are involved. As Chapter 4 indicated, any circuit failures 
would be discovered by the loss of transmission along those circuits into 
the 1RS. Some moments later Chris asks where James has identified
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trouble on the information systems available ("where are you lookin?"). In 
response, James points toward three locations (each pointing gesture is 
marked by (D, (D and (D alongside the transcript - the first of these is 
pictured in image iii). Of particular interest here, are the ways in which 
these are variously treated.
F r a g m e n t  6 . 2 ;  R C O l l / 5 / 9 3 - 1 6 : 3 4 ; 4 0
I  ' w s
If; 'r:arw -;'y":sr —rttsb  r
XX
XXX
J: excuse me, RCO wallahs? (1.2)
av'you lost anything to Italy?
( 1 . 0 )
C: well I don't want to tell you.
ha-ah. (.) where from'' James?
( 1 . 2 )
how about Maddley: and Kelvin. 
(0.4) hrmhh. you can't look at 
Kelvin, so it's no good asking 
you about that^=
=Kelvin?
(1 .8 ) 
hahrmhh.
( 1 . 8 )
where are you lookin?
( 0 . 2 )
J:
C:
look, we got- Milan up ther[e. (D
[yep=
=we got s- we got overflow at 
Mondial. = (D 
=right.=
=we got (techies) up there at- (.) 
at Maddley and Kelvin. ®
( 0 . 8 ) 
woa : oh''
( 1 . 2 )
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XV
C: well there' s Maddley'' (2.7) and
the answer is : :
( 2 . 0 )
C : no: .
Following Chris' question "where are you lookin?", James responds with a 
three part list of information that helps to identify the problems at hand. 
With each he accompanies his talk by producing a pointing gesture. For 
the first and third pointing gestures ((D and (D), Chris turns his head 
slightly to look at the respective parts of the media wall they indicate. 
However, for the second gesture ((D), Chris remains focused on the media 
wall, while the gesture points to the other side of the room. Therefore, the 
first gesture is treated by Chris as pointing to "Milan up there"; the second 
is not treated as providing the resources to locate where "overflow at 
Mondial^" may be seen; and the third is once again treated as locating 
"(techies) up there at Maddley and Kelvin". These three pointing gestures 
are distinguished by the participants themselves, such that the first and 
third can be seen to provide Chris with the resources to look at a 
particular 'object', whereas the second does not engender such a looking. 
The question is: what resources does Chris have to distinguish them as 
such?
Examining the physical form of the three gestures in isolation does not 
reveal how the participants distinguish them. Each gesture involves an 
outstretched arm toward a distant object in the room. However, much can 
be discovered from a consideration of the whole gamut of interdependent 
actions which make up a referential turn. In particular, there are two 
features of the turns which would seem relevant - firstly, the presence or 
not of a demonstrative, and secondly, James' line of regard during each of 
his pointing gestures.
For the first and third pointing gestures, the concomitant utterance 
includes a demonstrative - "up there" in both cases. However, for the
^Mondial, Maddley and Kelvin are all British International Repeater Stations. The RCO 
does not have the alarm screens for Kelvin. So they would have to phone them to find out 
if they have any problems there. Hence "you can’t look at Kelvin, so it’s no good asking 
you about that".
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second pointing gesture, James refers to "overflow at Mondial". He does 
not use a demonstrative. So, he does not strip the utterance of certain 
details such that it cannot be made sense of without a close inspection of 
some feature of the local milieu.
Moreover, for the first and third gestures James looks in the same domain 
that he points towards. For the second gesture, however, James wags his 
hand to his left, but turns his head to face Chris. His hand indicates the 
general direction in which that "overflow" is indicated (on a computer 
screen on his desk), but by not looking in that direction himself, he shows 
that nothing is relevantly visible over there. In order to see the "overflow" 
they would have to walk across the room.
So, each gesture demands being viewed in the framework of the talk and 
gaze which work with it. This complex of action enables participants to 
distinguish between those which point to objects to be viewed as opposed 
to illustrative gestures. The talk and line of regard of the speaker work to 
frame the pointing gesture as a resource to look or not.
This collaborative viewing of two features displayed on the media wall 
(they, of course, do not look at the "overflow at Mondial"), is situated  
within a problem-solving sequence. International Traffic Management 
deal with re-directing telecommunications traffic when circuits are, for 
whatever reason, temporarily overloaded (or incapacitated). It is not that 
the circuits have failed, just that they cannot cope with the amount of 
traffic trying to go down them. For instance, if  a hurricane was to strike 
Spain, then there would be a huge increase in the number of phone calls 
out of Britain to Spain, with people checking on the health of their friends 
and families there^. Extra routes would need to he found to cope with the 
extra load. So, whereas the RCO organises make-goods (essentially new  
routes) for normative circuits that fail, traffic management work with the 
circuits in place to re-direct overflow.
Sometimes, however, the systems which indicate traffic overloads can 
'hide' what turn out to be failed circuits. Therefore, ITM could be 
organising temporary measures to re-direct traffic, while the RCO have
'^That is one reason why the media wall displays a number of terrestrial and satellite 
television channels - so that members of the control room may keep abreast of news 
developments around the world and therefore anticipate increases in traffic.
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not yet been informed of the more serious problem of a failed circuit. To 
check this, members of the traffic management team can liaise with the 
RCO. The two groups use (and therefore have access to) different 
information systems. By comparing available data, personnel can 
establish the nature of an alarm. This can stimulate action on the part of 
the RCO, as they can then start chasing up the potential problem and 
begin organising a make-good.
By asking to be shown the problem indicators, Chris can get a sense of the 
problem itself. After having displayed a recognition of the problem 
("woaoh"), Chris then turns to the alarm screens on his desk to see if  these 
troubles are due to a failed circuit. As has been noted, they do not have 
the alarm screens for Kelvin, so such a check would require a phone call 
(which Chris offers to make some moments later). However, they do have 
the alarm screens for Maddley. This is the screen that Chris turns to, in 
order to give his answer ("no"). The showing of various features of the 
media wall enables Chris to get a sense of the problem at hand. This, 
then, informs the way he subsequently inspects his own systems, both in 
terms of which systems he looks at, hut also how he reads them. Through 
the collaborative viewing Chris and James establish some mutual frame of 
reference with which to address the problem at hand.
The whole package of James' actions help configure different orientations 
towards aspects of the visible world. It shows the critical importance of 
seeing gestures in regard to talk and other visual conduct. For the first 
and third gestures, the point emphasises a more specific orientation  
within a field of vision indicated by the speaker's line of regard. However, 
for the second gesture in the three part list, it may be seen as merely 
illustrative of a general area in which the relevant information may be 
located. Therefore, referential practice is understood hy participants with 
regard to the interplay of a whole range of bodily actions and the activities 
in which participants are engaged.
6.4 In stru cting  V iew ings: P resen tin g  a ’w ay o f se e in g ’
... he [Wittgenstein] says something like, "If I point to something and 
say 'this,' how are you supposed to decide that I'm talking about the 
nameable object, its colour, this side of it, its depth, whatever else?". 
That is to say, the very order of phenomenon being invoked by the 
indicator, is not invoked by the indicator.
Sacks, 1992 (Vol. 1), p. 518.
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The previous sections have shown that a co-participant has available 
certain kinds of resources in order to locate an object referred to in talk. 
The bodily orientation and the verbal reference to an object (whether that 
reference be through a deictic term or not), work together to reveal when 
those resources are available and to pinpoint the object referred to. 
However, the location of an object is not all that is involved in finding an 
object in interaction with others. As suggested in Chapter 5, a particular 
sense or characterisation of that object is discovered within the course of 
interaction. Given the potentially infinite number of characterisations of 
an object, the question becomes: what resources are available to a co­
participant such that a particular sense of the object is unproblematically 
seen? Once again the sequential environment and the emergent activity 
in which an object is encountered is critical. Consider the following 
firagment.
Chris, Martin and Tom are sitting at the console (see image i). Tom is 
complaining that they have not been taking collective responsibility to 
keep one of their many documentary records up to date. The document in 
this case is one of the plans in the Universal Restoration Manual (URM). 
These describe what steps should be taken if  any particular circuit fails. 
Tom has one of these plans on the desk in front of him. He is arguing that 
they should do a better job at entering changes that are occasionally made 
to the plans. As we join the action, Chris asks "how far is it out?" and then 
reformulates this utterance to ask how many faults there are in the 
document. In response, Tom holds up a page in the document and says 
"there's a fault in the plan there" and describes the nature of the error 
("there's no V.B.S. reference on there").
F r a g m e n t  6 . 3 ;  R C 0 1 2 / 2 / 9 3 - 9 î 5 3 i 2 5  
C M T
C: -w 'how far is it out?
(0.7)
T: well: I-I w'just looking at
this: now.
(0.4)
C : I mean, how many faults have
we got floating around?=
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a
T: =there's a fault in the plan,
there : (. ) there ' s no Vee : -
V.B.S. reference on there.
( 2 . 0 )
T: so:" when I go back to V.B.S.
now. I'm gunna- spend 
bloody ag[es,
C: Fno : hold'' on'' thats
Crystal Palace'' . . .
After Chris asks how many faults there are in the document, Tom 
encourages him to consider one example of a fault that he has just noticed 
in the plan^. He says that there is no VBS reference marked and, further, 
begins to suggest how that omission could impact upon the successful 
production of future work ("so when I go back to V.B.S. now. I’m gunna- 
spend bloody ages,"). So, there are certain questions to he answered: how 
is the document presented by Tom?; what characteristics are invoked as 
Chris encounters the document?; and what resources does Chris have to 
assess or inspect the document?
^During the 2 second pause (image iii) Tom's body continues to face the document even 
though his head is turned toward Chris. Moreover, throughout this period he continues 
to prop up the pertinent page of the document. It would seem then that his re-orientation 
to Chris is, and is displayed as, temporary, as his bodily orientation projects the 
continued and prospective relevance of the document. This posture and his look toward 
Chris is treated as some sort of 'display of recipiency' (Heath, 1982, 1986), where it is 
orientated to as demanding some next action. Rather than providing a subsequent turn 
at talk, however, Chris actually leans forward to read what is being referred to. It would 
seem that Tom withholds the continuation of his talk until his colleague had displayed an 
interest in looking at the 'fault' being discussed. As soon as Chris begins to move closer, 
Tom elaborates his complaint.
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When he presents the page, Tom says "there's a fault in the plan there". 
As he utters the deictic term (the noticeably louder "there"), he tilts one 
page of the plan towards his colleague, while continuing to look at it 
himself^. In isolation the page could be seen with regard to numerous 
characteristics - for instance, as an example of a page in a plan, an 
example of a printed page, a good information source, a bad information 
source, as displaying a great font, good quality paper or whatever. 
However, the way in which the ^age is presented constrains the sense 
which can be made of it by Chris, here and now.
Of course, there is the actual verbal characterisation of the referent as a 
"fault in the plan". However, this characterisation gains its determinate 
sense in a particular sequential environment. The presentation of the 
"fault" is embedded within a discussion about the production of their work, 
and more specifically, how many faults there are in the plan. Tom 
presents the "fault" as a response to Chris' question ahout how many 
faults there are in the document. It is presented as evidence of (at least) 
one fault that exists in the plan. Therefore, Chris sees it in regard to its 
adequacy as a response to his question. When Chris moves closer to see 
the details on the page (the "fault"), he inspects it with regard to its status 
as a fault and in terms of its ability to evidence a badly maintained  
document.
Indeed, Chris can he seen to orient to this, as he then goes on to discuss its 
status as a "fault". When he (eventually) leans forward to look at the 
document, he sees the candidate "fault" and begins to dispute its status as 
such: "no hold on that's Crystal Palace...".
So, this collaborative viewing is embedded within a debate about how well 
they are keeping the document up to date. That document is a book of 
plans, which they orient toward whenever a circuit fails. It presents the 
steps they should take to set up a particular make-good for a certain 
circuit failure. Each of the European adminstrations has agreed upon 
these steps. When the staff of the RCO contact remote colleagues (in 
Britain and abroad), they all have access to these plans and to the steps
®When Tom says "there", note how (the silent) Martin immediately turns to look at the 
document, whereas Chris makes no immediate effort to see the "fault". By comparing 
images i and ii, it can be seen that Martin turns his head towards the document, whereas 
Chris does not move.
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laid out. These plans can therefore be used to resolve any disagreements 
about how the circuit should be 'made good'. When changes are made to 
the agreed steps, the RCO should update their plans. If they do not, then 
their plans will be out of date. Therefore, they will not have access to the 
same information as remote colleagues. Indeed, they will be orienting to 
different steps and confusions can develop.
When Chris inquires "how many faults have we got floating around?", Tom 
responds by giving evidence of a specific example. He deals w ith a 
question about how many faults there are, using a collaborative viewing 
and concomitant discussion of a specific fault. This leads to a challenge to 
his characterisation of it as a fault - Chris moments later explains "that's 
Crystal Palace" and that the RCO "can't even see" Crystal Palace. So, the 
visible evidence which Tom provides to support his claim, is subsequently 
disputed.
Therefore, a viewing is 'instructed' by two interrelated and complex 
factors. Firstly, it is instructed by the characterisation of an object 
provided by the individual pointing it out - in this case as "a fault in the 
plan". Secondly, this characterisation is given its determinate sense 
within the sequential position in which that object is presented - in this 
case as a response to a question, where that response provides evidence of 
a badly maintained document. These resources enable Chris to see (and 
see unproblematically) the candidate "fault", rather than 'a piece of good 
quality paper' or 'a page of text'.
6.5 The In teraction al P roduction  o f  Instru ction
So, in pointing out an object, individuals provide certain kinds of 
instruction to their co-participants about how to see it. That object is 
presented and made sense of within a particular sequential environment, 
for instance with regard to its status as an answer to a question. This 
means that presented objects are encountered as particular phenomena - 
for example, they see a 'fault', or they see a 'puzzling item' and so forth. In 
such a way, viewings are instructed. However, it may be misleading to 
conceive this notion of 'instruction' in some stereotypical sense, where one 
speaker simply reels out directions. Individuals encouraging another to 
look at an object are deeply sensitive to their co-participants' actions and
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shape the 'instruction' accordingly, 
fragment.
To illustrate, consider the next
Rob and Steven are working on a restoration together. In the course of 
this work, and as the fragment begins, Rob asks about the time at which a 
remote colleague has said that the relevant transmission circuit failed 
("did he say what time it went?"). To explain his puzzlement surrounding 
this issue ("I couldn't understand that"), Steven, in turn, asks Rob about 
the way in which certain information is displayed on one of their alarm 
screens (the "AHS" monitor). In the course of this question, Steven  
encourages his colleague to look at the alarm screen with him. It is the 
way in which Steven describes what puzzles him about the information 
displayed that is of particular interest here.
F r a g m e n t  6 . 4 :  R C O l l / 5 / 9 3 - 1 2 ; 4 9 ; 0 0
R:
X I
B
did he say what time it went? 
( 0 . 6 )
if we (gonna [ )
[ w 'goonhi- (.) 
yeah::, well Goonhilly had 
it^-
(1.5)
>I couldn't understand< that 
(.) be[cause look 
[hm^ 'm: 
at the A.H.S:
(1.5)
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à
19 R
24 R
25
26 
27
=it ke;pt- (1.0) it kept 
appearing down the bottom, 
that's the latest one to come 
up wha- init? (.) the 
one in red.
( 0 . 2 )
(ee)y:es : [: :
[why d'you get one 
tha- (.) below it?
"that" says''
(2 .0 ) 
er: : [m:
[is that the latest 
alar:m? (.) (there")
(0.4)
28 R: I th: ink. (.) it mean:s
that one has cleared,
30 but it wz the latest...
(.)
X V
The four images show the gradual movement from a position of a general 
orientation to the range of monitors on the desk, to a more focused 
discussion of lines of text on one screen. Image ii shows the moment at 
which Steven begins to move closer to one of the monitors and calls for Rob 
to "look at the AHS". After this, and in various ways, Steven instructs Rob 
in how to view the AHS screen while pointing out different features of it. 
At every moment within this collaborative viewing, Steven displays a 
sensitivity to the activities of Rob and tailors his descriptions and actions 
with regard to those activities. Consider, for example, the sequence 
around lines 15-26.
At the screen face, Steven begins to describe the particular lines of text on 
the alarm screen that form the source of his puzzlement. In doing so, he 
points out a preliminary line of text prior to the one whose nature he 
actually queries. He displays his understanding of this first line ("that’s 
the latest one to come up wha- init? (.) the one in red"). In such a way 
Steven provides Rob with the realm of relevancies with which to interpret 
the text he subsequently points out ("why d’you get one tha- (.) below it?").
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These relevancies include both the spatial position of the subsequent line 
in relation to the first, but also the character of that text in relation to the 
first. More specifically, then, the text is seen with regard to the one above 
it, where the one above it is "the latest one to come up".
As discussed in Chapter 4, the RCO have these remote alarm screens 
depicting transmission problems at each International Repeater Station 
(1RS). The screen lists each of the circuits currently failed or being dealt 
with. Each entry is colour-coded, so that, for example, a new failure is 
indicated by red text. Also, entries are organised spatially to demonstrate 
their relation to each other. Picture 6.1 depicts Steven pointing toward 
'the latest one to come up, the one in red':
Picture 6.1; The "AHS" Screen
When Steven points towards one line of text and asks "that’s the latest one 
to come up wha- init?", he is providing a particular characterisation of the 
preliminary line of text. He is characterising it as "the latest one to come 
up". After a slight pause in which Rob makes no obvious move to agree, 
Steven provides more information about the line to which he is referring 
("the one in red"). It is not until Rob has displayed an understanding of, 
and alignment to, this characterisation ("(ee)yes-" in line 19), that Steven 
continues with his next turn. Only then does he shift the pen in his hand 
to a lower line of text and ask "why d’you get one tha- (.) below it?". So, 
Steven withholds the continuation of the showing until Rob has agreed 
with his characterisation of the first as "the latest one to come up". The 
showing does not progress until this is achieved.
Following this question ("why d’you get one tha- (.) below it?"), there is a 
pause of two seconds before Rob begins uncertainly with "erm". This
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hesitancy is treated by Steven as marking Rob's difficulties with the 
question. Steven elaborates. He provides a candidate solution to the 
question he has asked ("is that the latest alarm?"). This candidate 
solution elaborates the question by providing an example of the kind of 
answer that might be appropriate. In such a way, it focuses the field of 
potential answers.
Only at this stage does Rob begin his answer (lines 28-30). In fact, it 
would seem that Rob orientates to the consequence of the agreed 
characterisation of the line of text first discussed. He couches his answer, 
not in terms of the many features which one might pick out of such a line 
of text (e.g. colour, number of letters, general function, etc.), but in relation 
to the prior characterisation. Thus, he phrases his answer relative to its 
status as the latest one ("that one has cleared, but it wz the latest"), where 
the latest one was the first line of text pointed out by Steven ("that’s the 
latest one to come up wha- init?").
So, at various points, reference to these different lines of text progresses 
only in the light of Rob's displayed alignment to the ongoing development 
of the showing. In the face of a slight hesitancy in the first part of the 
showing, Steven elaborates his description (by adding "the one in red"). 
Then, he only moves on to describe the next item once alignment to the 
prior has been established. Finally, as Rob displays some difficulty in 
understanding, comprehending or dealing with the subsequent question, 
Steven reformulates it (by providing a candidate solution, "is that the 
latest alarm?"). So, the activity, and therefore the collaborative viewing 
which is embedded in and mediates that activity, only progresses with  
regard to the actions of Rob. Steven instructs Rob's viewing and tailors 
those instructions in terms of the emerging orientations of Rob. So, he 
does not simply reel out a question and point at some lines of text, but 
develops and organises this query in the light of Rob's actions.
This collaborative viewing organises and focuses the discussion. It is used 
to accomplish a workplace query about the nature of information  
presented on the AHS screen. Indeed, describing the complex of materials 
shown on the screen (Picture 6.1) would be quite difficult to produce with  
access to verbal utterances alone. Even Rob's subsequent answer includes 
numerous pointings towards features of that screen. The query focuses 
upon one line of text, but in many ways that text can only be made sense
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of in terms of its position with respect to the other lines of text. In 
particular, it is the spatial organisation of the screen materials that is in 
question. The query revolves around why a line of text appears below the 
line indicating the latest alarm triggered.
So, Fragment 6.4 illustrates the sensitivity with which participants 
engaged in referential practice attend to one another's actions. The 
context for viewing the object emerges and develops moment by moment. 
Each moment of the sequence provides the contextual environment from 
which the next action is configured. Once at the screen face, Steven  
discusses two lines of text in relation to one another. He elaborates his 
descriptions and reformulates his questions to help his co-participant see 
features of the screen when he finds him struggling to comprehend. In 
such a way, this activity of focusing on the object and how to view it, is 
accomplished interactionally. The way in which Steven 'instructs' Rob 
how to look at the AHS screen is produced with intimate regard to Rob's 
emerging actions. In such a way, it can be seen how instructions about 
how to view an object are tailored and refined with regard to the emerging 
actions and orientations of the other.
6.6 The In teraction al P roduction  o f R eferen tia l G estures
The discussion of the last fragment provides an idea about how  
instructions regarding where and how to view objects are organised with a 
certain sensitivity to the actions of the other. The discussion mainly 
focused upon turns at talk and how one turn is built in the light of the 
other's prior one. Interestingly, however, this senstivity can even be found 
in the design of referential gestures, used to instruct the viewing of 
another. So, it is not only the verbal 'instructions' which are shaped 
interactionally, but even the gestures used in referential sequences are 
produced and configured for the other. It will be shown how even the 
course of a gesture is shaped with regard to the ongoing actions of the co­
participant.
The examples which will illustrate this discussion are drawn from 
fragments which have been discussed throughout the chapter. These will 
be used to avoid further introductions to new participants, scenes and 
activities. This way the reader will hopefully already have a sense of the 
activities in which these gestures and the like are embedded.
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For the first example then, consider again Fragment 6.3, in which Chris 
asks Tom how many faults he has discovered in the paper document they 
are discussing. When Tom initially pinpoints a fault in the plan, he places 
his right hand under one of the pages and tilts it towards Chris. More 
specifically, as he uses the deictic term "there", he lifts the page up with 
his left hand, slides his right hand under it and retracts his left hand into 
his body. Once again, note how the deictic term is tightly co-ordinated 
with the physical presentation of the page:
F r a g m e n t  6 . 3 . 1
rh rests down
rh ///////////,,///////,,///.*slide* *steady
Ih *holds page__________________________ *retracts
T: there's a fault in the plan, there :"— there's
Clearly, when presenting an object to another, participants are attempting 
to get them to see some visible feature. Therefore, they try to present 
those objects to make it as easy as possible for the other to see it. This 
case provides a clear example of how an object is manipulated (by Tom) for 
the other (in this case Chris) to be able to find it and find it easily. When 
referring to the "fault", Tom could simply have produced a pointing  
gesture onto the document. However, he does not.
Chris is sitting to Tom's left, some distance from the document. Tom lifts 
the right-hand page of the document up and tilts it toward him. This 
presents it, even holds it towards him, inviting him to look at it. 
Moreover, Tom retracts his left hand from the document, which removes it 
from Chris' line of vision to the document. It makes the document more 
accessible for Chris to be able to both see what is on the page and to be 
able to move closer in to the document to read it. So, Tom's actions are 
designed with regard to the spatial position of his colleague in relation to 
the domain of scrutiny and in terms of his ability to view the document. 
In such a way, Tom makes it easier for Chris to read the document and see 
what he has referred to. By easing the ability of the other to look at the 
object, individuals both encourage that other to look at it and render that 
object 'most salient'.
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Therefore, the presentation of the object is "recipient designed" (Sacks, 
1992), it is produced with regard to the spatial location of the recipient in 
relation to the position of the referent. In many other instances, computer 
screens are tilted around to face another person for them to look at them; 
documents are lifted up and swung around to be placed such that another 
can view them and so forth. So then, objects are presented with regard to 
the position of the other's body when the showing begins.
Within the course of presenting an object to another, the changing 
orientation or emerging actions of that participant can also impact upon 
the form or shape of presentation. So, for instance, the dynamics of 
interaction can shape the design of a pointing gesture. Consider for 
example. Fragment 6.4 in which Rob and Steven are discussing the layout 
of information on one of their alarm screens and, more specifically, 
whether a particular line of text is "the latest alarm". Of particular 
interest are the activities around the 1.5 second pause in line 12:
F r a g m e n t  6 . 4  ( e x t r a c t )
8 S: >I couldn't understand< that
9 (.) be[cause look
10 R: [hm''m:
11 S: at the A.H.S:
12 (1.5)
13 S: =it ke:ot- (1.0) it keot
14 appearing down the bottom.
15 that's the latest one to come
16 up wha- init?
Steven begins to produce a referential gesture towards the screen quite 
early on in the 1.5 second pause. However, he turns a pen over in his 
hand in the course of building that gesture and he does not produce the 
final pointing movement (i.e. begin to move the pen to actually touch the 
screen) until the moment that Rob's body comes to rest alongside him  
(during "it ke:pt-"). The question is: why does Steven turn the pen over in 
his hand?
When Steven asks Rob to "look at the AHS", he is moving towards the 
AHS monitor (see image ii with the full transcript of Fragment 6.4). As 
the 1.5 second pause begins, Steven is already bent over it. However, Rob 
is only just beginning to move closer. In fact, to get in close enough to see 
the details on the screen, Rob has to step around a chair that lies in his
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way. This should be visible by comparing his starting position in image ii 
and the position he ends up in image iii (these images also accompany the 
full transcript) - in image ii the chair is to Rob's right; whereas in image iii 
it is on his left.
The use of the pen to point rather than using a finger requires that Steven 
turn it over in his hand so that it points toward the screen. This 
withholds the final pointing movement.
Now, when pointing something out to another, one wants them to be in a 
position to see that object and further, to be in a position to make use of 
the resources you are providing to help them see it. In this case, however, 
as Steven begins to produce his pointing gesture, Rob still needs to step 
around a chair in his way to get close enough to the AHS screen. Rob 
cannot see the details of the screen until he has done this. Steven's point 
would, therefore, seem to be forestalled until the time at which his 
recipient is able to see the very moment the gesture moves toward the 
referent. It is forestalled by simply turning the pen over in the hand prior 
to moving it in towards the screen. This allows Rob time enough to 
negotiate the chair in his way. So, the gesture is timed with respect to the 
emergent actions of Rob.
Moreover, it would seem to be forestalled to allow Rob to see the actual 
movement of the gesture towards the referent, rather than merely finding 
it already resting on the screen. This may allow Rob to both notice the 
production of the gesture and be guided towards the referent by the 
movement of the pen. It is forestalled such that it is designed to be seen  
and seen as it moves toward the object rather than after it has arrived.
The gesture is encountered in relation to the material terrain through 
which it is guided and the movement itse lf reveals much about the  
location of a referent. On a screen so packed with potentially relevant 
text, slight movements in the trajectory of the gesture can provide 
information about what is being pointed at; it can instruct the viewing. 
The gesture is seen with regard to where it has moved from and what it 
has moved past as much as where it finally comes to rest. Indeed, where 
it is taken to be finally resting can be discerned in part from where it has 
been seen to move 'through'.
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As noted earlier, for example, this showing focuses first on one line of text 
and then another. However, even in approaching that first line of text the 
gesture initially pauses at the one below it (the one it turns out that the 
query is all about). So, during the first part of the utterance ("it kept 
appearing down the bottom"), the gesture is at the bottom line of text, but 
then shifts up a line for "that's the latest one to come up". Steven's 
forestalling of the point therefore allows Rob to see this diversion, which 
instructs the way in which he sees these features on the screen and makes 
sense of the concomitant talk. Even at this stage, Steven can use the 
diversion of the gesture to project the upcoming relevance of the bottom 
line of text.
In the corpus, there are numerous other examples of pointing gestures 
being produced and timed with respect to the activities of the co­
participant, such that they are in a position to be able to see the pointing 
gesture in the course of its production. This timing of gestures not only 
includes the forestalling or withholding of points, as above, but also the re­
production of gestures in the form of tapping on a document for example. 
Rather than pointing once on the document, individuals tap on the 
document repeatedly, thereby repeating the production of the point. This 
not only highlights the gesture itself, but also displays the trajectory of the 
point, as if to guide (and encourage) the other into the specific referent. In 
each case the design of these points are sensitive to the activities of the 
recipient: where they are in relation to the object and thus whether they 
are situated in a position to see the referent as it is pointed toward.
So then, it would seem that gestures used to present objects to others are 
formed with certain regard for both the interactional and m aterial 
contexts of their production. Firstly, it has been shown how individuals 
presenting an object to another, orient their bodies and shape their 
gestures to facilitate a clear view of the domain of scrutiny. For example, 
Tom tilts one page of a plan towards Chris in Fragment 6.3. Therefore, in 
providing another with the resources to locate a referent, individuals tailor 
those resources for the recipient in terms of their spatial position in  
relation to the referent. Moreover, the presentation of an object to another 
is intimately tied to the ongoing actions of that other. That is to say, the 
ways in which a recipient varyingly orients towards an object (verbally, 
through gaze and through visual conduct) impacts upon the ways in which 
an individual presents the object to them. For instance, in Fragment 6.4,
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Steven withholds the eventual production of his pointing gesture until Rob 
has moved into a position to be able to see, and see in detail, the 
production of that gesture.
Returning to the broader issue of instructing viewings, therefore, it can be 
seen how even gestures used to instruct another on how to view an object 
are produced with intimate regard for the actions of those others. In 
particular, it is clear that when rendering visible some object in the local 
milieu, participants want the other to have unproblematic access to that 
phenomenon. This further acts to encourage the recipient to look at it. 
Therefore, participants configure their activities to try to avoid pointing to 
something such that the other is unable to see the artefact or pointing to 
something before the other has moved into a position to be able to see the 
artefact.
6.7 D iscu ssion
Chapter 5 discussed the ways in which individuals encourage co­
participants to look at an object with them. This chapter has developed 
this theme by considering how objects are presented to the co-participant. 
It has examined two issues involved in the presentation of objects: firstly, 
the resources a co-participant has to locate the referred-to object and, 
secondly, the resources available such that they encounter, and encounter 
unproblematically, a particular sense of that object.
The bodily orientation of the speaker becomes particularly relevant during 
sequences of referential practice. Although we are always facing in some 
direction and (parts of) our bodies are often in motion, those orientations 
or actions become especially important in the course of referring to visible 
objects. The line of regard of the speaker in conjunction with concomitant 
'pointing gestures' (with hands or head, for example) focus (to varying 
degrees) on specific objects or general domains of scrutiny. Indeed, these  
fragments highlight the material constraints upon how particular features 
of the local milieu may be presented. The mere size and distance from the 
floor of the media wall, for example, delimits the variety of ways in which 
an individual is able to show (aspects of) it to another. They would not be 
able to reach it, stroke it or otherwise physically manipulate (parts of) it. 
Thus the presentation of the object is very much tied to the object itself  
and what the object does facilitate. For instance, individuals can pick up
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paper documents and take them over to others; they hold up pages of 
documents for another to see; they swivel computer screens around to face 
a colleague and so forth. Moreover, if pointing out a monitor as opposed to 
a word displayed on that monitor, the concomitant gesture is designed 
differently.
The 'physical' resources to locate an object are tied to the talk in various 
ways. For example, deictic terms seem to mark when those resources are 
available for another to see an object. They render relevant the bodily 
orientation of the speaker at the moment of their production. It was 
shown how, in numerous cases, gestures are co-ordinated with these 
deictic terms. Sometimes, they reach a stable position on the referent just 
following the production of the term, but always they at least are 'on their 
way' to the referent during the term. Therefore, co-participants are made 
aware of when the resources are available for them to find the relevant 
object. This finding contrasts with Schegloffs (1984) work on iconic 
gestures, for example, in which he noted that an iconic gesture "... occurs 
before the talk it is built for, and up to co-incidence with that talk, and 
rather less after the bit of talk has been produced" (ibid., p. 291).
For the phenomenon at hand, this different pattern is critical for two 
reasons. Firstly, given that we are always looking in some direction or 
other, the deictic term provides a way of establishing when the orientation 
of the speaker should be treated as a resource for the other to find the 
referred-to object. Referential gestures are, usually, at least moving 
towards the referent and therefore allow the recipient to be guided to the 
relevant object when they turn towards it. Secondly, the activities in 
which collaborative view ings are embedded often demand some 
subsequent action in next turn; for example a question demands an 
answer in next turn. The ability to engage in that activity in next 
turn requires the ability to find the object quickly and unproblematically - 
they need to find the item as it is referred to. Moreover, they need to have 
the resources available until they have located the referent and can 
produce an answer, so often the gesture remains pointing to the object for 
some moments after the deictic term has been produced.
These findings have certain implications for the study of referential 
practice, or more specifically studies of reference to visible objects in face- 
to-face interaction. In particular, they reveal how deictic terms work
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within actual sequences of referential practice. It has been claimed 
elsewhere that deictic terms "act as pointers" and "specify the placement 
in space", yet it is unclear how these work as such. These materials would 
suggest that what counts as the "most salient" object is interactionally 
produced in embodied interaction. The deictic terms encourage another to 
look at an object and pinpoint when the bodily orientation of the speaker is 
specifically relevant as a resource to locate that object.
More generally, then, these findings show how consideration of the whole 
range of interdependent embodied actions are critical to an understanding 
of the practical accomplishment of reference. As Goodwin & Goodwin 
note, primarily in terms of studies of gesture, but also, and more 
relevantly, with regard to studies of deixis in linguistics:
Traditionally work on gesture in interaction (and deixis in linguistics) 
has drawn a bubble around the perimeters of the participants' bodies.
The body of the actor has not been connected to the built world within 
which it is situated.
Goodwin & Goodwin, 1992, p. 37.
Although more recently a number of linguists have taken the importance 
of embodied action in referential practice more seriously (Hanks, 1990; 
Havilland, 1992; Marslen-Wilson et al, 1983), they are still in the 
minority. The fragments discussed within the course of this chapter have 
begun to reveal how participants themselves attend to the practical nature 
of referencing and, in particular, the resources that enable a participant to 
be able to routinely turn to look at an object when it is referenced.
The second issue considered within the chapter was how individuals 
'instruct' others to see an object. In presenting an object to another, 
individuals do not only show where that object is, but they also instruct 
the other in how to view the object. In such a way, they present a 
particular sense of that object. Often they provide a verbal 
characterisation of the object (e.g. "a fault in the plan"; "one of these 
muwers"; "the latest one to come up"; etc.). However, the presentation of 
the object gains its determinate sense within a particular sequential 
environment. For example, an object is seen as an answer to a question, 
as evidence of a faulty document, as the source of a workplace query or as 
the punchline to a joke. The position of the collaborative viewing within 
the course of an activity, is critical to the way in which an object is seen.
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The object is inspected in terms of its status as an answer, a puzzle, or a 
joke, for instance. So, individuals often characterise the sense of an object 
when encouraging others to look at it with them (they instruct their 
viewing), but, moreover, the sequential environment in which that object 
is discovered is critical. It provides the realm of relevancies with which 
the object is viewed.
The presentation of an object is also 'deeply' interactional. Each step 
within the course of a showing is produced with intimate regard to the 
activities of the 'recipient'. For example, consider Fragment 6.4, in which 
Steven presented two lines of text to Rob. He elaborated his descriptions 
in the light of Rob's uncertainty and only progressed to his query after Rob 
agreed with his characterisation of the first line of text.
Even instructional gestures were shown to be interactionally produced. 
Part of encouraging another to look at an object with you, is about making 
it relatively unproblematic for them to see what you are looking at. 
Therefore, individuals shape their bodies such that the other has a clear 
view of the object. Consider Fragment 6.3, for example, in which Tom tilts 
a page of a document toward Chris and retracts his left hand to allow 
Chris a clear view of it. Or, for example, consider Fragment 6.1, in which 
Tom asks Chris about "that one there". Although he is right-handed, he 
gestures over the document with his left hand, so that Chris (to his right) 
has a clear view of both his gesture and the document. Moreover, it was 
shown how even gestures produced to instruct another's viewing are 
designed with regard to the emerging actions of the other. So, for example, 
in Fragment 6.4, Steven turned a pen over in his hand to point at part of 
the alarm screen, thereby withholding the production of the pointing 
gesture until his co-participant was in a position to be able to see it.
These findings display one aspect of the interactional nature of referential 
practice. They show how objects are presented to others, with intimate 
regard to their emerging actions. Indeed, these findings may once again 
resonate with contemporary moves within studies of deixis to reject the 
"Standard Account" (Jones, 1995) of deixis as 'egocentric' and in which the 
hearer is an outcast to, what Hanks (1990) calls "sociocentricity" - a 
fundamentally interactional account of deixis.
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The last two chapters have separated a series of issues. These have 
included how an individual encourages a co-participant to engage in a 
collaborative viewing of an object with them; what resources their co­
participant has to locate that object; and what resources their co­
participant has to discover a particular sense of that object, or how they 
are instructed to view the object. In order to do justice to the complexity of 
the phenomena, these issues had to be distinguished analytically. 
However, the fragments themselves reveal how all of these can be 
conflated into a single turn (e.g. "is that BST or MG?").
So despite the displayed analytic complexity, for the participants 
themselves it is a simple enough task to turn to see the object that another 
is showing them. In fact, one can quite easily see how linguists have 
tended not to spend much time considering the nature or form of a 
referential gesture, because for participants the referred-to object is easily 
located. It would seem that there is a tension between the trivial nature 
of the activity for the participants, and yet, the analytic complexity of the 
foundation to these collaborative viewings. A simple turn at talk and 
maybe a pointing gesture can encourage another to look for an object, find 
it and find its relevance, without any trouble at all. Indeed, for them, they 
are simply turning to see it.
So, collaborative view ings are built upon taken-for-granted (but 
nevertheless complex) features of face-to-face interaction. For example, 
individuals who encourage others to look at an object with them do not 
consider how they do this. Or, for example, when gesturing towards an 
object, participants do not examine how they are designing those gestures 
in the course of their production, they just do it. Imagine how self- 
conscious they would become if they thought about the very organisation 
of those activities as they attempted to accomplish them^.
'^Goffman (1967) provides a fascinating discussion of these issues of "involvement" in and 
"alienation" from interaction. For example, he describes the difficulties of hearing what 
another has to say, while simultaneously (and self-consciously) trying to be seen as a good 
listener. To be caught up in the latter makes it harder to accomplish the former.
133
C h a p ter  7
Recognising Recognition
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We have, then, the same undivided and common environment, each we 
may call "our environment". The world of We is not private to either of 
us, but is our world, the one common intersubjective world which is 
right there in front of us. It is only from the face-to-face relationship, 
from the common lived experience of the world in the We, that the 
intersubjective world can be constituted. This alone is the point from 
which it can be deduced.
Schütz, 1970, p. 193.
7.1 In troduction
The last two chapters have described some of the ways in which 
collaborative viewings are initiated. Firstly, they have discussed how 
individuals encourage others to look at objects with them. In particular, 
they have shown how individuals engage others in activities of which the 
viewing of an object is a constituent part. For example, when an 
individual asks a question which does not describe that object (but simply 
uses a demonstrative, for instance), their co-participant has some reason 
to look at the object they are pointing toward - namely, to attend to the 
demands of the question. Secondly, they have discussed how those objects 
are presented. This presentation provides the resources for another to 
establish (unproblematically) the location and relevant sense of the object 
being invoked. It was shown how showing an object is accomplished by a 
whole range of interdependent embodied actions. Also, it was argued that 
these actions (and the objects to which they point) are made sense of 
within particular sequential environments. So, the object is encountered 
as an answer to a question or in the course of a workplace query or as the 
punchline to a joke. This chapter will consider the next 'stage' in the 
organisation of collaborative viewings - what people do once they have 
seen the objects being shown to them.
When individuals point out an object to others, it would seem reasonable 
to suggest that they want that object to be seen. As Sacks notes with  
regard to 'having the floor':
One wants to make a distinction between 'having the floor' in the sense 
of being a speaker while others are hearers, and 'having the floor' in a 
sense of being a speaker while others are doing whatever they please.
One wants not merely to occupy the floor, but to have the floor while 
others listen.
Sacks, 1992 (Vol. 1), p. 683.
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Similarly, individuals point out objects for others to see them. For 
instance, if a question cannot be answered without looking at a particular 
object, the speaker would be irritated if  it is not looked at. Moreover, they 
would not just want any object to be looked at, but the very object that 
they have pointed out. This raises two interrelated issues regarding the 
subsequent actions of participants after an object has been presented to 
another. These issues will be the focus for the chapter.
Firstly, the chapter will consider the ways in which participants display 
that they have seen the object being shown to them. It has already been 
noted that collaborative viewings are embedded in particular activities, 
such as workplace queries, instructions and so forth. This chapter will 
show how displays of recognition are often embedded w ithin the  
appreciation of (the relevance of) the object to the emerging activity. This 
will reveal how displaying recognition of an object is intimately related to 
the nature of the activity at hand. Moreover, it will examine how the 
initiation of the collaborative viewing provides a recipient w ith the 
resources to assess how to respond to the object. The initiation projects 
the range of actions that could constitute an appropriate display of 
recognition. In essence, then, the chapter begins to consider how  
participants publicly display what they are seeing, through the activities 
in which they engage.
Secondly, the chapter will examine how those who point out objects can 
establish that the other has found the referred-to object and seen it 
appropriately. Objects are presented w ith regard to particular  
characteristics, therefore the object is seen 'appropriately' when it is seen 
with respect to those characteristics (e.g. as the answer to a question, as 
"one of these muwers", etc.) and not others. So, the chapter will consider 
how individuals can assume that their co-participant is looking at the 
'same' object as them and in the 'same' way. In particular, it will show 
how the very practices through which individuals initiate a collaborative 
viewing can then be used by them as a resource to establish that the other 
has seen the relevant object in the appropriate way.
It turns out that, sometimes, co-participants discover that they are not 
looking at the same object or in the same way. Indeed, in the course of 
th is chapter, certain fragm ents reveal m isunderstandings and  
misapprehensions. These are mainly problems individuals have in
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establishing some shared understanding of visible features of the local 
m ilieu. Interestingly, one of the two m ost common types of 
misunderstanding that arise in ordinary conversation is 'problematic 
reference' (Schegloff, 1987). Therefore, the analysis will consider the 
various ways in which participants may overcome these interactional 
'troubles'.
As such these concerns may be usefully located within a body of literature 
in Conversation Analysis concerned with exploring the nature of 'repair' 
and 'correction' in naturally-occurring interaction (see, for example, 
Schegloff et al, 1977; Jefferson, 1974; Sacks, 1992; Schegloff, 1992b). 
Whereas the term 'correction' is commonly used to refer to the 
replacement of an 'error' or 'mistake' (Schegloff et al, 1977), conversation 
analysts use the term 'repair' in a more general sense to refer to "... a 
fundamental form of organization in talk-in-interaction that provides 
mechanisms for the participants to deal with an immense variety of 
troubles in speaking, hearing, or understanding the talk" (Schegloff, 
1992b, p. 1341). It turns out that the mechanisms of repair also provide 
members with the resources to manage and maintain inter subjective 
understandings of inanimate objects.
Indeed, the chapter will use this discussion to consider some fundamental 
features of the problem of intersubjectivity. Re-visiting the work of 
Schütz, it will consider how the "world of We" is constituted within  
sequences of interaction. In particular, it will describe the resources 
available to individuals, which enable them to (continue to) assume they 
have a 'reciprocity of perspectives' with their co-participants and that they 
share a common environment. Then it will show how this assumption of 
"one inter subjective world which is right there in front of us" is also, and 
intriguingly, a resource with which individuals actually constitute  
(common features of) that world.
7.2 D isp lay in g  R ecogn ition
To begin this discussion, it may be worth indicating the kinds of actions 
that follow the moment at which individuals are shown objects by their co­
participants. The following three examples present the moment after an 
object has been shown to someone. Each depicts an image of that moment 
and the first utterance by the recipient after they have found the relevant
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object. They present 'snapshots' of action and thus cannot be used to 
explain how the viewings are organised, but they do reveal the wide range 
of actions that follow showings. It will be seen that although the actions 
are unique to the occasion and thus quite different in form, in each case 
the recipient displays that they have seen the object.
Example 7.1
1 I .  V - V  6
R: I th: ink. (.) it mean:s. (.)
that one has cleared, 
but it wz the latest...
Example 7.2
C: no : hold'' on'' thats Crystal 
Palace'' . . .
Example 7.3
M: o : : ''ooh: :
((Both participants then burst into 
laughter))
Prima facie, it may not seem that these examples are, in any way, similar. 
However, it is to be argued that each reveals a participant displaying that 
they have seen the object which has been drawn to their attention; indeed 
displaying recognition of that object.
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In the first example (drawn from Fragment 6.4), Rob answers Steven’s 
question about information displayed on the "AHS" screen. In the second 
(from Fragment 6.3), Chris challenges Tom's suggestion that the 
information displayed in the page represents a "fault". And in the final 
example (to be discussed more fully later in this chapter), Martin hoots 
with surprise ("o::^ooh::") and then bursts into laughter as Chris reveals 
two missing pages in a document. They are very different actions, yet 
they do all accomplish at least one action in common, namely displaying 
recognition of an object. To begin to reveal how this is so, consider two of 
the generic features of these examples.
In each case, notice how the participants are all looking at the same 
object, whether it be computer screen (see Example 7.1) or a paper 
document (see Examples 7.2 & 7.3). They are all visibly attending to the 
same domain of scrutiny.
Also, in each case the recipients are clearly attending to the activities at 
hand. Rob answers a question he has been asked. Chris continues the 
debate about a badly maintained document and Martin laughs at a 'joke'. 
So, in 'next' position each recipient remains attentive to the activity that 
has been initiated by their colleague.
It will be shown how these two common features of the examples, display 
that the recipients have found and seen the objects pointed out to them; 
that they display their recognition of the relevant object. However, even 
from a cursory glance at the examples, it is clear that this is accomplished 
in various ways. So, it will be shown how the sequential environment in 
which an object is encountered, provides the very resources through which 
recipients may display recognition of the object at hand. As each 
sequential environment (and each activity) is different, the display of 
recognition is necessarily configured differently.
7.3 A ppreciating  Objects in  Sequence
To consider how these various activities display that a co-participant has 
found and seen the relevant object, it is necessary to examine the 
sequential environment in which each object is encountered. In this way, 
the descriptions of the next two fragments will reveal how the subsequent 
actions of recipients display recognition of the relevant object.
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Consider Fragment 7.1, in which Rob directs his colleague's attention to a 
flashing icon on the telephone touch screen. During the course of asking 
Steven a question, Rob momentarily stops talking and jerks his body 
forward to examine the screen (see image ii). He then starts a new  
question ("whats that one. that’s not us, is it?"). The interest here, is how 
Steven's response can be seen to constitute a display of recognition of the 
referent.
F r a g m e n t  7 . 1 :  R C O  1 1 / 5 / 9 3  1 2 ; 3 6 ; 4 4  
R  S
XX
X X X
XV
ere. >d'you< know if there ws 
anything from Jeff 'earth, >or 
anyone< abou:t.
(0.4)
whats that one. that's not us, 
is it?
( 0 . 2 )
oh:"
(1.2) ( (S touches the TTS
and picks up a handset))
'(fuckin ell)° (0.3) I've not 
seen that'' one before''
(2.1) ( (S touches the TTS and
puts down the headset)) 
ee-I think it forwards through to 
the N.T.M. people.
140
The concern is in what Steven does after being encouraged to look at "that 
one" and, moreover how this displays that he has found and seen it. It will 
be shown that this is accomplished firstly by his attempt to answer a call 
(see image iii) and secondly by his answer to Rob's question, where Rob's 
question is "what's that one. that's not us, is it?". Clearly, these actions do 
a variety of things, but the point of interest is how they can be seen to 
reveal that the referred-to object has been seen. To describe how these 
actions show that Steven has seen "that one", it is necessary to examine 
first the sequential environment in which the object is encountered and 
thus how the collaborative viewing is initiated.
The question that Rob asks about the flashing icon is designed such that 
the referent cannot be recovered from the talk alone, it is merely described 
as "that one" ("what's that one. that's not us, is it?"). However, Rob also 
jerks his upper body toward the telephone touch screen and widens his 
eyes, which Steven is able to use to direct his own looking and locate "that 
one". Also, the witnessing is marked as somehow 'extraordinary', as it 
would seem to warrant the sudden jerking movement and the interruption 
of the prior, cut-off question ("d'you know if there ws anything from Jeff 
'eath, or anyone about..."). Furthermore, it is presented as potentially 
demanding their attention ("that's not us, is it?") and, moreover, 
demanding their immediate attention. Indeed, if it is a call for them, they 
need to answer it immediately.
So, in asking a question about "that one", Rob highlights the potential 
workplace relevance of the flashing icon. If it is a call for them, then "that 
one" demands that someone answer it and answer it now. If it is not a call 
for them, on the other hand, his question ("what's that one. that's not us, 
is it?") should expectably be answered.
Steven responds in the following ways. He is working on a paper 
document when Rob asks his question (see image i). However, when Rob 
jerks his body forward, Steven immediately looks up at the screen and 
drops the document onto the desk. He then presses the flashing icon and 
picks up a handset (see image iii - the handset is against his right ear). 
So, he ends his prior activity in order to answer the incoming call.
Steven attends to Rob's prior actions, therefore, by trying to answer the 
call. For him to be able to engage in this activity, demands that he has
141
understood where and what "that one" is. To make sense of Rob's question 
and the implicated potential demands of an incoming call, Steven must 
have found, and found the relevance of, "that one". Therefore, by trying to 
take the call, Steven displays that he has found both the object and 
discerned its relevance for the here and now; why it might be remark-able. 
That icon flashing is treated as a call for them.
Moroever, Steven physically displays the object he is attending to by both 
looking at the touch screen and also (and more powerfully) by touching a 
specific icon on it as he tries to take the call. This makes available to Rob 
(and to the analyst), his orientation to "that one".
Initially, trying to take the call is an appropriate response to the question, 
as the question provides the possibility for immediate action. It suggests 
that the call (potentially) needs to be answered. When Steven is unable to 
take the call, however, there are no more pressing demands that forestall 
his answer to Rob's question. So, he explains that it forwards through to 
National Traffic Management (NTM) (who are located elsewhere in the 
control centre) - see image iv.
Steven's immediate actions to respond to the call, directly attend to Rob's 
question. It shows, that a verbal answer is not the only way that an 
individual can attend to a question. Questions merely constrain the range 
of potential activities which may be appropriately carried out in next turn. 
Indeed, in this case, a verbal answer is not appropriate in the first 
instance. The question raises "that one" as potentially demanding some 
action (i.e. dealing with it), therefore, to explicitly 'answer' the question 
would delay the more pressing demands of the call. The question, then, 
produces a sequential environment in which answering the call is a 
potential next action.
In attending to the demands of the flashing icon, Steven appreciates the 
(relevance of) "that one" for the here and now. He appreciates that if  it is 
a call for them, it must be answered. In doing so, he displays that he has 
seen the referred-to object, as the question itself ("what's that one? that's 
not us, is it?") does not reveal the exact nature of the relevant object.
This begins to reveal the links between the initiation of collaborative 
viewings and the subsequent displays of recognition. In particular, co-
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participants display their appreciation  of the object in the light of the 
actions projected by the initiation. Moreover, that appreciation publicly 
displays that the relevant object has been seen. In Chapter 5, it was 
shown how individuals encourage others to look at an object with them. 
For instance, it was shown how masking the identity of the referent in a 
question (by the use of demonstratives and so forth) means that the co­
participant must look at the referent, and look at it in a particular way, in 
order to be able to answer the question. Therefore, producing an 
appropriate answer to the question reveals that the referent has been 
seen. They answer (or otherwise attend to) the question in the light of 
having seen the object.
Clearly not all showings take place in question-answer sequences, 
however. Nevertheless, it is possible to start to understand the differences 
between displays of recognition in the three examples depicted at the 
beginning of the chapter. Those next turns, in each example, 
accomplished different actions. Yet, in their various ways (and within  
their various activities) they all similarly display that the object has been 
seen.
The different ways in which collaborative viewings are initiated are key. 
The initiation builds the sequential environment in which objects are 
encountered, and moreover, the local, practical relevancies with which 
those objects are perceived. So, the initiation suggests how an object may 
be appropriately seen and appreciated in next turn. It is to be appreciated 
in terms of the sequentially relevant actions projected by the initiation. 
By appreciating the object, then, the fact that the object has been found 
(recognised) is also made publicly available. They must have found the 
object to be able to appropriately attend to the activity at hand. Moreover, 
the sequential position in which an object is encountered shapes the 
perception of the object. The object gains its determinate sense in the 
course of the activity and in a particular sequential environment.
This study only touches on a few examples of a small number of activities, 
mainly those most prevalent within the work of the RCO. However, as a 
simple example of an activity other than a question-answer sequence, 
consider Fragment 7.2, in which Eric requests that Martin attend to the 
distribution of a particular document, a document that he brings over with 
him. This fragment reveals how the appreciation of the object can be quite
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minimal and thus how often participants rely upon certain assumptions 
about what is unproblematically visible to the other. As the fragment 
begins, Eric, who works within another section of the control centre, walks 
up from behind Martin (see image i in which Eric's hands and the 
document are visible to the left of the seated Martin) to present a 
document before him (see image ii).
F r a g m e n t  7 . 2 ;  R C O l l / 5 / 9 3 - 2 5 9 0 ( c )  
E M
XX
£
X X X
M:
E:
tha:(t)" (.) fi'nal.
(.) to : go out.
( 0 . 8 )
ch(h)eers:.
(0.4)
if you can arrange for 
the dis : tribution 
of that'' (.) as per normral 
( 0 . 2 )
X V
M: okay. (.) will do.
During the course of the fragment, Eric shows Martin a document, 
requests certain actions to be taken on it and, as the encounter comes to a
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close, hands it over to him. Martin merely thanks Eric and agrees to 
distribute it. Once again, the initiation of the collaborative viewing must 
be considered in order to understand how Martin's actions adequately 
display his recognition of the document ("that").
Immediately prior to drawing level with his colleague (and before he 
begins his first utterance), Eric aligns his own gaze toward the document 
in his hands, then eases it in front of Martin. As Martin looks up (Photo 
ii), he sees where Eric is looking and subsequently redirects his own gaze 
to the document (Photo iii). 0.3 seconds later, Eric begins to make his 
request ("that, final, to go out.").
By maintaining his own gaze on the document in his hands, Eric renders 
that document (and a looking towards that document) relevant to the 
upcoming talk. In most episodic encounters, mutual gaze is established at 
the onset. However, the 'deviation' from the norm in this case, reveals to 
Martin that the document is the subject of the encounter.
Martin's turn to then look at that document displays his attention to and 
engagement in the activity at hand, and, more crucially, his orientation to 
the document itself. His looking displays that he is making sense of the 
talk with regard to the document.
Furthermore, Martin subsequently displays his appreciation of the 
document. When Eric requests for the distribution to be carried out "as 
per normal", he invokes a history of similar document distributions. It is 
presented as a routine activity. Therefore, when Martin says "okay, will 
do", he displays his orientation to the request with regard to this kind of 
document as routine and unproblematic. At the end of the encounter 
Martin takes the document from Eric.
So, Martin displays his recognition of the document by appreciating the 
relevance of the document for the here and now. Eric has presented "that" 
to him and asked for it to be distributed "as per normal". Martin does not 
say much, but attends to sequential demands of Eric's utterances by 
taking the document and saying "okay, will do.". He displays that he has 
understood the request and understood it with regard to the document 
before them.
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Critically, Martin physically displays his orientation toward the 
document. He firstly looks at it and then takes it from Eric. This holding 
of the document clearly (and physically) displays a recognition of the 
object. In the earlier instance (Fragment 7.1), Steven pressed the flashing 
icon. In other cases, recipients point at the relevant object. In different 
ways therefore, these actions physically demonstrate the co-participants' 
orientation to the object at hand. They provide a visible display of the 
object that they are attending to.
Within collaborative viewings the recipient recurrently looks at the same 
object, or at least the same domain, as their co-participant. They 
physically attend to the relevance of the feature at which their co­
participant is looking, rather than something on the other side of the room 
or under the table or whatever. The feature to which their co-participant 
is attending is treated as the appropriate visible focus of the discussion. 
Looking at the same object as the speaker provides a physical display of 
alignment by the recipient to the relevant object.
Sometimes recipients are already looking in the same direction as the 
speaker when the colaborative viewing is initiated. Yet within a number 
of fragments, recipients still seem to move their head slightly (e.g. tilting  
the head, leaning an inch closer or whatever). In many cases, these  
movements would not seem to afford a better view of the referent, but 
rather they work to d isp lay  that they are actively attending to the 
pointing, and have found (or are in the process of looking for) the location 
of the relevant object. This phenomenon is what Goffman termed "body 
gloss", where the individual "... pointedly uses over-all body gesture to 
make otherwise unavailable facts about his situation gleanable" (Goffinan, 
1971, p. 11). In these cases, where an individual can quite easily see the 
referent without moving, they can make slight shifts in posture to display 
that they are attending to it.
Two features recurrently seem to display a recpient's recognition of the 
relevant object. Firstly, they appropriately attend to the activity at hand 
with regard to the object. This is tied to the way in which collaborative 
viewings are initiated. Individuals appreciate objects being shown to them  
with regard to the sequential environment in which the object is 
encountered. To be able to engage in these activities appropriately 
recurrently demands that they have seen the relevant (i.e. referred-to)
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object. For example, they answer a question which refers to an object. Or 
they agree to carry out a task on a particular object. These could not be 
accomplished without seeing the relevant object. In such a way they show 
their appreciation of it.
Also, in each case, recipients produce a physical display that they are 
attending to the relevant object. For example, they look in the same 
domain as the speaker, they take the relevant document from the other or 
they press the referred-to flashing icon. These bodily activities make 
available their (visual) orientation to a particular object. Indeed, 
dependent upon the activity at hand, merely looking at the object may 
simultaneously display an appreciation of it. For example, Christensen 
(1993) has discussed the use of the command to "look" within communities 
of school children. It would seem that an appropriate response from other 
children can be simply to look with the person who points out the object, 
be that a swollen toe or a bleeding finger, indeed it can prove problematic 
if  they comment on that mutual w itnessing further. So, the very 
appreciation of such a showing can be embodied in the act of looking itself 
and nothing more.
7.4 Do You See What I See?
It has been shown how the ways in which individuals display that they 
have seen an object are intim ately tied to the way in which the 
collaborative viewing is initiated. So, for example, a question about an 
object is appropriately followed by an answer to that question with regard 
to that object. This section will develop this theme by considering how 
individuals establish that the other has found the object that they have 
pointed out. Indeed, it transpires that the very way in which they  
initiated the collaborative viewing can then be used as a resource by them. 
This is because the activity they initiated projects the ways in which the 
other should appropriately appreciate the object. This is to say that 
displays of recognition by a recipient are not just of interest to the analyst, 
but also reveal to their co-participant that they have found the referred-to 
object. To illustrate this, consider Fragment 7.3, in which a series of 
objects are presented to Martin.
Immediately prior to the start of this fragment, Chris and Martin are 
jovially discussing where one of their colleagues has gone (indeed Martin
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finishes off that topic in lines 2-4). As this discussion comes to an end, 
Chris swivels his chair around to look (half-heartedly) for that colleague. 
As he does so, he notices a document lying on the desk. It is a one of the 
many books of plans that they orient to when co-ordinating a make-good^. 
As we join the action Chris picks it up and begins to show parts of it to 
Martin. In presenting the document, Chris reveals three separate pages of 
the document, which he encourages Martin to appreciate by reading out 
the associated plan numbers. Then Chris renders visible a fourth item  
and Martin expresses surprise ("ox^ooh::"). Laughter follows. It turns out 
that two pages of a plan are missing.
F r a g m e n t  7 . 3 ;  R C O 1 2 / 2 / 9 3 - 1 0 : 1 0 : 5 0  
C  M
X I
ÿoÆM
ere, a you se[en this?
[he's got got a 
knack of that, to just 
saun:t off.
(2.7)
6 C: I'm not going bats, am I
7 look. look.
8 (0.3)
9 M: "wassat°
10 (0.2)
11 C: plain
12 (.)
13 M: twenity [five.
14 C: ['five'
15 (1.5)
16 M: plain twenity five.
17 (0.2)
18 M: olain twenitv six.
19 (1.0)
^As discussed in Chapter 4, all of the major telecommunications companies agree upon 
the make-goods that will be ideally organised when any particular (international) circuit 
fails. Therefore, these plans detail the alternative dedicated routes to be set up in the 
case of any failure, including information about which spare circuits should be used.
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XXX
X V
20 C: t'says that dun it?
21 (0 .2 )
M: it says that. I/ll vouch for
that, cos I can see that 
with my own eyes,
>that says twenty< th- 
o : :^ ooh::
( (both participants burst 
into laughter))
So, Chris renders visible four items. The first three showings seem to 
provide the contextual environment in which the fourth is encountered. 
However, all four items are each appreciated in turn. The particular 
interest here is in the resources that Chris has to establish that Martin 
has found the appropriate object. Once again, it is necessary in the first 
instance to consider the initiation of the showings.
Chris encourages Martin to "look, look." at the document that he places 
before him. This document is full of plans, each of which cover a number 
of pages, therefore each page displays the number of the plan of which it is 
a part. Chris points towards the page numbers on a series of pages and 
encourages Martin to read them out. In line 11, for example, Chris's 
"plain" projects and elicits a completion by Martin. The way in which 
Chris says "plain" projects some next part, but only with reference to the 
document can the next part be produced. By pointing to the number in the 
corner of the page Chris highlights the plan number as the next part. 
Further, Chris (quietly) joins in by saying the number out loud (line 14). 
As Chris presents each of the next two pages, Martin duly utters the plan 
numbers in each case.
By encouraging Martin to read out the plan number on the first page 
shown, Chris is able to instruct his reading of the document. There is a 
great deal of information contained on each page, so Chris is acting to 
render relevant a particular feature of the page; the plan numbers. This 
also acts to show Martin how to appropriately appreciate each subsequent
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item; i.e. by speaking them out loud. Indeed, on the third occasion, Chris 
merely has to turn the page for Martin to read off its plan number. He 
does not even have to point at it.
Therefore, in the very initiation of the collaborative viewing, Chris both 
instructs Martin how to read the page and also how to appreciate each 
one. As a result, Martin displays what he is looking at on each occasion by 
reading out the plan numbers. In such a way, Chris can 'hear' what 
Martin is seeing. Chris can hear that Martin is attending to the plan 
numbers on each page, for he has encouraged him to read them out. He 
knows therefore, that, at each and every stage of this showing, Martin is 
attending (and attending appropriately) to the relevant objects.
Following the presentation of three plan numbers, Chris turns to face his 
colleague and with a smile on his face he says "t'says that dun it?" (see 
image iii). Then he looks again at the document to prepare to reveal 
another feature of it. In such a way, Chris marks off the prior showings 
from the upcoming one. He builds a contextual environment in which the 
final showing is to be situated, that is in relation to the set of previously 
revealed plan numbers. Furthermore, Chris' smirking, sm iling and 
grinning throughout the fragment sets the 'flavour' of the showing as well 
as utterances such as "I'm not going bats, am I". He thereby instructs 
Martin in how to see or treat the upcoming object. He projects a comical 
viewing.
It is certainly orientated to in such a fashion, for when a further part of 
the document is presented to Martin he produces a prolonged hoot of 
gleeful surprise ("ox^ooh::"). with which he interrupts his own talk. This 
time no explicit instruction in how to view the page is required. He laughs 
out loud as he unproblematically finds the humour. By projecting the 
humour of the 'object', Chris provides for the way in which Martin may be 
seen to have found that 'object'. To find the object would be to find 
something funny, or at least, attend to the potential humour of it. So, as 
Martin's response quite publicly displays that he has found something 
funny, Chris knows that he has found the relevant object in the 
appropriate way.
After the laughter dies down, it transpires that two of the pages of the 
paper plan are missing. This may provide some clue to the seemingly
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extended or m ulti-stage nature of the showing. It is a problem to 
demonstrate that something is m issing, as that object itse lf  quite 
necessarily cannot be seen. Therefore Chris shows what is there in order 
to reveal the 'gap' in the plan, the incomplete set. In such a way, Chris 
can be seen to prepare the ground as it were, by drawing Martin's 
attention to certain pages that do exist in the document, prior to revealing 
where the missing pages should be. By instructing Martin how to display 
his understanding of the relevant feature of a page, he instructs his 
viewing. The initiation shows Martin how to perceive the document.
The verbal displays of appreciation function to make available to Chris, 
Martin's continuing alignment to the activity at hand. Moreover, they 
reveal his continuing and developing alignment to the unfolding pages of 
the document. Therefore, it can be seen how these appreciations are 
simultaneously retroactive and proactive.
They can be seen as retroactive, as the initiation of the viewings instructs 
the ways in which each page may be appropriately viewed and responded 
to. The appreciation comes in the light of, and is built with regard to, the 
initiation.
They can be seen as proactive because the viewing develops and emerges 
following the appropriate production of each appreciation. Returning to a 
theme introduced in Chapter 6, the viewing is built interactionally, such 
that it only progresses following the displayed alignment towards certain 
features of the object - in this case the plan numbers. In this way, each 
appreciation (the reading out of a plan number) can be seen as proactive. 
Indeed, the final laughter to mark Martin's appreciation of the m issing  
pages, can also be seen as proactive, because, following the end of the 
transcript, a discussion develops about the missing pages. Martin's hoot 
displays a common basis from which a discussion about the relevance of 
the missing pages develops.
Although, it is presented in a light-hearted fashion, the problem revealed 
is highly consequential for their work. It is essential that these plans are 
kept in order, as they could be needed at any time. On any occasion in 
which the are organising a make-good they need to orient to the relevant 
plan. They know many of the procedures without requiring the paper 
documentation, as some circuits fail over and over again (for instance, and
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in the words of one member of staff, "it's always that goddamn Brussels 
8"). However, sometimes they are unfamiliar with, or merely need to refer 
to, the numerous stages of action detailed in a particular plan. If, when 
they begin to use that plan, they find that two pages are missing, the way 
they can address what needs to be done would be impeded. Given the time 
critical nature of their work, this presents a problem.
So it would seem that this seemingly light-hearted or comical showing is 
used to draw Martin’s attention to a potentially vital piece of work-related 
information, that could save time if  that plan is needed to be used in the 
near future (while copies are prepared or the originals searched for). By 
presenting the document to his colleague, he shows him the very location 
of the problem and later they discuss what is to be done about it. The 
presentation of the problem stimulates action over how to deal with it.
So, the ways in which individuals point out an object provide the very 
resources with which they can establish whether the other has found and 
seen that object. The initiation of a collaborative viewing provides for a 
sequential environment in which the other is encouraged to look at an 
object and respond to it in particular ways. Thus, the recipient's 
appreciation of the object reveals whether they have found the relevant 
object. Moreover, the appreciation of an object can be seen to be both 
retroactive and proactive. That is to say, the recipient's appreciation of an 
object is shaped by the initiation of the collaborative viewing but also 
provides the basis for further action.
7.5 D isp lay in g  M isunderstanding
In the very notion of seeing as an achievement, a perceptual success, is
built the liability of the failure of not achieving.
Ryle, 1949, p. 226.
The fragments so far discussed within this chapter have depicted  
instances in which one individual has pointed something out, then their 
co-participant has unproblematically found that object and displayed an 
appreciation of it in terms of the way in which it has been pointed out. In 
such a way, the participants have seamlessly achieved a common referent 
which allows the activity to progress - a workplace query is solved, the 
relevance of some missing pages are discussed and so forth.
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Indeed, in  m ost cases, show ings are accom plished equally  
unproblematically; objects are found and form the basis for further action. 
They are often accomplished in a matter of seconds seemingly without too 
much attention paid to their production. Answers to questions are given 
w ith regard to some document, laughter is produced following the 
presentation of a comical object and so on. Nevertheless, there are 
occasions in which individuals are unclear, for whatever reason, of what is 
heing shown to them or, indeed, why it is being shown to them. In such 
situations, individuals, just as they can display their understanding and 
appreciation of an object, can display their lack of understanding. In order 
to illustrate this, consider Fragment 7.4, in which Chris points to part of a 
document on which Martin is working.
Chris is on the phone discussing the current status of a failed circuit. As 
the fragment begins, he is in the middle of saying that the make-good is 
still in operation and that the normative circuit has not yet been repaired 
(lines 1-2). In the course of this utterance, however, he forestalls the 
telephone conversation to check the situation with Martin (line 4)^. 
However, there is some delay before Chris points to part of a document on 
their desk and says "this". The particular interest here is the slight 
confusion that develops during the course of the sequence (lines 7-21) and 
how that confusion is both highlighted and resolved.
^The way in which someone engaged in a telephone call can render a particular utterance 
explicitly consequential for a copresent other without naming them or achieving mutual 
gaze is remarkable. With a slight pause (0.2 seconds), a slight raise of the voice and an 
even slighter shift in bodily orientation, Chris quite unproblematically manages to have 
Martin hear the utterance in line 4 as produced for him and as requiring his immediate 
attention, rather than being part of the ongoing telephone call. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that Martin is attending to a separate task. It is not, for instance, that he is 
waiting on his colleague. So, even seemingly slight transformations of posture, talk and 
so forth can be detected as consequential by participants (both on the other end of the 
phone and sitting nearby). Chris returns to his conversation with the caller in line 25, 
and simultaneously physically turns away from Martin (see image iv).
153
F r a g m e n t  7 . 4 ;  R C O  1 2 / 2 / 9 3  1 5 ; 5 5  
C  M
I X
X X X
X V
3
1 C: = yeah we're up an' runnin'
2 eh- as far: as- ((on ’phone))
3 (0.2)
4 C: we are still on make good
5 en't we.
6 (1.3)
7 M: on wha:t?
8 (3.0)
9 M: sorry?
10 (2.3)
11 M: tu''
12 (.)
13 C: this.
14 (0.6)
15 M: this'' (.) whart?
16 (0.3)
17 C: i [s i'on make good.
18 M: [tuh
19 (.)
20 C: ih-ihw-they they they
21 di[n't restore it normal.=
22 M: [oh" yes : :.
23 M: =no-no they aven't
24 re[stored tha:t.
25 C: [no: its-its- still on-
yeah we're up an' runnin' 
on make good yeah, 
sorry, go on.
Although the confusion between Chris and Martin can be seen to extend 
for a number of turns at talk, line 15 is of particular concern here. It 
reveals the difficulty Martin has making sense of Chris' utterance "this" 
and his concomitant gesture toward part of the document on the desk (see 
image iii, where Chris is pointing with his left arm). The discussion will 
explore what "this, what?" reveals about Martin's orientation towards the 
referred-to "this". Firstly, consider the initiation of the sequence.
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Martin replies fairly promptly to Chris' initial question ("we are still on 
make-good en't we") by asking which circuit is under discussion ("on 
what?"). However, Chris does not elaborate on his question for some 8 or 9 
seconds, at which point he indicates part of the document on which Martin 
is working (and looking at) and says "this". Martin then asks "this, 
what?".
Martin may be unclear about whether the question he was asked a few 
moments ago is still being dealt with; or he may feel that he misheard or 
misunderstood that initial question; or he may not initially see how this 
object has anything to do with that question at all; or he may not realise 
how to read "this" as it could be interpreted as a reference to a failed 
circuit, but also a number of other things. Whatever the reason(s), he 
certainly displays some problem in attending to the demands posed by 
Chris saying "this" and pointing to part of the document under his nose.
Chris is in fact dealing, in a somewhat delayed position, with Martin's 
earlier question, "on what?" and he is pointing to something which refers 
to the failed circuit of interest to him (and the caller). However, Martin 
displays a problem with the showing and, more particularly, what to do 
having seen the object or what the relevance of the object is.
Chris' "this" and pointing gesture are oriented to by Martin as demanding 
something of him; they require that he 'do' something with regard to 
"this". In previous fragments, it has been revealed how after being shown 
an object, participants have provided an answer to a question, agreed to a 
request, laughed at a joke or whatever. These have all been accomplished 
in 'next position', once they have seen the object. However, in this case, 
Martin is unclear about what is expected of him.
It would seem that, in this instance, Martin has found the relevant object, 
the "this" that is referred to by Chris, but is unclear about what to do 
having seen it - why this now?, as it were. Certainly Chris treats Martin's 
"this, what?" in such a way. He does not give more detailed instructions 
about the physical location of the relevant object or what it looks like. 
Instead he elaborates the nature of the question he is asking; he explains 
why he is interested in "this". So, although Martin seems to find the 
object being shown to him, he also displays a lack of understanding over
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what he is to do having seen it. In such a way they have established a 
mutual referent, but the relevance of that referent to the here and now is 
rendered problematic by the recipient.
In earlier fragments, the appreciation of the object also displayed that the 
object had been found. For instance, answering a question with regard to 
a visible object seems to reveal that that object has been found. Therefore, 
in many cases appreciation and recognition are conflated into a single 
action. Yet, this fragment begins to unveil a members' distinction between 
seeing (or finding) the relevant object and appreciating its relevance. This 
distinction is not always evident, but in certain cases, such as this, it is.
So, through his utterance "this, what?", Martin displays that he has found 
the object, but is unsure about why it is relevant. He does not know how 
to appropriately appreciate it. Nevertheless, he is able to express this 
problem and characterise the nature of his misunderstanding. Thus, the 
next position (following Chris' "this") provides Martin with an opportunity 
to voice his concerns regarding the object. It is the flip side of being able 
to display appreciation of the object in next position, in that there remains 
the possibility that a participant may not appreciate why they are being 
shown an object.
These problems would seem to arise, because of the distance between the 
initial question and the identification of the referent. The question asked 
by Chris does not identify which make-good he is talking about. However, 
when Martin asks which one it is, Chris does not tell him. It is likely that 
the caller says something which otherwise occupies him. However, when 
Chris does eventually point out the relevant case, "this", it has somehow 
lost its sense in the unfolding sequence of actions and leads Martin to ask 
"this. what?".
In this example, the recipient (Martin) displays a problem appreciating 
the object. He displays that he has found it, but does not know what to do 
having seen it. However, recipients are also afforded the opportunity to 
display other kinds of troubles in 'next' position. Participants may also 
complain that they do not know where to look or they do not know what to 
look for or whatever. So, although it was shown earlier that the 
sequential organisation of interaction provides participants w ith the
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opportunity to display their understanding of what they have seen, it also 
affords them the opportunity to reveal their lack of understanding.
This fragment has also revealed a members' distinction between  
recognition and appreciation. So, participants can display that they have 
found an object, but do not necessarily know why they are looking at it.
So, in next position, individuals who are shown some feature of the local 
environment may not only display an appreciation of the object with  
regard to the activity at hand, they may also present their difficulties in 
appropriately appreciating that object. This may then elicit elaborated 
instruction firom the 'pointer' about where to look, how to look at it and/or 
what to do having seen it. The ways in which individuals display their 
(mis)understanding of an object, therefore, allows their co-participant to 
address those problems and to help them to find or understand it.
7.6 M isapprehensions and R epair
It is ... through the use adjacent positioning that appreciations, failures, 
correctings, et cetera can be themselves understandably attempted.
Schegloff & Sacks, 1974, p. 240.
The last section considered how individuals may reveal they are unclear of 
where to find, how to view or what to do with a referred-to object. Those 
attempting to point out the object can then address these problems to help 
them find or appreciate it. They can, in effect, elaborate their  
instructions. However, as we shall see, problems in establishing a shared 
referent are not always 'spotted' by those to whom an object is pointed out. 
Sometimes, they display that they have unproblematically appreciated the 
object and, yet, it transpires that they have not. This section deals with 
such 'misapprehensions'. It will begin to explicate the means through 
which individuals may ascertain that another has not seen the object, 
even when they have displayed recognition of it in next turn. Consider, for 
example, the next fragment in which Rob and Chris interpret an 
information screen quite differently.
The two colleagues have been collaborating over a particularly problematic 
restoration and are currently waiting for various international colleagues 
to accomplish tasks that they have co-ordinated. As the transcript begins, 
Chris turns to ask Rob what the current situation is, or as he puts it: "how
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we doin son?". Rob invites his colleague to see or judge for him self by 
encouraging him to look at one of the alarm screens. He also seems to 
take this moment to check the situation by reading the screen information 
him self - he says "well, d'know", which displays that he may not have the 
answer until he has examined the screen himself. Therefore, this activity 
has a dual purpose of finding the information for him self to answer the 
query, while simultaneously encouraging his colleague to find the answer 
for himself. It is the subsequent discussion and interpretation of the 
screen image that is of particular interest, as competing readings of the 
image develop.
F r a g m e n t  7 . 5 :  R C O l O / 5 7 9 3 * 3 - 1 7 ; 2 7 ; 2 5  
R  C
TTTrTTTTlZTlSf ft
11
1 1 1
IV
r.
C: how we doin' so:n?
( 1 . 0 )
R: well, d'know.
( 0 . 6 ) 
well its
all [quiet on the Western.
[presumably thats up 
there :, so=
C : =ves; : (0.7) ve[s: :
[no. (.) no.
its re:d still. 
(0.5)
w'thats alright its only 
Sto:ckholm"(0.6) prrrh:
(1.0) °hhh (1.0) th(h)ey're 
used to being cu(h)t o(h)ff 
ha-ha-ha °huh
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The utterance of particular interest is Rob's "no. no. it's red still", in which 
he challenges Chris' prior turn. The concern here is to establish what 
resources Rob has to recognise that Chris has not treated the information 
presented on the screen in the same way as himself.
The activity in which the participants are engaged revolves around a 
question regarding the current work situation ("how we doin son?"). This 
is what the participants are dealing with. The alarm screen has been 
rendered both visible and relevant in an attempt to answer that question. 
Indeed, the alarm screen provides the information from which a 
judgement about the current situation can be generated. Therefore, when 
Rob and then Chris begin to read the information on the screen, they are 
reading it with these practical concerns at hand - to assess the current 
work situation.
Chris is the first to proffer a reading when he says "its all quiet on the 
Western" or 'its all quiet on the Western Front' - a British colloquialism 
meaning everything is calm or fine at the moment. During Chris' 
utterance, however, Rob begins to project his own assessm ent  
("presumably that's up there, so"). Before he finishes, though, he is 
interrupted as Chris excitedly says "yes, yes". Chris' reading of the 
information suggests that their job is done and the restoration has been 
successfully accomplished. Certainly Rob treats it as a positive  
assessment, as he provides an alternative: "no, no, it's red still".
Earlier in this chapter it was shown how individuals can see that the 
other has found the referred-to object. Indeed, the very ways in which 
they initiate the collaborative viewing provide the resources with which 
they can see that they have found it. That is to say, if their co-participant 
attends appropriately to the activity at hand - for instance by producing 
an answer to a question with regard to the object - they can be seen to 
have found the relevant object. Of course, these resources not only allow 
individuals to see that the other has found the object, but similarly, reveal 
when the other has not found it. This is a case in point.
Chris' excitable "yes, yes" displays his appreciation of the alarm screen 
with regard to the activity at hand, where the activity at hand is assessing  
the current work situation. It is used by Rob to reveal a potential missed 
noticing or misunderstanding. It is treated as a problematic assessment.
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Indeed, it enables Rob to conclude that Chris has not interpreted the 
screen in the same way as himself. Rob proceeds to point out that one of 
the relevant lines of text is still coloured red, marking the circuit's 
continued failed status.
The first way in which they would be able to tell if  the restoration had 
been successfully accomplished would be if  the relevant red signals on the 
alarm screen disappeared, and there would be a number of lines of text 
which would have to change colour to indicate a successful restoration. 
However, Chris does not say "oh I didn't see that there", but rather he 
suggests that that feature of the alarm screen, that red line of text, is 
irrelevant for the practical purposes at hand; that it is irrelevant for 
assessing whether the restoration has been successfully co-ordinated. In 
particular, he notes that the failed circuit that persists only continues to 
cut off a telecommunications route to Stockholm and that this a minor 
concern because they are "used to being cut o ff . He presents it as a 
recurrent problem for Stockholm.
Rob is a fairly recent recruit to the RCO, so in certain informal ways, and 
w ithin the course of this sequence, he is instructed how to read 
information on their alarm screens in situations like these. Although in 
theory all red lines of text indicate problems yet to be dealt with, Chris 
provides Rob with an alternative practical understanding, i.e. that some 
lines of text are 'more red than others' as it were. Some display more 
pressing working concerns whereas others, like this circuit to Stockholm, 
are less problematic (due to a fairly minor amount of traffic on that route 
or whatever). As Goodwin (1994) highlighted, professional work shapes 
the ways in which an object is perceived. Therefore, Rob is being, if  only 
informally, instructed on how to read information available on one of their 
information screens. In such a way, he is being shown a 'professional 
vision', just as Goodwin's archaeologists teach students how to examine 
and categorise a cross-section of earth.
Rob is able to discern a difference in their respective readings of the alarm 
screen, with reference to the activity through which the collaborative 
viewing is initiated. Chris' appreciation of the screen is seen with regard 
to the practical purposes of assessing the state of a restoration. Chris' 
reading of the screen ("yes. yes.") is treated as a positive assessm ent by
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Rob. Rob is then able to take issue with this such that they can resolve 
their competing versions.
Although appreciating an object with regard to the activity at hand does 
make available participant's orientations toward the relevant object, 
sometimes misapprehensions arise which are not displayed in next 
position. Misapprehensions may be uncovered much later in the course of 
a discussion or even within the course of discussions about some object 
that occur days later. An illustration of a misapprehension uncovered 
within the space of a few turns, but not revealed in next position, can be 
found in Fragment 7.6, in which Martin asks Chris what he knows about a 
particular restoration.
As we join the action, Chris is finishing one telephone call just as another 
incoming call (from the Mondial telecoms station) is flashing up on the 
touch screen telephone display. At this very moment, Martin asks him a 
question about the current state of a restoration displayed on an alarm 
screen and, more specifically, what Chris knows about it^. In lines 6-7 
Martin leans towards the alarm screen and points to a part of it as he 
refers to 'that' ("th:a").
F r a g m e n t  7 . 6 :  R C O  1 2 / 2 / 9 3  1 5 ; 5 6  
M C
X3.
1 C: ( (call completion))
2 (0.4)
3 M: .hhh (.) >right''< before you
4 answer Mondial's call.
5 what do you know ab^ou::t
6 (1.4)
7 M: th: a .
8 (1.4)
9 C: nothing.
10 (1.4)
11 M: I got a bloke here claiming
12 that we know all about it
^Martin's turn ("right, before you answer Mondial’s call,what do you know abou::t") is 
built to project a brevity to the proposed activity, to suggest that Chris should not be 
prevented outright from answering the incoming call from Mondial.
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It was noted how asking a question of another can encourage them to look 
at an object, i.e. so that they can answer that question. This fragment 
provides a further example of this. Martin points out the referent, "tha", 
on one of the alarm screens. In order to be able to answer the question, 
Chris must look at the referent. However, the question does not only 
motivate Chris to look at the alarm screen, but it also provides him with 
the resources to establish what to do having looked at it; that is to provide 
an answer.
Indeed, in line 9, Chris does provide an answer to Martin's question. He 
says that he knows nothing about the case which has been pointed out. If 
the sequence had ended at this stage, a claim could have made that 
"nothing" by appropriately answering the question, displays recognition of 
both the location and the relevance of the line of text. That is to say that 
Chris seems to display an appropriate appreciation of the text in the light 
of the question that has been asked. Indeed, Martin seems to treat the 
referent as mutually secured, that they are both orienting to the 'same' 
object, at least for the purposes of dealing with the question. He certainly 
treats his colleague's response as adequate within his next turn, as he 
goes on to introduce the reason for his question, "I got a bloke here 
claiming that we know all about it". He is talking about "it" without 
pointing towards any object. Therefore, he has begun to develop the 
discussion with regard to the now assumed common referent. He assumes 
that Chris knows what "it" is and, moreover, that they have a shared 
notion of what "it" is.
This again reveals the proactive nature of appreciations. Chris' 
appreciation of "tha" with regard to the question - "nothing" - provides a 
context from which the discussion can develop. Martin assumes a common 
referent and builds from that to begin to deal with the reason for the 
question - "I got a bloke here claiming that we know all about it". So, the 
participants develop their activities while assuming that the referent is 
secured. However, moments later, evidence arises that renders 
problematic that assumed mutual orientation:
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F r a g m e n t  7 . 6  c o n t i n u e d
11 M: I got a bloke here claiming
12 that we know all about it
13 (0.8)
14 C: no-ones^ spoken to me about Zagreb.
15 (1.2)
16 M: not^ Zazgreb^, Gloucester.
When Chris asserts that no-one has spoken to him about this case, a 
misapprehension is discovered. Maybe Chris is treating the prior turn as 
challenging the fact that he knows nothing about the case or, maybe, he is 
asserting that not only does he have no details about the case, but no-one 
has even mentioned it to him, thereby contesting the caller's claim. He 
may even orient to the potentially problematic nature of the identification 
of the referent, as a potential solution to the dilemma facing them - that 
the caller claims to have spoken to someone in the RCO that knows all 
about it. Whatever the reason, Chris certainly finds it relevant to assert 
that no-one has spoken to him about the case and make explicit the 
referent in terms of a location to which the cable runs ("Zagreb"). In such 
a way, he reveals the line of text to which he is orienting.
This is the first point at which one of the participants makes verbally 
explicit some feature of the screen that has been pointed at. It is also the 
moment they discover that they have been discussing completely different 
cases displayed on the alarm screen - as Martin says "not Zagreb, 
Gloucester". Given that the alarm screen provides a list of current circuit 
failures, all items on that screen potentially constitute aspects of current 
work in the RCO. Therefore, any item on that screen could be relevantly 
asked about. Furthermore the finger at the end of any pointing gesture 
produced with regard to the screen could cover one, two, maybe even three 
items located there (see Chapter 6, for a picture of such an alarm screen). 
So, it would seem quite understandable how a confusion may arise in this 
case.
They had assumed that they were looking at and discussing the same 
case. Martin had pointed to it and Chris had not displayed any problem 
finding it. They had begun to develop their discussion with common 
regard to it, but moments later they discovered that they are not talking  
about the same case at all. So then, a recipient can seemingly produce a 
sequentially appropriate display of appreciation, participants can assume
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that they have secured a common referent and yet, later on, this 
assumption can be proved incorrect.
As discussed earlier, misapprehensions may be discovered in next position 
following the displayed appreciation of the object. However, the  
appreciation of an object in terms of a particular activity may also conceal 
a misapprehension and it may only be discovered later in the encounter or 
plausibly, as hinted at earlier, some later date when the participants are 
required to refer once again to that activity. Therefore, participants' 
orientations towards particular objects ongoingly provide a resource for 
their interlocutors to ascertain whether they are indeed looking at the 
same object. That is to say, each and every subsequent action by the 
recipient provides further evidence for their co-participant to establish  
whether they are looking at the same object. And vice versa.
Fragment 7.6 provides further illustration of this, because a further 
misapprehension develops. Although Martin recognised that Chris had 
been orienting to a different line of text and therefore a different 
restoration, it turns out that even after securing the same line of text, a 
particular feature of that text is then missed or ignored by Chris.
F r a g m e n t 7 . 6  c o n t i n u e d
16 M: not'' Za-.areb'', Gloucester.
17 (0.8)
18 C: oh:'' Glou"cester.
19 (0.3)
20 M: yeah
21 (0.3)
2 2 C: ye:SB its its: been made good, erm Wales and
23 West have made it good.
24 (1.0)
25 M: it doen't look very made good to me.
26 (0.5)
27 C: oh that'', no thi-I mean the-the-'' (.) the-the-
2 8 they're just sti:ll trying to make it good.
29 I've got to get onto em=
30 C: =in fa[ct I'll do it right now.
31 M: [oh right, okay.
Once Martin has said that his question was in reference to "Gloucester", 
not "Zagreb", Chris produces what Heritage (1984b) has called a 'change of 
state' term ("oh Gloucester"), which marks his shift in orientation away
164
from "Zagreb" to "Gloucester". Then, Chris renews his appreciation of the 
original question in the light of, what is for him, the 'new' case (line 22-23). 
He explains that their colleagues in the "Wales & West" district have 
already dealt with it, they have already set up a make-good. However, 
this is also rendered problematic as Martin says "it doen't look very made 
good to me".
Whereas previously Chris was looking at and dealing with a different line 
of text than Martin, now their misunderstanding revolves around a 
particular feature of the 'same' line of text, probably that the text is still 
coloured red, indicating that it has not yet been 'made good'. Thus, the 
misapprehension rests on how to view that object. Once again the 
confusion is dealt with and Chris begins to attend to a new course of 
action, by re-contacting the Wales & West office.
Notice once more how the members' distinction between recognition and 
appreciation is displayed. Notice how expressions like "oh Gloucester" 
reveal a recognition of the object, while not committing to a renewed 
appreciation for some moments later (lines 22-23). So, it can be seen that 
although appreciation can be conflated with recognition, they can also be 
distanced, as in this case.
There would seem to be a number of reasons why misapprehensions or 
misunderstandings might arise within the course of particular showings. 
For instance, participants may discover that they have been discussing 
different objects, as occurs at the beginning of Fragment 7.6. Indeed, this 
would seem to be a potentially recurrent problem within artefact-rich 
environments, where many work-related objects can be clustered close 
together, for instance lines of text on a computer screen. However, even 
when participants are looking at the same object, the feature of that object 
relevant to the activity at hand may be misapprehended or even contested. 
So, consider Fragment 7.5, in which the same line of text on a computer 
screen is alternatively assessed as demanding further action because it is 
"red still", versus inconsequential to the restoration because it is "only 
Stockholm". Within both examples discussed the problems are revealed 
when the participants provide a display of appreciation of the object.
Troubles can also be revealed through the ways in which someone is 
looking for an object. For instance, if  a person is looking in the wrong
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direction, their co-participant may be able to discern that they cannot be 
looking at the relevant object (even if  they claim to be). For example, in 
the course of Heath's discussion of the impact of recording equipment on 
his study of medical consultations, he refers to a particular fragment of 
data (Heath, 1986, pp. 11-14). In that fragment, we find a child pointing 
out the video camera to her father. Although her father turns to look 
where she has pointed, he does not swing his head around far enough to 
see it. The child, recognising this, then encourages him to turn further.
Also, it may not just be the direction in which someone looks, but how they 
look which can reveal whether or not they could have found the object. 
Indeed, the way we look reveals much about our ongoing orientations:
..the characterization of our visual orientations to the world is both 
variable and extraordinarily subtle in its range of possibilities. Blanket 
attributions of 'seeing' to normally sighted persons in ordinary 
circumstances will not capture these distinctions. Even if we grant that 
many visual-perceptual verbs in their conventional contexts of use can 
be subject to attributions of 'seeing', it is clear that we can, and do, 
distinguish between [them] ... We say such things as: ... 'You weren’t 
just looking at me, you were staring at me!'
Coulter & Parsons, 1990, p. 262.
So, for example, through their movements, participants can show that 
they are reading, inspecting or merely glancing at an object. These can 
reveal whether they are appropriately attending to the object. For 
example, within motorcycle testing, if  a rider looks in their mirror twice in 
quick succession, the examiners often interpret this as indicating that 
their initial gaze at the mirror was for show (for the examiners to notice) 
rather than to see the state of the traffic reflected in the mirror' .^ So, the 
way in which someone looks can be used as a resource to determine what 
could be seen.
The practical purposes at hand provide individuals with the resources to 
assess whether or not their co-participant has seen the object that has 
been rendered visible. Moreover, this is an ongoing and emergent 
resource. Each turn at talk, each looking, each action that follows the 
presentation of the object continues to reveal that other's appreciation of 
the object with regard to the activity at hand. Maybe they are looking in 
the appropriate domain, maybe their utterance in next turn is
would like to thank Marcus Redley for drawing this to my attention.
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sequentially appropriate with regard to the object and, yet, as Fragment
7.6 reveals, moments later it may turn out that the participants have not 
achieved a common referent at all.
Interestingly, it is the very way in which individuals in itiate the 
collaborative viewing that builds the resources with which they are able to 
assess the orientations of the other. The sequential environment in and 
through which the other is encouraged to look at an object, constrains the 
potential ways in which that object might be appropriately attended to. 
This, then, enables individuals to see whether the other has found the 
relevant object in the appropriate way.
7.7 D iscu ssion
The last three chapters have gradually revealed a description of the 
organisation of collaborative viewings. This has encompassed the 
discussion of a series of issues. Firstly, they have considered how  
individuals encourage others to look at an object with them, by engaging 
them in activities which cannot be accomplished without visible regard to 
that object. Secondly, they considered how individuals instruct their 
colleagues to find and see the 'same' object. This highlighted the embodied 
nature of referential practice, such that participants see an object by using  
resources provided by the interplay of talk and visual conduct. It also 
revealed the critical relevance of the sequential environment in which the 
object is discovered. Thirdly, they have revealed how participants display 
that they have found the relevant object in the appropriate way. As 
collaborative viewings are initiated such that the object is critical to the 
accomplshment of the activity, continuing to engage appropriately in that 
activity (necessarily) reveals that the object has been found. This has 
been termed appreciation of the object. This is supported by a physical 
display of attention to the speaker's domain of scrutiny. These two 
features provide a resource for those who have pointed out the object to 
discover whether or not the other has found the relevant object.
Throughout these chapters, the critical importance of the initiation of the 
collaborative viewing has been highlighted. The way the viewing has been 
initiated permeates the organisation of the viewing as a whole. Indeed, it 
builds the framework within which the occasioned sense of the object is 
constituted.
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Consider the example of a workplace query, when a question is asked with 
regard to a local, visible object. The co-participant is encouraged to look at 
the object in order to be able to attend to the question - maybe by 
providing an answer in next position, but as Fragment 7.1 demonstrated, 
there may be other ways of attending to the question. Therefore, the 
object is seen (constituted) by the recipient with respect to the question 
asked.
The occasioned sense of the object is consituted for the practical purposes 
of answering the question. Moreover, the next actions by the recipient are 
sim ilarly made sense of with respect to the question asked. The 
appropriateness of those actions in next position reveal whether they can 
have found the relevant object. For example, have they turned around far 
enough to see it (a resource used by the little girl who to tries to get her 
father to see the camera in Heath's account)?; are they having trouble 
producing an answer?; does the next turn make sense as an answer to the 
question (e.g. the two misapprehensions in Fragment 7.6)?; does the 
answer contradict the questioner's characterisation of the object (e.g. 
Fragment 7.5)?; indeed, does the recipient explicitly say that they do not 
know where to look or do not know what to do having seen the object (e.g. 
Fragment 7.4)? If troubles are identified, then the questioner can provide 
further instruction in how to see the relevant object.
The participants themselves orient to particular characterisations or 
features of those objects - indeed, what those objects actually are (for the 
participants) at that moment in time. For example, a computer is seen at 
that moment in time in terms of the practical purpose at hand. It is seen 
within the activity at hand. It is variously seen as the answer to a 
question; it seen as evidence of a faulty record; it is seen as a puzzling 
object; it is seen as an instruction; or whatever. Indeed, it may not even be 
'the computer' that is focused on, but the colour of the screen, a line of text, 
a word, a picture, a brand name. Even when analysts sit down to list all 
the characteristics of an object, they are seeing it with those practical 
purposes at hand: i.e. what would the appropriate characteristics of such 
an object be for this list we are creating? This practical nature of 
perception produces a unique sense of the object each time it is acted on or 
towards. The sense of the object is therefore indexical, as it cannot be 
retrieved apart from the interactional context in which it is encountered.
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This leads into a discussion of how a shared notion of the object is 
consituted. To what extent do two people see the 'same' object?
Schütz suggested that an object^ cannot be experienced by individuals in 
exactly the same way. He argues that this is so, for two taken-for-granted 
reasons. First of all, individuals occupy different physical spaces and 
therefore are positioned differently with regard to that object, thus objects 
are seen from different distances and perspectives. Secondly, the 
biographical situations of each participant encountering the object is 
necessarily different, thus furnishing them a different system  of 
relevancies with which to view it - what may be a meaningful photograph 
of their grandmother for one is just a picture of an old lady for another.
Nevertheless, Schütz suggested that common-sense thinking overcomes 
the differences in individual perspectives through what he has termed the 
general thesis of reciprocal perspectives. His thesis incorporates two basic 
idealizations of common-sense thinking:
i) The idealization of the interchangeability of the standpoints: I take it 
for granted - and assume that my fellow man does the same - that if  I 
change places with him so that his "here" becomes mine, I would be at 
the same distance from things and see them in the same typicality as he 
actually does; moreover, the same things would be in my reach which 
are actually in his. (All this vice versa.)
ii) The idealization of the congruency of the system of relevances: Until 
counter-evidence I take it for granted - and assume my fellow man does 
the same - that the differences in perspectives originating in my and his 
unique biographical situations are irrelevant for the purpose at hand of 
either of us and that he and I, that "We" assume that both of us have 
selected and interpreted the actually or potentially common objects and 
their features in an identical manner or at least an "empirically 
identical" manner, namely sufficient for all practical purposes.
Schütz, 1970, pp. 183-184.
This ties back to the argument about the constitution of objects in terms of 
the practical purposes at hand. Although two individuals cannot see 
exactly the same object, they can see an "empirically identical" object. For 
the practical purposes of telling a joke, giving an instruction, answering a 
question and so forth, they can see the same object. They only need to be
^Like Garfinkel, Schütz uses the term 'object' in a broader sense than adopted in this 
thesis. For Schütz, this term includes not only physical objects, but also features of the 
social environment (cultural artefacts, language, etc.).
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able to appropriately accomplish the task at hand to have seen the same 
object, to have constituted a shared sense of that object.
Schutz's work also suggests that individuals assume a common world until 
or unless that assumption is proved incorrect. Indeed, throughout the 
chapters, it has been seen how individuals point to an object and assume 
its availability. Indeed, the way some viewings are initiated rely upon 
this. Consider, for example, questions asked using a demonstrative to 
reference a visible object. These questions cannot be answered without 
the other turning to find the object. In such a way, the speaker assumes 
that that object can (or can potentially) be seen by their co-participant.
Similarly, individuals experience a fundamentally intersubjective world of 
objects. They assume that what is available to them is, for all practical 
purposes, available to their co-participants. Building on this assumption 
they can refiexively constitute features in common. Consider, for example, 
how individuals asking a question can mask the identity of the referent in 
the talk. They provide the resources to find the referent, however, by 
pointing toward it. Therefore, they assume at least its potential 
availability. In such a way, they constitute a shared sense of that object, 
while simultaneously assuming its pre-existence as an objective fact - as 
part of a world standing before them. So, individuals use the assumption 
of a world-in-common, objectively standing before them, as a resource in  
order to refiexively produce or constitute it (c.f. Pollner, 1974).
Moreover, participants have certain resources to allow them (confidently) 
to continue to make these assumptions; time and time again. Firstly, they 
are rarely led to believe that they are wrong in assuming a common world 
(although see Chapter 9). Secondly, they have the resources to discover 
and resolve any troubles that arise. How participants 'appreciate* an 
object in next turn (and with regard to the activity at hand) can be used by 
them to assess whether or not they are seeing the 'same' object.
These appreciations can reveal misunderstandings and misapprehensions 
of the relevant object. For example, in Fragment 7.4, Martin revealed his 
problems identifying the relevance of the restoration being pointed out to 
him ("this. what?"). In Fragment 7.5, when Chris reads the alarm screen, 
he subsequently screams "yes. yes.". This makes available to Rob, his 
reading of the screen in terms of assessing the work situation. Further, it
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reveals their competing versions of the relevance of that screen to that 
activity. Once these 'troubles' are revealed, the sequential organisation of 
interaction provide participants with the resources to 'repair' them. For 
instance, in Fragment 7.5, Rob then says "no, no it's red still", referring to 
one of the circuits displayed, and the discussion develops about how to 
appropriately interpret the information presented on the screen.
Wootton (1994) has revealed a similar organisation of repair with regard 
to object transfer. He focuses upon the ways in which a small, pre-verbal 
child requests particular objects. He describes a sequence which runs 
something like Request-Offer-Comment(or Third Position). The child's 
response to the candidate object transfer (accepting it, turning away from 
it, re-requesting another object or whatever) displays whether or not they 
want that object, and is also used by the adult to decide whether the object 
being passed is the appropriate one. In such a way, Wootton suggests that 
"...there is in third position a display of inter subjective alignment between 
the actions of the parent and the child" (Wootton, 1994, p. 562).
The fragments discussed in this chapter similarly reveal how the person 
who has pointed out an object can assess whether the other has found that 
object - i.e. with reference to their appreciation of the object. Indeed, as 
Schegloff (1992b) argues, the "defense of inter subjectivity" is loca lly  
managed. That is to say, although it is an ever-present resource, it is 
invoked as and when deemed situationally relevant by the participants 
themselves in the course of their everyday affairs. Moreover, he also 
argues that it is interactional and sequential'.
It is set into operation in a turn-by-turn metric at just the point at 
which problematic understanding appears incipiently consequential, as 
evidenced in the ostensibly interactionally responsive conduct of an 
interactional coparticipant.
Schegloff, 1992b, p. 1338.
However, this does not only occur in "third position". Each and every 
subsequent action with regard to the object provides a basis to uncover 
misapprehensions. Thus, an individual's subsequent orientations to the 
object provide a resource with which their co-participant can assess  
whether they are looking at the same object. This never stops, there is no 
time out in the production of the world. As Garfinkel suggests, social life 
is not a series of flights and perches, but is continually in flight. There is
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no moment of 'interpretative closure', where the sense of the object is 
stabilised or "fixated" (Amann & Knorr-Cetina, 1990). Rather, the object 
is momentarily (re)produced with each and every action in the sequence. 
In such a way, the constitution of the object can be seen to be reflexive to 
each action within the interaction.
So, the thesis is proposing a more radical notion of the construction of 
objects than evident within many sociological texts. It has demonstrated 
how participants them selves see (constitute) the occasioned sense of 
objects in interaction with regard to the practical purposes at hand - 
answering a question, finding a joke, and the rest. Moreover, through the 
sequential organisation of interaction "...a context o f publicly displayed  
and continuously up-dated intersubjective understandings is systematically 
su sta in ed"  (Heritage, 1984a, p. 259, original italics). Given, that 
participants ongoingly reveal their orientations toward objects, the sense 
of those objects may be constituted only momentarily. The relevant 
features or characterisation of the very same object (a line of text) is 
variously re-constituted over a sequence of turns. Objects are refiexively 
and ongoingly (re)produced. As Garfinkel explains:
While we say there is an outer horizon - which means other relevant 
objects - the relations between these objects changes with each moment 
of activity. Just like the physical horizon that changes with every 
change of perspective, the world of the natural attitude is altered by 
every action.
Garfinkel, 1952, p. 341.
So, it has been argued that participants make sense of objects, produce the 
sense of objects, constitute objects with regard to the activities in which 
they engage. These activities provide the framework within which 
participants both see an object and make judgements about whether some 
intersubjective alignment toward that object has been achieved.
Moreover, and quite intriguingly, a critical resource in the consitution of 
the occasioned sense of an object is the common, taken-for-granted 
assumption that that object is pre-existently available. Thus, individuals 
experience a fundamentally inter subjective world - and as they assume it, 
they constitute it. Imagine the alternative. One would have to provide 
long descriptions of the referent prior to asking a question about it. 
Rather than embedding the collaborative viewing of an object within the
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activity, securing the referent would become a long and arduous activity in 
its own right. However, individuals can and do assume a pre-existent and 
common environment. They assume that when they point towards an 
object, their co-participant has, at least potential, access to seeing that 
object. Moreover, the sequential ordering of activities provides the 
resources with which they can ongoingly test those assumptions.
The past three chapters have described the complex and detailed  
organisation of rendering visible an object to another. Although it is 
routinely experienced as a simple task, the complexity of this foundation 
to action is critical. If such an organisation did not exist, how would we 
know where to look when someone asked us about something? how would 
we know when to look at that thing? how would we know whether we had 
found it? and how would we discover its relevance for us? All of these 
issues have been addressed in detail to show how basic interactional 
activities are accomplished.
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C hapter 8
Eliciting Showings
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8.1 In troduction
The three preceding chapters have examined a range of issues related to 
the organisation of collaborative viewings. In particular, they have shown 
how objects are presented to others and how some inter subjective sense of 
that object is, if  only momentarily, constituted. However, the majority of 
the fragments discussed involve one individual encouraging another to 
look at an object that they themselves are looking at. In fact, collaborative 
viewings are configured in all kinds of different ways. As a result the 
relevant objects stand in relation to the activities in which they feature in 
a variety of ways.
This chapter will introduce two specific kinds of collaborative viewing to 
augment those discussed previously. This will facilitate a more wide- 
ranging discussion about the ways in which objects stand in relation to 
action.
Firstly, there are many occasions in which individuals ask for something 
to be pointed out to them. That is to say, a participant will encourage 
another to show them the location of a specific artefact. This chapter will 
examine how this is accomplished and organised. Moreover, it will 
consider the interactional constraints then placed upon those who ask to 
be shown something. In particular, it will consider the kinds of obligations 
they place upon themselves by asking to see an object in the local milieu.
The chapter will then turn to another way in which collaborative viewings 
are routinely initiated - exclamatory noticings. These are distinguished by 
what Goffman has termed a 'response cry' (1981). These exclamatory 
tokens, such as laughter, expressions of surprise and so forth, seem to 
pique the interest of another. They excite the curiosity of the other such 
that they attem pt to discover what m ight have occasioned the  
exclamation. Therefore, the other might ask or inquire about the 
activities of the vocaliser. Moreover, these exclamatory tokens are 
routinely treated as marking a feature of the visible world as the 
occasioning source of the exclamation.
The chapter will provide a specific discussion of these two configurations 
of collaborative viewings. It will then use this discussion, alongside 
findings drawn from previous chapters, to describe the various ways in
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which objects stand in relation to, and feature within, the ongoing actions 
in which they are encountered.
8.2 In v itin g  a Show ing
Collaborative viewings are sometimes produced when one participant asks 
another where an object is situated. Indeed, this is particularly the case 
within complex technological environments. Consider the specific example 
of the RCO. The RCO is one part of a large control centre and they have 
unique technologies, documents and other artefacts to aid the production 
of their specific duties of restoration work. Moreover, many of these 
artefacts have similar features, such as the row of computer screens each 
with a different function, or the piles of documents each relating to 
different aspects of their work. Also, personnel from other parts of the 
organisation often visit the setting to carry out tasks. These not only 
include regular encounters with support staff and those staff based on 
other desks in the control centre, but also other members of the wider 
organisation. For example, during the research period, a team of software 
engineers were installing a new system for the RCO. Also at that time, a 
television crew turned up to make a programme about telecommunications 
requirements for major sporting events. Also, of course, the field  
researchers that collected this data were working in the RCO. As they are 
unfamiliar with the scene, all of these people require help in locating 
relevant artefacts within the environment, in order that they may 
accomplish their work. At these times, RCO personnel are often asked 
where an object is situated. A relevant response is often a showing.
Consider Fragment 8.1 for example, in which Jeff, a systems designer 
working on a project to install a new technology into the RCO, asks Martin 
where one of their systems is located. Just prior to the onset of the 
fragment Martin, who is sitting at the RCO desk, swivels around to find 
Jeff approaching (see image i). Jeff subsequently asks "which is the 
E.I.S.?".
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F r a g m e n t  8 . 1 :  R C O l l / 5 / 9 3 - 3 1 8 0 ( c )  
J  M
3L *
0.x
X X X
i
J: which is thee (.) E.I.S:?
( 1 . 0 )
M: E.I.S:, that one. ((M points))
( 0 . 2 )
J: that one. yeah?= ((J points))
M : =yeah.
X V
Jeff asks "which is the E.I.S.?" and Martin, in next position, points toward 
one of the monitors in front of them and says "that one". So, Martin shows 
his colleague where the "E.I.S." system is, rather than providing a verbal 
description of its whereabouts. There are three interrelated issues to be 
considered in this section: how does Jeff encourage Martin to show him the 
"E.I.S."?; after being shown the "E.I.S.", what kinds of actions are 
expectable from Jeff?; and, more generally, how does the "EIS" feature 
within and stand in relation to the emerging activity?
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Consider first how Jeffs actions promote a showing. As Martin turns 
around to find his colleague approaching, Jeff does not return his gaze, but 
instead looks past him to scan the range of monitors along the console. So, 
as he asks "which is the E.I.S.?", Jeff is gradually moving his head to look 
at each of the monitors in front of him. The question itself implies that 
there are a range of possibles, from which the E.I.S. should appropriately 
be drawn. It is not phrased as 'where is the E.I.S.?' or 'how do I find the 
E.I.S.?', but "which is the E.I.S.?". This works with Jeffs looking along the 
range of systems to present the candidate artefacts which constitute that 
range of possibles. In doing so, he reveals his commitment to the relevant 
system being found in amongst this group of screens, as opposed to a 
screen elsewhere in the control room. Even his pace as he approaches 
Martin, seems to reveal a commitment to further closing in on the console. 
His posture towards, and lookings at, the different screens works with the 
question to situate the relevant answer in terms of the screens in front of 
them.
Such actions reveal Jeffs orientation to the visible location of the screen. 
Indeed, as he asks the question, he simultaneously presents him self as 
looking for it. Thus, he would seem to encourage Martin to help him with 
his search. This collection of embodied actions provides for a sequential 
environment in which the E.I.S. is to be identified as a specific one of these 
screens. An appropriate (if not expectable) next turn then, is to 'show' 
which one of the screens is the E.I.S. This is what Martin duly does.
Previous chapters have discussed how the referent within a question can 
be indicated by the visual orientation of the speaker and that this can 
encourage the other to look at the same object as the speaker. Similarly, 
then, a question can be asked such that another may find a particular 
environment (in the above case, a row of computer screens) presented as 
relevant. Moreover, it may be presented as an environment in which the 
'looked for' item is (likely to be) situated. In such a way, it encourages a 
showing rather than a verbal description.
Also, notice the contrast with the initiation of previous examples of 
collaborative viewings, in which a question asked is stripped of a 
characterisation of the object by the use of a demonstrative. In this case, 
however, the query contains an explicit naming of the sought-for object. It 
does not 'mask' the identity of the object, but rather makes it explicit
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("E.I.S."). Both however encourage the other to engage in a collaborative 
viewing.
In next turn, Martin points at one of the screens and says "E.I.S. that 
one". Jeff turns to the screen, points at it himself and echoes "that one" as 
he steps forward to crouch down before the system. This final movement, 
retrospectively accounts for Jeffs question. It displays a reason for asking 
where the E.I.S. system is situated; that is, so that he can use it.
J
Imagine a hypothetical alternative, where Jeff, having asked for the 
"E.I.S." to be shown to him, does not even look at it, he just turns and 
leaves. This act may well be treated as odd, and, moreover, having asked 
for it, it may be seen as somehow discourteous. Therefore, there would 
seem to be certain sequential obligations on a person who asks for 
something to be pointed out to them. In some ways, they should 
expectably attend to the object that they have asked to be shown.
Having seen the "E.I.S.", Jeff can begin a new activity. Being shown the 
location of the "E.I.S." enables Jeff to begin to carry out a task which is an 
integral part of the implementation of the new system. He requires 
certain information from the E.I.S. system, which is to be incorporated 
into the new system. Therefore, the showing of the object is essential to 
the successful production of the activity. Within the sequence, the object 
is constituted as the sought-for locus of an upcoming work task.
The next fragment provides a further case in which one person seems to 
encourage another to point out an object for them. However, in this 
instance, a showing seems to be pursu ed . Phil's (verbal) attempts to 
attend to Chris' activities are repeatedly rejected, until the moment at 
which he points out a feature on their alarm screen. Thus, Chris seems to 
pursue a showing as opposed to a verbal answer.
It begins as Chris receives a call from a remote colleague. He initially  
attempts to put the caller on hold while he is deals with another matter, 
but the caller (Rick) seems to be able to persuade him to deal with his 
query i n s t e a d I t  would also seem that Rick has asked Chris for the
^Unfortunately, the data collected does not include any talk by the caller. However, 
there is no ‘beep’ noise, which would mark putting the caller on hold, nor a re-newed
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reference number for a circuit that is currently being made-good. That 
circuit runs from the International Repeater Station in Keybridge 
(London) to an equivalent in Brussels. From Line 9 onwards Chris' 
utterances are attended to by Phil, but can also be heard by Rick. The 
interest here is the way in which Chris encourages and shapes Phil's help 
in attending to Rick's query.
F r a g m e n t  8 . 2 ;  R C 0 1 1 / 5 / 9 3 * l - 1 3 ; 1 1 ; 1 9  
C  P
XX
X X X
1 C: hello"' Rick"' ((on ’phone))
2 (0.8)
3 C: 'ang on a minute. I'll just
4 put you on hold, don't go
5 away.
6 (1.0)
7 C: go on.
8 (3.7)
9 C: Brussel : :s: :
10 (0.6)
11 P: yes?
12 (0.6)
13 C: Brussel-
14 (0.2)
15 P: twenty one.=
16 C: =Brussels Keybridge::''
17 (0.3)
18 P: twenty one.
19 (1.0)
20 C: uh-er, ss: :i- wha-
21 (0.2)
22 P: six oh two one.
23 (0.2)
greeting to another. Therefore, it would seem that although Chris initially moves to put 
him on hold, Rick persuades him otherwise (hence "go on" in line 7).
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IV
9
24 C: oh"' six oh two one. (.) yeah.
Chris does not initially seem to request a showing. He merely says 
"Brussels". However, this seems to provide enough information for Phil to 
recognise the nature of his activity - a search. Moreover, it leads Phil to 
provide a series of attempted answers to the query, which Chris seems to 
'ignore'. In line 22, Phil eventually points to a feature on one of their 
alarm screens (see image iii) and Chris' search is completed (see image iv). 
This section will consider how Chris can be seen to pursue a showing 
rather than a verbal description. More generally, it will examine how the 
visible circuit reference ("6021") depicted on the alarm screen stands in 
relation to the activity at hand.
Towards the end of the 3.7 second silence (line 8) in which the caller, Rick, 
(presumably) details the nature of his request, Chris begins to turn 
towards his co-present colleague (Phil) and as this pause^  reaches 
completion, Chris produces an elongated "Brusselxs::::". Phil, who has 
been writing on a paper document on the desk, treats this utterance as a 
request for help. He both turns to face Chris and asks for information 
about the request ("yes?"). At the moment Phil's gaze reaches his 
colleague, Chris almost stumbles to look at one of their alarm screens, 
shifting his body to face it more straight on (see image ii).
Given that Chris is currently on the phone, his utterances are neatly  
designed to attend both to the involvement of Phil and the overhearing 
Rick. He does not, for instance, seem to explicitly attend to Phil's "yes?" 
and yet his "Brussel-" (line 13) manages to mark the ongoing activity as a 
search, repeat the nature of his search for Phil, mark the fact that the 
search is not yet complete for both Phil and Rick and, further, constitute 
the site of the search as the alarm screen he is looking at. Indeed, as can
^Note that this is a pause for the analyst and Phil, but not for Chris who can hear Rick's 
utterance.
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be seen in Fragment 8.2.1, Chris' focus upon the alarm screen (AS) 
encourages Phil to also turn toward that alarm screen:
F r a g m e n t  8 . 2 . 1
/////.Chris .AS 
p. ----- yes?------
C: Brussei-
Phil .AS___________
Chris seems to play on the fact that Phil should have the local knowledge 
to find in that alarm screen, what might be being searched for in reference 
to something as brief as "Brussel-". It certainly provides the resources 
sufficient for Phil to proffer a candidate suggestion: "twenty one". 
However, Chris renders it inappropriate, or at least insufficient, by 
continuing to look towards the screen and by reform ulating the 
parameters of the search by adding "Keybridge" to the previously  
mentioned "Brussels" ("Brussels Keybridge"; line 16). In such a way, 
Chris elaborates the nature of the circuit he is interested in. He not only 
identifies one end of the circuit (Brussels), but also the British 1RS that 
receives transmission from that circuit (Keybridge). Again, this displays 
to both the caller and Phil, that the search is not yet complete. Moreover 
it encourages further participation from Phil.
Phil repeats his candidate answer ("twenty one"; line 18) and as he does so 
he shifts his gaze to Chris, who continues to focus upon the alarm screen. 
Again, Chris does not directly acknowledge this response and once again 
displays that he has not found the information he is after. He continues 
fixedly to look at the alarm screen and says "uh-er, ss::i- wha-". Now, each 
of the reference numbers for digital transmission circuits begins '60-' and 
is suffixed by a unique referent. So Chris can be heard to begin the 'form' 
of a candidate answer, in that an appropriate answer would begin 'six...' 
("ss::i-"). However, he breaks off his utterance with a sound that bearably 
projects 'what?', or possibly 'where?' ("wha-"), continues to search features 
of the alarm screen and looks increasingly puzzled.
Phil then produces his candidate answer once again, but this time in the 
form of "six oh two one". Moreover, he simultaneously points to the 
location of this information on the alarm screen. Chris' continued visual 
focus and displayed confusion, seems to eventually engender a showing of
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where on the screen the relevant information can be found. As soon as 
Phil's utterance and concomitant showing are completed, Chris turns 
away to answer the caller's query (see image iv). He displays his 
recognition of the information and recycles it for the remote colleague ("six 
oh two one"). This displays his appreciation of that information for the 
practical purposes of dealing with Rick's query.
Throughout this fragment Chris is attending to some very delicate 
interactional work. Each of his utterances has two recipients: his co­
present colleague and also the telephone caller. Thus, each of his turns is 
designed to attend to two very different hearers. On the phone especially, 
there is a need to account for particular kinds of conversational silence 
and to display that you are either attending to the others' demands or 
engaged in some other disrupting activity. In this case these utterances 
can be seen to act as a display of an ongoing search for the requested 
information. However, these utterances and other bodily activities also 
work to encourage the participation of Phil to provide (or find) an answer 
to the query.
So, Phil was initially attracted into mutual alignment to a particular 
alarm screen, and encouraged to help answer the query. However, in the 
face of Chris' continued visual orientation towards the alarm screen, 
continued searching even in the face of answers provided by Phil and 
increasingly visible puzzlement, Phil eventually shows Chris where the 
relevant information can be found. It would seem, therefore, that Chris 
pursues a showing, such that he can see the information for himself.
These two fragments have illustrated a different kind of collaborative 
viewing to many of those featured in earlier chapters. They depict 
instances in which an individual encourages another to show them  
something. In the first, the showing is provided immediately in next turn. 
However, in the second that showing would seem to be pursued while a 
series of verbal candidate answers are rejected. In encouraging another to 
point out something an individual is able to constitute 'areas' of the local 
environment as the focus for action and indicate the domain in which some 
feature of that environment is to be rendered visible. This is accomplished 
through a marked bodily orientation towards that domain. In the first 
case, for example, as Jeff approaches Martin and asks him "which is the 
E.I.S.?", he looks straight past him to the row of monitors on the desk. In
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Fragment 8.2, Chris continues to focus on the alarm screen while Phil 
speaks to him. Both of their co-participants (Martin and Phil respectively) 
would seem to orient to the relevance of these domains as the locus of the 
sought-for object. Both turn to look in those areas and point towards 
objects situated in those areas.
When an individual encourages a co-participant to point something out, 
they would seem obliged to both attend to that showing and further 
provide a reason for asking to see it. In the first example, when Jeff 
moves to use the "E.I.S." system, he retrospectively displays his need to 
see that system. He shows why he asked for it by starting to work on it. 
In the second instance, as soon as Chris is shown (and told) the relevant 
information, he passes that information on to his remote colleague. An 
alternative scenario in which, having asked for something to be pointed 
out, the individual completely disattends, could well be problematic.
Objects, then, feature within these kinds of requests for showings in  
particular sorts of ways. The actions of individuals project the relevance 
of a particular domain in which a characterised object (e.g. "the E.I.S." or 
"Brussels Keybridge") is to be found. Those domains are constituted as 
relevant domains of inspection and action; they are presented as domains 
in which an object should be pointed out. Furthermore, once the relevant 
object has been pointed out, they provide the basis for further action. 
Those who request the showing, then attend to the object in various ways - 
for example, they use the E.I.S. system or pass on information displayed 
on an alarm screen. Therefore, domains are constituted as domains of 
action - the sequentially relevant showings - and then the objects rendered 
visible form the basis for further action.
8.3 E xclam atory N oticings
It has been argued that when someone asks another to point something 
out to them, they are immediately subject to certain interactional 
constraints. For instance, and in particular, having requested a showing, 
they should expectably remain attentive to that showing. More generally, 
having asked a question of someone else, an individual should attend to 
the answer subsequently provided. That is to say, just as 'recipients' are 
constrained in certain ways when asked a question, 'questioners' are 
constrained, by their own actions, to remain attentive to the answer or, of
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course, account for not doing so. Moreover, having asked for some feature 
of the local environment to be shown to them or having asked a question 
which may be appropriately answered with a showing in next turn, 
speakers are under certain constraints to attend to that showing.
The rest of the chapter will introduce a particular kind of vocalisation 
which would seem to pique the interest of co-participants. Often these 
lead co-participants to inquire about the vocaliser's activities. In doing so, 
an appropriate next turn is a showing. Therefore, this section will reveal 
how these vocalisations often lead to collaborative viewings and it will 
examine their organisation. This will contribute to the consideration of 
the ways in which objects relate to ongoing action.
First of all consider the following fragment, which will begin to reveal the 
kinds of interactional devices which may elicit interest from a co­
participant. As it begins Martin is talking to a colleague on the telephone. 
Sitting to either side of him and slightly closer to the console are Chris 
and Tom. The concern here is with the interaction and discussion that 
develops between Chris and Tom (so their talk is highlighted with bold 
type). Immediately prior to onset of the transcript, Tom and Chris are 
involved in discrete activities; they are working on separate documents. 
However, by image iii they are both looking at the same document, which 
is being held up by Tom. The focus of this section is how the collaborative 
viewing emerges.
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Fragment 8.3: RC012/2/93-9;43;15
M C
X I
X X X
M: ...look out for: enn
bee ess circuits in 
the [(fill in lines), please. 
T :  [ ° h h h h h  h a - a h .
( 1 . 2 )
M : ye :s:.
(1.7)
T :  * t c h .  i s  t h a t *  y o u r  c o m : m e n t ?
i s  i t ?  i n  h e r e .
(0 .8 )
C :  w o t s s a t ?
(2.3)
M: sorry?
( 1 . 0 )
M: >yes I know so (the-
the- [the :)<] spanish=
T :  [ h h h  ]
M: =banking sys: terns an:d
(0.5)
C :  y e a h : =
M: =they[ve go :t] er (.)
T :  [ ' y e a h . ' ]
These three photos and the associated transcript chart the developing 
course of a showing, in which Tom asks whether Chris is the author of a 
particular entry in one of their log books. It would seem that this is a 
fairly mundane showing. However, prior to the showing, an intriguing 
sequence of actions unfolds which hinges on Tom's laughter token ("ha- 
ah") towards the beginning of the transcript. It is to be argued that this 
laughter and the eventual showing are intimately related. Therefore, this 
section will consider the nature of the laughter token and the actions 
which it gives rise to.
The first still image immediately follows the production of this laughter 
token. In that photo Chris has disengaged from the document in front of 
him, which he has been reading for some moments, and has turned his 
head to look towards his colleague. Overlapping with and immediately 
following the "ha-ah", Chris shifts his upper body around and fixes his
186
gaze quite clearly on the document before Tom. After Chris has looked at 
the document, he shifts his gaze up to Tom's face.
Even though it takes around three seconds for Chris to return his gaze to 
his prior activity, Tom does not explicitly orientate to it as demanding 
anything of him. Tom does not act at any point during this period to 
encourage Chris to upgrade his attention or involvement. It is not until 
Chris has returned to his previous activities that Tom turns to ask him  
about the comment in the log book.
Tom's question is framed such that the talk alone does not provide Chris 
with the resources to find the referent and immediately answer the 
question. To enable him provide an informed answer, Chris is shown the 
textual entry in the context of its form and position on the page. Basically, 
Tom picks up the log book and turns it around to face his colleague, who 
then reads the text and confirms that it is ("yeah"). Moreover, the showing 
works to provide some alignment to the humour of the entry - Tom laughs 
("hhh") and Chris smiles having read the text.
So, Tom, who initially laughed out loud ends up (some three seconds later) 
pointing out a feature of the document at which he has been staring.
This section will consider what may be seen to occasion Tom's laughter. It 
will also explore the relationship between the laughter token produced by 
Tom, Chris' subsequent look at him and the showing that follows some 
moments later. In order to elaborate the discussion of this curious case, it 
is necessary to firstly turn to a fragment taken from another complex 
technological working environment - a Police Station Control Room, from 
which the local police response is co-ordinated^. This will highlight 
certain features of the organisation of this sequence of actions.
In this fragment Debi and Susan are working side by side. As the 
transcript begins, Debi is finishing off a telephone call and Susan is 
editing a document on her computer. As with Fragment 8.3, note that a 
laughter token is produced early in the transcript and some moments later
^Following our discussion of Fragment 8.3, Christian Heath came across the following, 
clearer example of the phenomenon in one of his MSc student's data. I am grateful to 
Christian for allowing me to use both the fragment and his transcript. His treatment of 
this fragment can be found in Heath, 1994.
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a showing develops, in which Susan, the person who initially laughs, turns 
her monitor for Debi to examine. The concern here, is for the activities 
that develop between these two events.
F ra g m en t 8 . 4 :  GPS. CR;3 . 9 4  ( 0 : 9 : 4 9 )
D: ((call completion))
( 2 . 8 )
S : heh he
( 1 . 2 )
D: what (you) doing now:[: ?
S: [°heh
(0.3)
S: °thhhthhhhh
(1.3)
S: °heh heh
(0.6) ( (E turns  h er  monitor  toward Debi))
S: I meant to put han: : die : °hhh
(3.2)
D: °hhhhhh
(0.4)
S: (°hhh)
( 1 . 2 )
D: °hhrhhhh 
S : [he heh
As Susan produces her initial laughter token, she doubles up towards the 
computer screen. Then, Debi, who has just been inputting something into 
her own computer, ends a short flurry of keystrokes, turns towards Susan 
and inquires "what (you) doing now?". This question elicits the showing 
from Susan. She laughs again and turns her monitor toward Debi, both to 
allow her to see it more clearly and simultaneously encouraging her to 
read it. Then Susan instructs her colleague how to see the screen by 
telling Debi what she meant to write ("I meant to put handle"). This 
provides a context with which Debi can contrast, but also inspect and find, 
the screen image. As she says this, she tags on a further laughter token to 
the end of her utterance. While her colleague reads, Susan's laughter is 
almost palpably held back until Debi finally chuckles, at which point 
Susan doubles up with laughter once more.
In this fragment, then, Susan's initial laughter token works to encourage 
Debi to disengage (at least temporarily) from her current activities to 
inquire about the reason for the laughter. It provokes Debi's curiosity and
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brings her in to a mutual appreciation of the humorous error in the text. 
Moreover, even in the first few moments of the fragment, it would seem  
that Debi orients not only to the fact that Susan has done something 
noteworthy ("what (you) doing now?"), but also that this relates to the 
screen in front of her. After Debi has asked her question, Susan sits back 
in her chair, but Debi does not follow the face, but rather remains focused 
on the screen in front of her. The laughter and the doubling up toward 
that screen situates the humorous event in the screen; to the work that 
Susan has been doing.
This brief example, then, can develop our understanding of Fragment 8.3, 
the fragment in which Tom laughs and Chris turns towards him. It was 
noted how, through his turning motion following Tom's laughter, Chris 
does not just glance at his colleague, but produces a careful and studied 
examination of Tom's domain and his orientations and activities within  
that domain. He first looks towards the document at which Tom is gazing 
(TDoc) before turning to look at his face:
F ra g m en t 8 . 3 . 1
, ,Chris_________________
T: ha-ah------------------/ -----------------/------------------/—°tch (.) is that...
C: , , , , TDoc ,T_____, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Chris' looking would seem to be occasioned by Tom's laughter token - he 
begins to turn immediately following the noticeably louder "ha". Just as 
Debi turns to inquire about her colleague's activities in Fragment 8.4, it 
would seem that here Chris is exploring the visible world of his colleague 
for clues to the reason for the production of the laughter; to find out what 
is amusing him. As has been discussed, the line of regard of an individual 
can provide a co-participant with a great deal of information as to their 
ongoing activities. In this case, in the course of turning towards his 
colleague, Chris finds Tom hunched over and fixedly staring at the 
document. He first looks at that document to try to discover the reason for 
the laughter, before briefly glancing up towards his colleague and then  
back to his own document. In the light of no explicit inquiry, Tom 
subsequently upgrades the noticing by actually asking Chris i f  he 
authored a particular log book entry (retrospectively accounting for the 
production of the laughter token).
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Goffman (1981) touched upon this phenomenon when discussing  
"Response Cries". He defined response cries as "...exclamatory 
interjections which are not fully-fledged words. Oops! is an example." 
(Goffman, 1981, p. 99), which "...may be uttered in the hope that (the) half­
license it gives to hearers to strike up a conversation will be exercised" 
(ibid., p. 100) and which display "...evidence of the alignment we take to 
events, the display taking the condensed, truncated form of a discretely 
articulated, nonlexicalized expression" (ibid., p. 100). In his list of 
response cries, he included "floor cues" (ibid., p. 106), which pay more than 
a passing resemblance to the phenomenon being dealt with here. He gave 
the example of a husband reading the evening paper, who laughs and 
shouts Good God! catching his wife's attention and even easing the 
transition into talk by providing her with the opportunity to ask what's up 
(ibid., p. 106). He accounted for their production, as follows:
Wanting to avoid being thought, for example, self-centered, intrusive, 
garrulous, or whatever, and in consequence feeling uneasy about 
making an open request for a hearing in the particular circumstances, 
we act so as to encourage our putative listeners to make the initial 
move, inviting us to let them in on what we are experiencing.
Goffman, 1981, p. 106
Whether or not this provides an accurate reflection of the reasons why 
people engage in exclamatory noticings, it would certainly seem that they 
do provide an environment to ease the transition into talk. Moreover, they 
provoke curiosity and encourage another to ask what has stimulated such 
an exclamation. However, this is the full extent of Goffman's treatment of 
the phenomenon. It therefore calls for some elaboration.
People quite regularly make various kinds of vocalisation throughout the 
course of a day. They may well be heard coughing, humming, whistling, 
breathing heavily and so forth. However, not all of these encourage 
another to ask why it has been produced or to invite a showing. This may 
well have something to do with the occasion of its production. Personnel 
within the RCO (and also, for that matter within the Police Station control 
centre) work within "continuing states of incipient talk" (Schegloff & 
Sacks, 1974, p. 262), where these more broadly consist of "Members of a 
household in their living room, employees who share an office, passengers 
in an automobile" (ibid., p. 262) and so on. These can be seen in contrast, 
for instance, to more intensive interactions, such as telephone calls,
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fleeting meetings on the street, medical consultations and so forth. These 
kinds of situation exhibit certain qualities, one of which is that there often 
occurs long periods of silence or 'adjournments'. To begin a new discussion 
in these situations does not require an exchange of greetings and such, 
however the kind of vocalisation highlighted above would seem to be one 
way in which new segments of talk begin. By eliciting an inquiry, the 
laughter token can be seen to procure a 'ticket' to talk for the vocaliser of 
the laughter. This kind of vocalisation may, therefore, be analogous to a 
device described by Sacks.
One of the concerns that Sacks attends to in his discussion of the 
analysability of children's stories (Sacks, 1972), is the restricted rights of 
children to speak and, in particular, one of the ways in which they go 
about overcoming this 'problem'. When beginning a story, children 
(around the age of about three) often use an opening which is similar in 
nature to: 'You know what. Daddy?'. As a question it demands some 
response. However, the proper and recurrent response to this question is 
'What?', which, as a consequence, invites the first speaker to talk once 
more. Thus, the child manages to encourage someone else to provide them  
with the interactional 'floor', to express an interest in their talk and to 
allow them to tell their story.
Now, the kinds of vocalisations that are being discussed here may act in a 
similar, but far more subtle, way, as they merely invite another to express 
some form of interest in the vocaliser's activities. They do not constrain 
another to respond in a particular way, whereas a question like 'You know 
what. Daddy?' does. Thus, a recipient can inquire if they wish to, but they 
are not explicitly demanded or requested to look at or ask about 
something; it is not an accountable act if they do not ask 'What’s up?'. 
Interestingly, in Fragment 8.3, Tom follows up his "ha-ah" with the 
question "is that your comment? is it? in here?". While the "ha-ah" merely 
invites a query from the other, the question "is that your comment? is it? 
in here?" works much more like Sacks' 'You know what. Daddy' in that a 
next turn is expectably something like 'what comment?', or as Chris says 
"wossat?".
Given that these exclamatory tokens work to engender the curiosity of a 
co-participant, it is clear how their production and placement within the 
surrounding talk and activity is critical to their success. For instance, if
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they are not themselves noticed by the relevant other, how could they 
encourage or foster intrigue? So, for example, in Fragment 8.3, the 
laughter token itself is produced such that it builds to a crescendo, with 
the initial in-breath marking the beginning of it, but the louder "ha-ah" 
seemingly withheld. It is produced within an environment of talk on the 
telephone by their co-present colleague Martin. Thus the laughter token 
is produced when Martin’s utterance is bearably fading out and coming to 
a close. The main laughter token ("ha-ah") is therefore, produced at a 
moment it is likely to be hearable by Chris:
F ra g m en t 8 . 3 . 2
M: . . .look out for: enn bee ess circuits
in the [(fill in lines), please.
T: [°hhhhh h a - a h .
Furthermore, this vocalisation seems to be animated to some extent, as 
Tom raises and lowers his shoulders while he rocks on his seat. This may 
act to increase the chance of his actions being noticed, so that they may 
not only be heard, but also, in some ways, seen. Similarly, and to a much 
greater degree, in Fragment 8.4 Susan animates her exclamation, by 
doubling up toward her computer screen. Indeed, these greatly animated 
actions may well be more demanding of the other. To fail to notice her 
doubling-up would be difficult, so to fail to attend to it in some way, 
without being insensitive, would be also be difficult.
The way these laughter tokens (or similar devices, "oh no!", "eurgh", etc.) 
work to provoke curiosity may be founded on what occasions them. 
Indeed, they are so bereft of explicit information, that there is an 
asymmetry of access to the phenomenon that occasions them. Therefore, 
it is unclear to those who hear them, what has occasioned them. The 
access a co-participant has to that phenomenon is only through the 
vocalisation. To find out more about it requires that they ask the vocaliser 
or, at least, examine their activities more closely. So for example, in 
Fragment 8.4 Debi asks "what (you) doing now?"; or, for instance, in 
Fragment 8.3 Chris turns to look at Tom's activities.
Moreover, in both cases the visual orientation of the vocaliser seems to be 
treated as relevant by the hearer. Notice how, in Fragment 8.3, following 
Tom's "ha-ah", Chris turns to look first at the document which Tom is
192
reading. Similarly, when Debi asks "what (you) doing now?", she has 
already focused on the computer screen which Susan is leaning over. 
Therefore, it would seem that co-participants attempt to make sense of 
these exclamations in terms of the vocaliser's orientation to objects in 
their immediate environment. They would seem, then, to pique not only 
another's interest in the activities of the vocaliser, but more specifically an 
interest in the objects to which they are attending. They provoke a 
curiosity in what is so funny (or whatever) in an oriented-to document or 
screen image.
The exclamatory token also gives a 'sense' of the occasioning phenomenon. 
Even at this stage in a sequence they instruct what kind of object is to be 
discovered - for example, something funny. It provides the recipient with 
certain information as to the nature of the occasioning phenomenon. The 
text is funny, the picture is scary or whatever. Moreover, this instructs 
the appropriate appreciation of the object of interest. In such a way, these 
exclamatory tokens may be likened to the "prospective indexicals" of story 
prefaces (Sacks, 1974). Sacks suggested that, within story prefaces, 
certain utterances characterised upcoming stories by giving the recipients 
not only a framework for interpreting the upcoming story, but also a way 
of appreciating or responding to those stories. In similar ways, these 
exclamatory tokens instruct how the object is to be found and, further, 
imply a way in which that feature may be relevantly appreciated. For 
instance, in the two examples discussed above, an initial laughter token 
presents some text as comical and further that this then should, 
expectably, be appreciated through some kind of reciprocal laughter or 
whatever.
Now, earlier in this discussion, a comparison was drawn between the 
workings of these exclamatory noticings and Sacks' analysis of the phrase 
"You know what. Daddy?". However, it was also noted that these  
exclamatory tokens do not dem and  the participation of the other, but 
instead invite  or encourage the other to inquire about the vocaliser's 
activities. Indeed, sometimes such vocalisations engender a display of 
curiosity and sometimes not, but they never 'fail', as they do not demand  
anything that could be withheld. They enable an individual to provoke the 
curiosity of another and to discover whether or not they are available for 
discussion and indeed interested. Further, if  no inquiry is forthcoming the 
original vocaliser may upgrade the marker or indeed start discussing their
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activities anyway, as in Fragment 8.3. On the other hand, if  the hearer 
does inquire, they have expressed an interest, which gives the vocaliser an 
opportunity to show some object.
Interestingly co-participants sometimes do not inquire what occasioned an 
exclamatory token, but still treat them as marking the availability of the 
vocaliser to engage in conversation. Consider, for instance, the next 
fragment which involves Rob and Chris.
As the transcript begins, Rob is just terminating a telephone conversation 
and Chris is staring at the ICARUS information screen (the computer 
system which holds a database of static information about the network). A 
few moments later Chris says "oh dear", which would seem a similar 
object to the laughter tokens previously discussed. Consider the ways in 
which the interaction subsequently develops.
F ra g m en t 8 . 5 :  R C O l l / 5 / 9 3 - 1 5 : 2 5 t 55  
R C
xr
XXX
R: ( (Ca l l  com ple t ion))
(3.6)
C: oh:: dear:
(2.3)
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IV
c : ( thats ) dodcrv*^
(1.3)
R : bonj ou :r . (0.3) bon après midi .
In this case, following two exclamatory tokens ("oh dear" and "that's 
dodgy"), Rob does not ask Chris what occasioned them. Rather he utters 
some French, which then starts a discussion about the reason Chris has 
not left for his French class' .^ So, he begins a topic quite at a tangent to 
that seemingly marked by the exclamatory token. Nevertheless, he does 
inspect his colleague's domain prior to saying "bonjour" (see images ii and 
iii). Consider the actions which follow the first exclamatory token ("oh 
dear").
As he says "oh dear", Chris simultaneously thumps his arm down onto the 
desk (image i shows his right fist hitting the desk). At this point he is 
looking at the ICARUS screen, but he subsequently turns to write 
something on a piece of paper to his left (see image ii). Following this 
utterance Rob swivels around to first look at ICARUS (image ii) and then 
down to the document in which Chris is writing (image iii):
F ra g m en t 8 . 5 . 1
, Scr_______. Doc
R:  /------------
C : oh : : dear : :
Scr , Doc
(Scr = ICARUS screen; Doc = document in front of Chris)
So, Rob examines two different features of the local environment following 
Chris' "oh dear" - the computer screen and the document which he is 
writing on. Once again, it does not seem coincidental that these are the 
two objects at which Chris is looking at during and just after he uttered 
"oh dear". Rob would seem to be inspecting these objects to discover what 
occasioned the exclamatory token.
^As the RCO personnel have to communicate with a range of foreign telecommunications 
centres, they have language courses available to them within BT.
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Next, Tom looks up at Chris himself. At this very moment, Chris says 
"(thats) dodgy" while looking at ICARUS. This attracts Rob's attention 
back to that screen. In such a way, this second utterance seems to exploit 
the visual interest shown by Rob in the ongoing activities by once again 
attracting his attention to ICARUS:
F ra g m en t 8 . 5 . 2
,C , , Scr_________________________
R:    / -----bonjouir,
C: (thats) dodgy^
, , Scr___________________________, .Doc______
Like Fragment 8.3, following an exclamatory token, in this case "oh dear", 
the co-participant turns to examine the local environment for clues as to 
the 'reason' for such an utterance. During the course of this search, Chris 
produces another utterance while once again visibly focused on the 
ICARUS monitor. Unlike Fragment 8.3, however, a showing does not get 
produced. As Chris begins to shift his gaze away from the screen and 
down to write on the paper once more, Rob starts to address him in  
French. The introduction of a different topic means that they do not 
(within the next few minutes at least) discuss any information displayed 
on ICARUS.
So, then, this vocalisation works to attract some visual interest from Rob. 
He turns to inspect the working domain for what might have occasioned 
Chris' "oh dear". However, he does not follow this up with a verbal inquiry 
about the nature of the potential problem marked by Chris' "oh 
dear...that's dodgy". Instead, and following these two exclamatory tokens, 
Rob exploits the "...half-license it gives to hearers to strike up a 
conversation" (Coffman, 1981, p. 100). He does not strike up a 
conversation in relation to Chris' two utterances, but, instead, introduces 
an entirely separate topic. As these response cries invite another to 
inquire about what occasioned them, they necessarily mark the speaker's 
availability for (and interest in) focused interaction more generally. This 
feature of these exclamatory tokens is exploited by Rob in the above 
fragment.
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So, this section has introduced a particular kind of sequence that can be 
seen to develop within continuing states of incipient talk. It would seem  
that certain exclamatory tokens provoke the curiosity of co-participants in 
what might have occasioned their production. They are designed to be 
heard by that other, as they can be seen to be animated (for instance, 
Susan physically doubles over in Fragment 8.4), timed with regard to 
ongoing activities (for instance, at the moment Martin's talk begins to trail 
off in Fragment 8.3) and complemented by other actions (for example, in 
Fragment 8.5, Chris thumps the desk as he says "oh dear") to render them  
noticeable.
They work to pique the interest of co-participants. It has been shown how 
co-participants sometimes verbally inquire about the activities of the 
speaker and at other times merely inspect the visible features of their 
activities. In the latter case, they attempt to make sense of the activities 
of the speaker in terms of their orientation to objects in their immediate 
environment. In such a way, they attempt to find what might have 
occasioned the speaker's exclamation. Thus, these tokens render relevant 
the orientations of the speaker (at the time of the exclamation). They are 
treated as marking the reason for that exclamation. Thus, in Fragment 
8.5, Rob can be seen to closely follow the gaze of Chris as he looks between 
the ICARUS computer screen and the document in which he is writing.
As a result, some of these vocalisations lead to a showing. Sometimes they 
follow an inquiry by the co-participant, as in Fragment 8.4, and at other 
times, the speaker upgrades their actions to actually volunteer a showing, 
as in Fragment 8.3. Moreover, they work to instruct that co-participant in 
how to discern an object. For example, they present an object as 
humorous or scandalous or whatever.
8.4 D iscu ssion
This chapter has examined some different ways in which collaborative 
viewings are initiated and how some common sense of an object is 
variously constituted. Firstly, it described how showings can be 
encouraged or requested, such that an individual asks for an object to be 
pointed out to them. Secondly, it discussed how certain exclamatory 
tokens (such as laughter particles) can pique the interest of a co-
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participant such that they inquire about or inspect the activities of the 
vocaliser with regard to the objects at which they are looking.
In many of the fragments in earlier chapters individuals encouraged 
another to look at an object they were pointing towards. In this chapter 
however, it was shown how individuals may also encourage or request 
another to show them something. This can range from explicit requests to 
be shown something (e.g. "which is the EIS") to actions that otherwise 
promote a showing rather than a verbal description (as in Fragment 8.2). 
It was also suggested that the action of requesting a showing places 
certain obligations on the speaker. In particular, it was argued that 
having asked to see an object, they must attend to that object in some way.
More generally, when any question is asked of another, it places particular 
constraints upon the speaker to attend to the answer. Building on this, 
the chapter has demonstrated how participants may exploit these  
demands by encouraging another to ask about their actions. In such a 
way they encourage another to display an interest in their activities, such 
that a showing may subsequently be produced. In particular, it described 
how certain exclamatory tokens can provoke the curiosity of a co­
participant. They work to heighten the interest of that other in the 
activities of the vocaliser. They are encouraged to find out what 
occasioned the exclamation - what it is that is so funny, horrific or 
whatever.
Moreover, they seem to be treated as occasioned by some local artefact, as 
those that inquire focus on the current orientation of the vocaliser to an 
object. This continues to reveal what a powerful resource an individual's 
line of regard is and how particular vocalisations (such as a chuckle, a tut 
or a sigh) may render a looking relevant. That is to say, individuals seem  
to expect to find a reason for an exclamation in the domain in which the 
other is looking.
Furthermore, when showings do get produced, they can be seen to work 
like the prospective indexicals of Sacks' discussion of story prefaces. They 
set the tone for the subsequent showing. This may be humorous, 
scandalous, horrific, problematic or whatever, dependent upon the kind of 
exclamatory token produced. The environment is viewed and made sense 
of with regard to the initial exclamation, just as the initial exclamation is
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made sense of in the light of viewing a particular feature of the local 
milieu. Indeed, this point may be applied more generally to a discussion of 
instruction. As instructional actions develop, they develop within the 
context of the objects that are being made available. That is to say, 
actions that instruct another how to view a scene or an object are similarly 
made sense of with regard to that scene or object. When an individual 
asks a question such as 'what's that?', the recipient not only views the 
object in terms of that question, but discovers the sense of the question in 
relation to the object at hand.
Over the past few chapters, then, the objects that feature within each 
collaborative viewing have occupied a variety of positions within the 
emerging activities. For example, many instances have shown a question 
asked using a demonstrative to reference an oriented-to object (e.g. "is that 
BST or MG"). This has then encouraged another to look at that object, in 
order to produce an answer. In other instances, individuals have 
requested a co-participant to show them something. In doing so, they 
have given a characterisation of that object to provide the other with the 
resources to be able to point it out to them (e.g. "which is the E.I.S."). 
Also, instances have shown how answers are produced w ith direct 
reference to some previously unmentioned object. Often these provide 
evidence to support some claim (e.g. "there's a fault in the plan there"). 
Finally, and most intriguingly, exclamatory tokens can pique the interest 
of a co-participant, such that they inquire about or inspect the objects 
which the vocaliser is looking at. They make sense of the exclamation by 
inspecting the object at hand.
In each case, the object contributes to the emerging activity in different 
kinds of ways. Indeed, in each case, their contribution is locally  
determined.
The object is looked at, inspected and constituted with regard to the 
practices in and through which the collaborative viewing is initiated. That 
is to say, the way the object is made sense of is constrained by the 
sequential environment in which that object is encountered. So, for 
example, take the case of an exclamatory noticing. The overhearing other 
attempts to make sense of the initial exclamation with regard to the 
oriented-to object. Therefore, that object (computer screen, document or 
whatever) is inspected (constituted) in terms of the exclamation. It is
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examined for its humour or horror, for example. The occasioned sense of 
the object is embedded in, and consituted with regard to, the activity at 
hand. So, for that moment, the object is a 'joke', the 'E.I.S.' and so forth. 
The appreciation of the object is therefore retroactive, as it is produced in 
terms of the prior actions of the other, in terms of their question, chuckle, 
etc.
Similarly, the object is used to make sense of the actions of another. The 
object is seen in terms of the actions of the other, but similarly allows an 
individual to make sense of those very actions. A question or a joke is 
understood in terms of the constituted object, just as that object is 
consituted within that activity.
The other feature generic to these constituted objects is that they provide 
the common basis for future activities. The achievem ent of an 
inter subjective alignment towards an object, provides a basis through 
which a discussion develops, a joke is made and so forth. Without, the 
potential to achieve such a common understanding, the activity would 
develop far more precariously. This is not to suggest, however, that the 
sense of the object is somehow 'stable' to enable the activity to develop. On 
the contrary, each and every subsequent action in the activity (re)produces 
the sense of the object. Each and every invocation of, or orientation 
toward, the object provides the opportunity for a misapprehension to be 
revealed, as Chapter 7 showed.
Overall, then, the occasioned sense of the object is firmly rooted in (and 
reflexive to) the ongoing interactional activities. Each moment of their 
invocation constitutes them and simultaneously provides a basis through 
which the activity progresses. They enable the successful, parsimonious 
accomplishment of a huge variety of activities, such as dealing w ith  
queries, giving instructions, revealing problems and locating information; 
tasks that would be both cumbersome and precarious without recourse to 
the collaborative viewing of certain objects. Imagine, for example, how a 
query about the organisation of text on a computer screen could be 
managed without the ability to point towards (features of) that screen. 
These small activities make up the work of the RCO. Therefore, 
collaborative viewings provide one key element to contribute to the 
successful accomplishment of work in the RCO.
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C hapter 9
Identifying Objects in Media Space
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9.1 In troduction
The previous four chapters have outlined some of the interactional 
practices in and through which the sense of an object is, if  only 
momentarily, constituted. In particular, they have highlighted how the 
interplay of talk and body movement is critical to the production of 
collaborative viewings. Moreover, they have revealed some of the 
assumptions that participants rely upon in the course of referential 
practice. For example, and as Schütz suggested, individuals would seem  
to pre-suppose the mutual availability of a world-in-common. They 
assume that when they point to an object, the other has immediate and 
unproblematic access to that object.
The data that illustrated these issues were taken from co-present 
interaction and it was shown how, in such an environment, these  
assumptions could be seen to be upheld. Even when troubles emerged, 
participants continued to assume that the objects to which they were 
attending were at least potentially available to the other. This chapter 
will consider an environment in which these assumptions break down. In 
particular, the chapter will explore the troubles that arise when the 
resources that individuals routinely rely upon in co-present interaction to 
support referential practice are denied them. To do this, it will consider 
the same kinds of referential activities, but w ithin a media space 
environment.
Media space technologies are designed to support physically-distributed 
collaborative work (work between individuals located in different 
geographical domains). They provide an audio-visual infrastructure to 
support communication between physically remote co-participants. Often 
they also provide some shared computing facility.
The previous chapters have shown how collaborative viewings of objects 
are critical to the parsimonious accomplishment of a variety of workplace 
activities. However, in media space it would seem that troubles emerge in 
the course of even basic referential practice. This chapter will consider 
why such troubles emerge.
The particular media space technology discussed is called Multiple Target 
Video II (MTVII) and was developed by researchers at the Rank Xerox
202
Research Centre at Cambridge. The data are video-taped experiments of 
participants attempting to work with each other 'within' the MTVII 
workspace. As with the earlier analyses of the 'traditional' workplace, this 
chapter considers how (features of) documents and other artefacts are 
rendered visible by participants. It will draw on Schutz's general thesis of 
reciprocal perspectives to make sense of the problems encountered by 
participants. To begin with, however, it would seem useful to introduce 
both the provenance of media space technology and the nature of the 
experimental data.
9.2 The V irtual W orkplace
It is argued that there is a growing need for technologies to support 
physically-distributed collaborative work. For example, it is suggested 
that the globalised economy and the emergence of the 'post-modern 
organisation' (Blackler, 1994) increases the need for business people to 
travel to meet with colleagues and clients. This demands that they spend 
a great deal of time and effort in attending face-to-face meetings. One 
suggestion for the future, then, is the development of technologies to 
support such meetings. Furthermore, immediate access to experts based 
in remote geographical areas could be supported by new communications 
technologies. As a result, a great deal of studies, particularly within  
CSCW, are concerned with providing innovative technological support for 
physically-distributed collaborative tasks.
Many of the more successful technologies have tended to be asynchronous, 
text-based communications technologies, such as e-mail. Notes and a 
variety of World Wide Web applications. Already the use of these  
technologies is flourishing within the business and academic communities. 
It has been reported, for instance, that employees at Microsoft send 200 
million e-mails a month - around 600 messages per employee, per day 
(Seabrook, 1997)!
Another strand of technology development has attempted to more literally 
replace face-to-face meetings by visually representing participants in work 
meetings. The most notable of these technologies is video conferencing, 
which provides video images and the sounds of others at a meeting. These 
technologies come in various configurations (see Finn et al, 1997; Sellen,
203
1995), however they all tend to present only a video image of the head and 
shoulders of all co-participants.
However, this thesis supports the findings of many workplace studies that 
have revealed how collaborative work is often characterised by reference 
to documents, screen images, diagrams and so forth. Indeed, in the RCO, 
the collaborative viewing of objects was shown to be critical to the 
production of range of workplace activities, ranging from giving  
instructions to solving queries. It would seem therefore that in order to 
provide adequate support for the demands of collaborative work, new  
communicative environments must facilitate the sharing of various 
artefacts. Indeed, the kinds of activities commonly considered to be 
potentially supported within virtual workplaces demand some common 
access to documents and such like. For instance, distance learning  
sometimes involves tutors discussing features of graphs and tables with  
their students; medical interactions often involve the collaborative 
inspection and discussion of the details of an X-ray or other medical 
records; and even more mundane business interactions feature the 
collaborative discussion of reports and statistics. Standard video 
conferencing systems are not able, and were not designed, to support such 
a diverse range of tasks. Indeed it has been found that video telephones, 
for example, are used less by those "...whose jobs involved working with  
documents" (Kraut et al, 1994, p. 20).
A number of scholars have recognised the importance of object-focused 
interaction and have begun to develop systems which attempt to support 
such tasks. For example different kinds of 'media space' are heing  
developed, which involve various configurations of camera images of the 
remote other and (often) access to common electronic desktops (e.g. Smith 
et al, 1989; McGuffin & Olson, 1992; Heath, Luff & Sellen, 1997). Also, 
there are shared drawing board technologies which provide shadowy 
images of a colleague (or a colleague's hands) within or on top of the 
workspace (e.g. Tang & Minneman, 1991; Ishii & Kobayashi, 1992). 
Furthermore, there are the developments of 'collaborative virtual 
environments' based on virtual reality technologies (e.g. Benford et al, 
1994), which support multiple users who are depicted by virtual bodies in 
a single electronic domain.
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The activity of rendering visible local artefacts has been shown to be 
routinely, and relatively unproblematically, accomplished within co­
present interaction in the work of the RCO. However, within these new  
communications environments, such a simple activity is often rendered 
problematic. It is the concern of this chapter to consider why such 
problems occur in one virtual workplace. In particular, it will explore the 
nature of the troubles that arise in an advanced media space developed by 
researchers at Rank Xerox, called Multiple Target Video II (MTVII).
9.3 The MTVII E xperim ents
Several years ago Rank Xerox implemented a media space called RAVE 
(Gaver et al, 1992) into their British research laboratories. This provided 
users with a single view of the face of others, an audio link and the 
potential to have simultaneous access to an electronic workspace. 
Although there is some evidence to suggest that such media spaces can 
provide effective support for ongoing, informal communication links 
between remote colleagues (Dourish et al, forthcoming), the range of tasks 
in which users can usefully engage would seem limited. Indeed, users of 
RAVE did not use the system to work over documents or other artefacts. 
For media spaces more generally, users find it relatively difficult to 
discuss and share (features of) documents, even when a shared electronic 
desktop is visible. This has drawn researchers to suggest that standard 
head and shoulders views of co-participants are insufficient to support 
focused collaborative work involving documents and the like (Gaver et al, 
1993). This stim ulated Rank Xerox researchers to develop more 
innovative media spaces in an attempt to support more flexible and 
variable access to the respective remote environments and the objects and 
artefacts therein. One of these is called Multiple Target Video II (MTVII).
MTVII 1 was developed by Abi Sellen, Christian Heath, Paul Luff and Bill 
Gaver at RXRC Cambridge between 1992 and 1993. MTVII provided each 
of the two participants with simultaneous access to three static views of 
the other. So, rather than merely providing a head and shoulders view, 
numerous images of the other are made available - a conventional head 
and shoulders view; an 'in-context' view of the other in their room; and a 
desktop view, showing the document or other artefact being worked on.
^Unsurprisingly, it was a direct development of a system called MTVI.
205
These were separately and continuously available on three different 
monitors (see Figure 9.1).
Figure 9.1: The MTVII Workspace^
desktop camera
in-context camera
'face-to-face' camera
m context face-to-face document
view view or model
view
In order to test out the use of the system, experiments were carried out in 
which participants were asked to engage in two collaborative tasks:
• to draw a plan of the room in which their co­
participant was located
• to lay-out the furniture in an architectural model 
which was given to only one of the participants
These tasks were specifically designed to consider how easily  co­
participants could render visible aspects of their different local 
environments. Therefore, they were designed to encourage participants to 
point out features of their own and the other's domain - parts of their 
rooms and furniture in the architectural model.
The experiments were initially analysed by the Rank Xerox researchers to 
assess the relative use of the variety of images available; in particular how 
much the head and shoulders view was used in object-focused tasks (for a 
discussion, see Gaver et al, 1993). Nevertheless, as the experiments 
demand that participants engage in discussion of both paper diagrams and 
an architectural model, these data provide a rich resource for a study of 
the collaborative viewing of objects. Indeed, the fact that participants 
experienced problems referencing features of these artefacts using MTVII 
has been noted elsewhere (Gaver et al, 1993; Heath & Luff, 1992b; Heath, 
Luff & Sellen, 1997). Thus far, however, there has been little work
am grateful to Paul Luff for allowing me to use his diagram.
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focusing on the nature of these troubles and the ways in which 
participants overcame them.
In order to study these experiments, all of the camera images were video 
recorded. This resulted in the collection of six camera images (3 from each 
workspace). To make the comparison of images easier, video images were 
combined onto individual tapes. However, dealing with six images on a 
single screen would lose too much detail of the individual images. 
Therefore, two sets of videos were produced, both with four images on a 
single screen; the in-context views (ICV) appeared on both videos and were 
accompanied by the face-to-face views (FTF) on one and the desktop view  
(DV) on the other^. This obviously makes the presentation of materials 
more complex. An example frame taken from each video is shown below:
Desktop Tape
L Ü  1 ? f ■ l i
i n ^ j '
' !  . . . J . .  •: - . ^ 1
------- . e L j l
Face-to-Face Tape
Both tapes feature the in-context views of the participants on the left hand 
side of the screen. This frame is taken from an experiment featuring Guy 
and Helen. Guy is pictured in the top left hand box on both tapes. His 
desktop is shown in the top right box on the 'desktop tape' and his face is 
depicted in the top right box on the 'face-to-face tape'. Similarly, Helen is 
pictured in the bottom left box. Her desktop is shown in the bottom right 
box on the 'desktop tape' and her face is depicted in the bottom right box 
on the 'face-to-face tape'. These depict the access they have to each other's 
activities and environment.
found that, given the focus of my concerns, the 'desktop tape' was most useful and all 
my analyses began with that video. I only used the 'face-to-face tape' to check out specific 
information (e.g. particular gaze direction) unavailable on the other.
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The chapter will now consider some of the problems faced by participants 
as they attempt to reference objects relevant to the accomplishment of 
certain tasks.
9.4 L osing th e  P o in t
The experiments demand that participants engage in collaborative 
discussion of both paper diagrams and an architectural model. In the 
course of these discussions the participants continually reference features 
of those artefacts. However, one participant is always unable to touch, 
manipulate or draw directly onto artefacts in the remote other's local 
workspace. Inevitably, therefore, this kind of communication technology 
sets up a problem of access to the artefacts in use throughout the 
interaction: one person cannot touch or gesture over objects in front of 
their co-participant.
It would seem that most troubles arise from those occasions when a 
participant is attempting to reference some feature of a remote object (an 
object in the other's environment). In these instances, the practices used 
to reference in co-present interaction somehow 'fail' in media space.
From the study of co-present interaction in the RCO, it was shown how 
individuals recurrently design questions and the like with concomitant 
pointing gestures. These work to both encourage another to engage in a 
collaborative viewing of an object and instruct their viewing. These 
utterances often include the use of a deictic term (e.g. 'this', 'that', 'there'), 
which, if  the talk alone is considered, somehow veils the exact identity of 
the referent. However, the concomitant visual conduct, often including a 
pointing gesture, provides the resources for the co-participant to 
unproblematically locate the referent in the local milieu. Within the MTV 
experiments, similar practices were regularly used by individuals to refer 
to a remote object. However, troubles emerged.
To illustrate this, consider Fragment 9.1, in which Doris (D) and Colin (C) 
are arranging furniture in the architectural model. Colin has the model 
within his domain, so any movement of furniture has to be accomplished 
by him. At this moment, however, Doris is suggesting where one of the 
(model) stereo speakers should be relocated. The image shows Doris
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pointing towards her 'desktop view' (DV) monitor, which displays the 
remote model.
F r a g m e n t  9 . 1 ;  M T V I I / P 4
C: so ah- the speakers need to go: {.) some-somewhere like
tha:[:t .
D: [yeah, I would suggest that the one on the fireplace,
actually comes down to thi:ss"
{(D points to own DV monitor) )
( 0 . 8 )
D: the corner. (.) actually you can't see where I'm pointing, can
you^
Doris suggests that the speaker currently situated on the fireplace could 
be moved into one of the corners of the room. However, the model itself is 
located in Colin's domain, so she cannot gesture over it. Nevertheless, she 
does have an image of the model on her 'desktop view' monitor. So to 
articulate her instruction, she gestures towards the relevant corner as she 
says "actually comes down to this".
This action can be seen as very similar to practices described in co-present 
interaction. Doris designs an utterance, such that the exact location is not 
verbally detailed, but instead a gesture is produced to identify where the 
speaker should be moved. In order to make sense of the suggestion, 
therefore, Colin must see where the finger is pointing. And indeed, the 
moment Doris utters the "this" of "actually comes down to this", Colin 
visibly shifts his head closer into his 'desktop view' monitor to find the 
target of the gesture. So, just as with co-present interaction, one 
individual gestures towards (one feature of) an artefact through both talk 
and body movement and another is encouraged to turn to look at that 
artefact.
The problem that develops is this. Although Colin can see the gesture and 
can hear the talk, he cannot see what is being pointed towards; he cannot 
see Doris' 'desktop view' monitor. The access he has to the gesture is the
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same as is depicted in the transcript above. So, he can see a hand 
pointing, but cannot see where it is pointing. This means that he has 
before him the model stereo speaker which Doris is asking him to move, 
but he cannot see where she wants him to move it. After a short pause, in 
which Colin does not act, Doris realises "you can't see where I'm pointing, 
can you". She herself discovers the failure of her referential turn.
A similar problem develops in the next fragment, when Betty (B) tries to 
suggest to Anna (A) where the model television might best be placed. 
However, in this case, it is the recipient that recognises the problem at 
hand. The model is in Anna's domain and Betty can see it on her 'desktop 
view' (DV) monitor.
F r a g m e n t  8 . 2 ;  M T V I I / P 2
X
XX
'
» A................
XXX
A: this is the television,
( 1 . 0 )
B: oh: I think the television
can go he : re.
( (B taps on own DV monitor - the left 
hand screen in image ii))
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IV
rn ( 1 . 2 )
( (A turns to look at own ICV monitor - 
the left hand screen in image iv) )
B: er[r:
A : [heehh°hre?
whhhere[: : : ? hah-hah-°hahh 
B: [hehhhh heh-heh-heh
Once again, a practice routinely used in co-present interaction fails in 
media space. Betty designs her suggestion, such that the talk and gesture 
work together to locate "here". When Betty says "I think the television  
can go here" she also taps on her 'desktop view' screen. The utterance 
alone does not specify the location which the television should be moved, 
but the concomitant gesture is to designed to provide the resources for 
Anna to see it.
The noise produced by the tapping on the screen, the gesture itself and the 
demonstrative ("here") encourages Anna to try to find where Betty is 
pointing. Images iii and iv show her turning at this moment, to look at 
her 'in context view' monitor in order to identify where the hand is 
tapping. Although the turn works to encourage Anna to look for the 
referent, she cannot see what is being pointed towards. Image ii displays 
what she turns to find, and it clearly does not depict enough detail to 
identify the referent. In fact, it is even hard to make out the model on the 
screen. So, she cannot see what Betty is looking at and referring to.
When Anna discovers that she does not have the resources to be able to 
move the television as instructed she bursts out laughing. When she says 
"here? where?" through her laughter, the troubles at hand are realised. 
Therefore, the problems faced are very similar to those in Fragment 9.1, 
except in this case it is the remote participant who first discovers the 
problem.
So, in the two examples, individuals produce utterances which encourage 
their co-participants to seek out a referent. In that sense they work in a 
similar fashion as referential utterances discussed throughout the four 
previous chapters. They request some action to be taken by the other and 
the full nature of that request is stripped of explicit detail by the use of a
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deictic term. Both Doris and Betty use demonstratives to refer to some 
object ("this" in Fragment 9.1; "here" in Fragment 9.2) and point at images 
on their 'desktop view' monitors. These pointing gestures are designed to 
provide the resources for the other to locate the referent.
In both cases, they work to encourage the recipient to turn to use the 
gesture to find the referent. However, these initiating actions pre-suppose 
the mutual availability of the target of the gesture. That is to say, both 
Doris and Betty assume that the objects they are pointing at can be seen 
by their co-participant. On the contrary, however, their co-participant has 
little or no access to the details of the image shown on their 'desktop view' 
monitor as the fragments presented above reveal. They are able to see the 
movement of the hand itself, but are unable to find exactly what it is 
pointing at. In both cases, the recipient visibly tries to locate what is 
being gestured at, by shifting their orientation towards some screen or 
other. However, they cannot see (in enough detail) the object. This 
problem recurs during the experiments.
So, the first two fragments feature pointing gestures which cannot be 
made sense of. The recipient cannot establish where a gesture is pointing. 
However, there are other ways in which gestures produced by one 
participant can result in confusion for the other. Gestures in media space 
can be misunderstood.
In Fragment 9.3, for instance, Guy and Helen are drawing plans of each 
others' room. In order to complete this task, Guy is trying to find out the 
length of a desk situated to Helen's left. He has already had one attempt 
to get her to look at the desk, but some confusion developed. As we join 
the fragment, Guy tries again. This time he gestures towards his own 
monitor of her, which she cannot see. It is her action im m ediately 
following that which is of particular interest.
F r a g m e n t  9 . 3 ;  M T V I I / P 3
G: no I mean er (1.4) leh'see (0.4) where the wall: (.) tur:ns (.)
on your left.
((G gestures toward own ICV monitor))
(1.0) {{H turns to her right))
G: left or: is it right? (0.5) °er yeah° your left^
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The key feature to note is that when Guy refers to the desk to her left, 
Helen turns to her right.
On the face-to-face monitor, Helen is confronted by an image of Guy 
looking away from her and to his left. In fact, he is studying his 'in context 
view' (ICV) image of her domain in order to describe where the relevant 
desk is in relation to her. Moments later (during the "left" of "on your 
left"), Guy produces a gesture towards that monitor. He does not point to 
it, but rather, the gesture seems to characterise the position of the desk in 
relation to her. Indeed, it is almost as if  he imagines sitting in her seat 
and running his hand along the edge of the (remote) table, such that he 
(and not her) is alongside it. This gesture is shown in the two images 
below:
11
IS 3 »
Immediately following the onset of this sweeping gesture and at the end of 
the utterance "on your left", Helen looks at the wall to her right. This 
intriguing state-of-affairs may be seen from her perspective. As she looks 
at Guy's activities through her face-to-face monitor, she sees him produce 
a gesture to his left. The next two images roughly present how she sees 
Guy:
1 1 1 I V
m K S i
Now, Helen would seem to see this, not as a gesture towards his 'in­
context view' monitor (as that is not visible on her face-to-face monitor).
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but as a gesture of explicit relevance to a feature of her domain; almost as 
if  he is pointing through the screen and to her right. The power of this 
gesture is such that Helen looks to her right at the moment it is produced, 
even though Guy accompanies the gesture with the words "on your left". 
At no point does she look to her left, as can be seen in the next two images:
V V I
This may not seem so strange, when one considers that the gesture is 
related to identifying a desk in her domain. In such a way, it is directly 
relevant for her domain. It refers to a feature within her domain and yet, 
at the same time, it is produced with regard to an image on Guy's own 'in­
context view' monitor. Helen, however, cannot see what Guy is actually 
pointing at; she cannot she his 'in-context view' monitor. Rather, she sees 
the gesture as it is presented on her screen. So, she sees the gesture 
presented on her screen and surrounded by (and seemingly indicating) 
features within her local domain.
Her actions lead Guy to question his own instructions ("left or is it right?"). 
It takes some moments before he continues by resorting to more elaborate 
description. The desk on her left is then (eventually) secured as the 
referent. Although it must be acknowledged that people in everyday life 
have difficulties following commands or directions which relate to 'left' and 
'right', it would seem that MTVII exacerbates this problem.
Unlike gestures produced in the first two fragments, Guy's gesture is 
made sense of. However, it is misunderstood. Helen sees and treats the 
gesture as if  it is directly pointing 'through' the screen. She certainly 
turns as if  it is. The irony is that the gesture leads Helen to look in the 
opposite direction to that in which Guy is encouraging her to turn.
In all three examples, it would seem that the technological configuration 
of the media space problematises one participant's access to the gesture
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and its relation to the referent. This leads to that gesture being seen in a 
very different physical context than that in which it is produced and 
designed. For example, Guy's gesture is produced in relation to his 'in­
context view' monitor. However, it is seen in relation to a different set of 
objects that surround Helen's 'face-to-face' monitor. In the earlier 
examples, an individual would point at an image on their 'document view' 
monitor, which their co-participant could not see. So, the recipient's views 
of the gesture are separated or fragmented from their views of the 
referent.
It would seem that participants often initially assume that what they are 
looking at and gesturing towards is equally available to their co­
participant. Given that the other often has the referent itself at their 
fingertips and the media space shows them next to it, it is not an 
irrational assumption. However, they discover that the other cannot 
unproblematically see what is being pointed at and confusions emerge. 
The fragmentation of views of the gesture and the referent render 
particular actions problematic. As a result, routine practices which 
encourage another to find an object in co-present interaction are 
problematised in MTVII.
9.5 The P roblem s o f R econ cilin g  O bjects A cross M edia S pace
It has already been noted that many of the objects toward which 
individuals may gesture cannot be seen by their remote co-participants. 
For example when pointing to details on a monitor, the gesture can be 
seen, but appropriate sense cannot be made of it. So, the sense of that 
gesture is lost, when seen apart from the object to which it refers. 
Further, it has been shown that participants discover these troubles as the 
sequence develops - for example, when some requested action is not 
produced.
Participants themselves then attempt to overcome or address problems 
that arise. In many cases, for instance, participants ingeniously transform 
their own workspace in order to 'recontextualise' their gestures. For 
instance, when referring to the architectural model, the remote 
participant (i.e. s/he who is not in the same physical space as the model) 
often produces a line drawing or map of that model. The details of this 
drawing are available to the other on their 'document view' monitor, so
215
any gestures produced over it can be seen and seen along with the 
referent. Thus participants can refer to a feature of the remote model by 
pointing towards their own drawing of it. Their co-participant finds the 
equivalent object or location within the actual model, by reconciling the 
two objects. However, even these actions, in which participants no longer 
display total commitment to assuming a common environment, fail.
Following the difficulties encountered by Colin and Doris in Fragment 9.1, 
Doris produces a "rough plan" of the model.
F r a g m e n t  9 . 1  c o n ' t
I'[11 ]dra:w::, (.) erm (1.0) a rough plan of=
[yes]
=what I'm- (.) seeing. >n'then I can< point .
This drawing is used to suggest the corner of the room into which the 
stereo speaker should be moved. For that purpose, the representation 
works wonderfully well. However, the use of these kinds of representation 
can lead to troubles and confusion. In particular, it raises certain 
difficu lties for participants when attem pting to reconcile the  
representation with the referent; more particularly, how the gesture 
towards some line drawing might be linked to a relevant next action with 
regard to the architectural model itself. For example, some minutes later, 
and during the same experimental task, the drawing is used again, in  
order to reference another part of the model room.
They have nearly agreed upon an arrangement of the furniture in their 
model, but just as the fragment begins, Doris gestures towards the "rough 
plan" that she drew earlier to suggest an alternative placement for the 
bookcase. Some confusion then arises regarding where Doris is actually 
suggesting the bookcase be moved.
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Fragment 9.4; MTVII/P4
D;
yer bookcase isn't to happy 
where it is^ ( . ) yeah'" I 
would move your- I 'd move 
the bookcase out- (.) 
erm: : (.)
up on to thi:s wall actually. 
(.) up here.
(1.5)
upon to thee : : (. )
th-the wall :.
(0.2)
actually I haven't got the- 
I've got the scale wrong 
here. (.) yeah.=
=the wall: ther- (.) there.
(0.2)
no : the- where you had it a 
moment ago, here.
(.) bookcase.
(3.2)
C : er[:
D: [no :
( 0 . 2 )
C : there.=
D:
=veah,
yes [ there. ] bookcase
[yeah, sorry.]
=°yeah.°
( 0 . 2 )
o^kay.
( (D g e s t u r e s  f i r s t  to  the DV 
monitor ,  then to  h er  drawing))
( (D s h i f t s  h er  hand to  another  
p a r t  o f  h er  drawing))
( (D a l t e r s  the drawing))
( (C moves the bookcase f i r s t  to  
one p o s i t i o n ,  then a n o th e r ) )
( (D a l t e r s  h er  drawing again ) )  
( (C s h i f t s  the  bookcase to  i t s  
o r i g i n a l  p o s i t i o n ) )
( (C moves the  bookcase to  the  
f i n a l  p o s t i o n ) )
Virtually the whole of this sequence is devoted to the attempt by Doris to 
suggest a new location for the bookcase. Given that Doris has already 
produced a diagram on which she can point and refer to features of the 
remote model, the question is how it proves so difficult to accomplish.
During Doris' initial utterance she gestures towards her line drawing. 
The gesture indicates the projected movement of the bookcase. It comes to
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rest at a point during "out-", providing the alternative position for the 
bookcase. However, the point she has constructed with the pen in her 
hand is shifted moments later and at the end of this extra motion Doris 
taps on the new location. Figure 9.2 provides a representation of the 
position of the two pointing gestures that Doris produces on her drawing. 
The two gestures Eire juxtaposed with the relevant transcripts of her talk.
"up on to thi:s 
wall actually 
(. ) up here"
Door
"yeah^ I would move your- I'd 
move the bookcase out- (. ) 
erm: : "
The tapping on the diagram elicits Colin's gaze, but the ensuing pause (1.5 
seconds) is treated as marking his difficulties securing the referent. Doris 
seems to attribute these difficulties to the inadequacy of her diagram as a 
representation of the remote model ("actually... I've got the scale wrong 
here"). So she then proceeds to re-draw one aspect of her representation, 
in order to extend the length of one of the walls. Figure 9.3 gives a sense 
of the alteration she makes to the shape of the room.
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Figure 9.3
"a c t u a l l y  I  h a v e n ' t  g o t  
t h e -  I ' v e  g o t  t h e  s c a l e  
w rong h e r e ." Door
As she makes this alteration, Colin begins to move the bookcase across the 
model and then back to an intermediate position. Images i-iii illustrate 
these movements and how they occur in relation to his talk:
X &
XX
X X X
C: the wall: ther- (.)
there.
So, Colin initially places the bookcase to the right of the model (image ii), 
and begins to present it as a candidate position, "the wall ther-". However, 
he cuts this utterance short and brings the bookcase back somewhat 
(image iii). This last change of position seems to co-occur with Doris' 
alteration of her diagram. It would seem that although Doris is changing
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the diagram to alter the shape of the room, the extra lines are viewed by 
Colin as the potential location for the bookcase itself (look at Figure 9.3 
again to see how such a misunderstanding could develop).
This candidate position (image iii) is rejected by Doris and she begins to 
further alter her diagram in order to clarify the issue. Figure 9.4 shows 
how she begins to alter the diagram again and the talk she uses to reject 
the candidate position and simultaneously suggest what Colin should do 
next.
Figure 9.4
" n o t  t h e -  w h e r e  y o u  h a d  
i t  a  m o m e n t  a g o ,  h e r e .
( . )  b o o k c a s e "
As she begins to make further alterations, Colin attends to the utterance 
"where you had it a moment ago" and slowly returns the bookcase to its 
original position (see image iv below, which is similar to the original image 
i above).
I V  z
( 0 . 2 )
C : there.= 
D: =veah,
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Once her drawing is almost complete, Colin attracts the attention of his 
co-participant with the beginning of an utterance ("er:"). When Doris 
looks up to see that Colin has moved the bookcase, she once again rejects 
it as a candidate position - this time with an emphatic "no:". As she does 
so, he quickly moves it across the room (see image v) and this time she 
displays that they have secured the referent ("yeah").
So, Doris originally produced the diagram (during Fragment 9.1) in order 
to suggest that the stereo speaker be shifted into the bottom left hand 
corner (as we look at it) of the room. The diagram was designed for that 
purpose and within the course of that activity, so that merely the rough 
shape of the room was sufficient to locate the appropriate referred-to 
corner. However, for this new task, other aspects of the drawing become 
relevant. In particular the relative lengths and shape of the 'bottom' wall 
becomes very important to indicate the new position for the bookcase. As 
a result, it would seem that Colin faces some trouble reconciling the 
gestures that Doris produces over the drawing, with the proposed actions 
he is to carry out within the actual model room. When she realises this, 
Doris begins to change aspects of the drawing. However, the nature of 
these changes is misinterpreted by Colin as he attempts to re-position the 
bookcase. So, the changes then made to the diagram lead to further 
complications.
In many of these experiments, it would seem that participants ingeniously 
utilise features of their own workspace to serve as representations of 
objects in the remote setting. However, these representations are not 
always produced with immediate regard to the practical purposes at hand. 
Indeed, the above fragment displays very clearly the troubles that may 
arise when a drawing is produced and then re-used. This is because the 
practical purposes of referring to the drawing are very different on each 
occasion. Of course, in co-present interaction, such confusions do not 
ordinarily occur as gestures can be produced and seen with regard to the 
referent itself.
Som etim es, then, the participants realise that the other cannot 
unproblematically see them point to objects that they can both perceive. 
They often attempt to get around this problem by drawing a plan of what 
they want to refer to. However, even this alternative way of referencing 
objects can lead to further confusion.
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9.6 L ooking in  Two W orlds
At various points within the discussion of co-present interaction, it was 
shown how an individual's line of regard is a critical resource to make 
sense of their activities and the objects to which they are attending. For 
example. Chapter 5 discussed how personnel in the RCO use the ongoing 
orientations of colleagues to make sense of their activities and, indeed, co­
ordinate their own work. A particular example was given in which Nancy 
sees Chris notice a flashing icon indicating an incoming call. As he begins 
to lift his headphones onto his head, she concludes that he is about to 
answer the call. Therefore, she completes her utterance, turns and leaves 
to allow him to attend to the demands of the call. Also, in Chapter 8, it 
was shown how certain exclamatory tokens excite the curiosity of co­
participants. Often those co-participants then inspect the activities of the 
vocaliser to find out what occasioned the exclamation. At these times, 
they routinely look where the vocaliser is looking to see what might have 
provoked them. Thus, they try to make sense of the exclamation with  
regard to the objects the vocaliser is viewing.
In the MTVII experim ents, however, participants do not have  
unproblematic access to the ongoing orientations of the other within their 
local environment. It is obvious when they are looking at their face-to-face 
(FTF) monitor and thus when they are looking at the face of the other. 
However, when they turn away from that monitor, it becomes extremely 
difficult for a participant to discern what they are looking at. This can 
lead to confusions. For example, consider Fragment 9.5, which charts the 
development of one experiment, from the moment the researcher (X) calls 
into the rooms to ask the participants to begin. Their task is to draw a 
plan of their co-participant's room.
The particular point of interest comes some moments into the start of the 
experiment, when Ian turns to look over his shoulder (see the two inserted 
images, which show him turning around). The fact that James has no 
visible access to what Ian might be turning towards, leads to some 
confusion about what Ian is, in fact, be doing.
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Fragment 9.5: MTVII/P5
X: okay, you can start.
( 0 . 2 )
I : okay.=
J: okay^ (0.5) erm: (1.3) well ye- we can start
sketching, but erm: (2.0) yeah, >if you'd like
to< shout out any questions you want to :
I : =right. okay then.
((I & J start drawing))
( 8 . 0 )
( (I turns around))
(15.0)
( (J stops drawing & does not resume) )
(14.0)
well, I think, just a minute. I'm confused
(1.6) are we supposed to be doing maps of 
each oth:ers^ rooms?=
=that's the idea. (1.5) you're you're::
(1.0) looking at your screens at what 
I've got. (1.0) and I'm looking at 
your screens,=
=right.
( 0 . 2 )
er[: : m y  s c r e e n s ]  at what you've got.
[>it's funny, cos just-<]
=yeah. just the way that you were looking 
around^ (0.6) I just- thought- that you 
were actually drawing a map of your 
ow:n^ room. [“sorry.°
[no-no.
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They have begun to draw a plan of each other's room by using the 
information available to them on the monitors and by talking to each 
other. Some short time into the activity, Ian turns right around to look 
towards the back of his own room. His looking could not possibly reveal 
any information about his co-participant's room, as all the visual 
information relevant to that task is available on the three screens before 
him.
However, he may have been distracted by any number of sights or noises 
that routinely occur in office environments. That is to say, one of any 
number of activities in his surroundings could have attracted his 
attention. Nevertheless, James can only see that Ian has turned away 
from the set of screens which depict him and his workspace. James sees 
this action within the context of the activity at hand, within the activity of 
drawing each others' room.
There is little available for James to account for Ian's turning within the 
context of the activity in which they are engaged. As a result, that act of 
turning is rendered highly consequential. Indeed, there follows some deal 
of confusion. This confusion is all begun by Ian simply turning around. 
This is evidenced by James' utterance "just the way that you were looking 
around, I just thought that you were actually drawing a map of your own 
room".
So, participants have little access to the objects which others are looking 
at and this can cause some problem in the organisation of everyday 
activities. It also inhibits the ways in which participants can point out an 
object for another, as the next fragment reveals.
Chapter 6 discussed how referential practice is tailored with regard to the 
emerging orientations of the recipient. It detailed some of the ways in 
which individuals encourage another to look at an object and how verbal 
and gestural instructions are produced with regard to the ongoing 
orientations and actions of that other. Indeed, even the way an individual 
positions, sculpts and times the production of a gesture can be seen to be 
sensitive to the actions of the co-participant. However, this design of 
actions for the recipient becomes more problematic within the peculiar 
MTVII workspace. Essentially, this is due to the lack of unproblematic 
access to a co-participant's current orientation. Consider Fragment 9.6.
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Betty has asked Anna what is at the end of the desk alongside her. As 
the transcript begins, Anna is describing the position of two filing  
cabinets. Then she wants to show Betty how the wall stands in relation to 
the desk by tracing over a piece of paper in her workspace. To do this, she 
must attract Betty's attention to her tracing action. The particular 
interest is in the way in which she encourages Betty (pictured in image i) 
to watch her doing that.
F r a g m e n t  9 . 6 :  M T V I I / P 2
i i
1 1 1
IV
i
and then. (1.0) two filing: 
ca:binets and then the wall 
sort of-
(1.3)
A: doe :s, ((A turns to FTF View))
(0.4)
wa-watch.
( (A turns to document))
(1.0) ( (B turns to FTF Monitor))
A: the wall sort of go:es,
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( 0 . 8 )
((B turns to DV monitor))
((A begins gesture over document)) 
like tha(t).
( 0 . 6 )
A: got the window there. (1.0)
got“^ the window 
there. (1.5) and the desk 
coming along here.
In co-present interaction gestures are timed such that a recipient is in a 
position to see them. Here, Anna is attempting to produce a gesture for 
Betty to see and attempts to time its production for a moment when she is 
able to see it. However, it is to be shown that this activity is far more 
problematic than in co-present environments.
When Anna is about to trace the corner of the room for her participant to 
see, she looks to her face-to-face monitor (see image ii). She is attempting 
to see where her co-participant is looking. At that moment, she finds 
Betty looking away from the 'face-to-face' monitor (see image i). As she is 
looking away firom the 'face-to-face' monitor, it is difficult for Anna to know 
what she is looking at. From the 'face-to-face' monitor she has little access 
to what surrounds Betty. Therefore, she is unclear whether she has 
Betty's attention and whether Betty is in a position to see the upcoming 
gesture. In fact, Betty may well already be focused upon the 'document 
view' monitor and thus in a position to see the gesture. However Anna is 
sufficiently unsure of that to demand that she "wa-watch".
This request elicits Betty's gaze to the face-to-face monitor (see image iii). 
Interestingly, this command therefore, encourages her to look in a domain 
where the gesture cannot be seen. The face of Anna (shown on the 'face-to- 
face' monitor) is not where the action is. The gesture is to be visible on the 
'document view' monitor. However, as Betty looks at the 'face-to-face' 
monitor, she finds Anna looking down (see image iv). She has been asked 
to "wa-watch", but when she looks up at the face, there is nothing to see. 
So, as Anna says "the wall sort of goes", Betty turns (back) to the 
'document view' monitor to see Anna begin the tracing gesture.
Co-ordinating and designing referential practice relies upon participants 
being able to establish relatively unproblematically where another is
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oriented. However, for users of MTVII, this resource is not easily  
available. This leads to explicit calls for displays of attention.
In particular, it is extremely difficult for individuals to establish where 
their co-participant is orientated when they shift away from the face-to- 
face view. When their co-participant is looking straight at them they can 
see that. However, if  the other turns away from that orientation, away 
from mutual gaze, then individuals have little access to where they have 
turned or indeed what they are looking at. This makes the seam less 
production of referential gestures and utterances more problematic. It 
makes it harder for participants to encourage another to look at an object, 
without requesting or asking them to. More generally, they have little  
access to the ongoing orientations and actions of co-participants.
9.7 O rdinary A ction  & R eferen tia l P ractice  in  M edia S pace
Child: Why does THAT one come out?
Parent: That what?
Child: THAT one.
Parent: That what?
Child: That ONE!
Parent: That one what?
Child: The lever there that you push to let the water out.
It did not occur to the child that he could point to object in question, 
presumably because it did not occur to him that what was in HIS focus 
of attention was not also in everyone else's...
Halliday & Hasan, 1976, p. 34.
The above fragments have revealed various problems faced by users of 
MTVII. For example, unlike the child discussed by Halliday & Hasan, 
individuals using MTVII, often do make pointing gestures and assume 
that they can thereby direct another towards their focus of attention (for 
all practical purposes). However, they are unfortunately proved to be 
quite incorrect.
For co-present interaction, Schütz suggested that we assume our different 
perspectives on the world and on an object are irrelevant for the activity at 
hand; that we can assume a common world for all practical purposes. 
However, in MTVII, although the participants both have visible access to 
the same object, their difference in perspectives cannot easily  be 
reconciled. Although individuals attempt to point out (features of) a
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remote object and they assume a reciprocity of perspectives, they discover 
as the encounter develops that the other does not have access to where 
they are pointing or looking.
Whereas one is looking at the actual object, the other is looking at a 
monitor showing an image of that object. It turns out that this difference 
of perspectives on the object cannot easily be assumed away. MTVII gives 
a sense of a co-present environment but does not uphold our everyday 
assumptions. In some ways it provides us with a false sense of security in 
that we make assumptions, but then those assumptions turn out to be 
incorrect.
Schütz suggested that within the face-to-face situation individuals ascribe 
to co-participants an environment corresponding to their own. They 
assume that what is available to themselves is available or, at least, 
potentially available to that co-present other:
It is further essential to the face-to-face situation that you and I have 
the same environment. First of all I ascribe to you an environment 
corresponding to my own. Here in the face-to-face situation, but only 
here does this pre-supposition prove correct...
Schütz, 1970, p. 192.
This has been shown for fragments of co-present interaction discussed in 
earlier chapters. This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that 
participants ask a question or give an instruction and assume that the 
other can see what they are pointing at. Indeed, they strip their 
utterances of detail about the referent, under the assumption that their 
bodily orientation provides sufficient resources for the other to find it. For 
co-present interaction, this assumption is proved correct time and time 
again.
In MTVII, similar assumptions can be seen to be made. Individuals make 
requests such as "I think the television can go here" or "I would suggest 
that the one on the fireplace actually comes down to this, the corner". 
They simultaneously produce gestures designed for the other to find the 
"here" or the "this". So, individuals in media space would similarly seem  
to ascribe to their co-participants an environment corresponding to their 
own. Unfortunately, unlike the face-to-face situation, this pre-supposition 
is proved incorrect as the sequence develops. Participants discover in the
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course of interactions and in the midst of activities that they do not 
encounter a world-in-common. Their attempts to point out and their 
attempts to see where another is pointing are rendered problematic.
However, they do manage to make sense of one another and secure the 
referent in the end. In fact, in spite of the quite marked differences in this 
workspace compared from the co-present workplace, troubles that arise in 
virtual spaces are overcome through everyday conversational practices 
and resources. Indeed, the resources which are brought to bear when 
referential difficulties arise are the very same resources which have been 
discussed with regard to the RCO in Chapter 7. To illustrate, consider the 
following two fragments.
In Fragment 9.7, Ian and James are arranging the furniture in their 
architectural model. We join the action as James suggests a new location 
for the piano. Ian has the model before him and therefore he has to 
operationalise any changes requested by James. The im ages that 
accompany the transcript are of Ian's hand in the model.
F r a g m e n t  9 . 7 ;  M T V I I / P 5
I
1 I
J:
X X
errr: : (0.8) how 'bout pushing the
piano right'' across to thee" (. ) 
opposite side of the room.
( (I moves hand to piano))
J:
( 0 . 8 )
((sniff))
( 0 . 8 )
((I’s hand gradually 
slips off the piano))
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XXX
J: to thee::, the wall opposite
(.) thee : (1.0) fireplace 
( 0 . 2 )
((I moves the piano across 
the room))
There are two or three seconds from the moment that James makes his 
initial request to the point at which Ian eventually shifts the piano. 
Indeed, Ian seems to have some difficulty dealing with James asking for 
the piano to be moved "across to the opposite side of the room". Of interest 
here, is how that difficulty is made manifest and how it is overcome.
When James says the word "piano", Ian almost immediately moves his 
hand to pick it up (see image i). However, following the completion of the 
full utterance, he does not shift it. Instead, as the moments pass, he 
begins to relax his grip on the piano (compare image i with image ii, which 
shows only his fingertips touching it). This is the critical point, as it 
reveals his lack of appreciation of the referred-to location ("the opposite 
side of the room").
Previous chapters have shown how an object is appropriately appreciated 
when a recipient of a showing carries out a relevant next action with 
regard to that object. So, for example, questions are answered in the light 
of seeing an object or an object is laughed at after being presented as 
humorous. The task here is to move an item of model furniture to a new  
location. Moreover, the request for the piano to be moved may expectably 
be attended to in next position, not in an hour or next week. Therefore, 
when Ian does not move the piano for some moments, this is accountable. 
Moreover, he begins to let his hand slip from the piano, which gives no 
evidence that it might be moved in subsequent moments.
James certainly treats it this way, as he elaborates his request. He re­
formulates his description of the relevant location by saying "the wall 
opposite the fireplace". 0.2 of a second later, Ian removes an object at the 
appropriate end of the room and shifts the piano into the space he has 
produced (image iii).
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Therefore, as with co-present interaction the appreciation of the referred- 
to object (in this case, a location in the room) is used to assess whether the 
referent has been secured. In this instance, the lack of response provides 
a basis for further action by James. He elaborates his description and the 
referent is immediately secured.
In the case above, the notion of "opposite" proved problematic and an 
additional description was all that was required to secure the referent. 
However, referents are som etim es more difficult to describe. 
Nevertheless, participants can still assess each attempt to identify a 
referent by the response in next position. Indeed, sometimes this can be 
used as a resource to iteratively move towards securing the referent. 
Consider the next fragment.
Betty is trying to describe where Anna should draw a cupboard on her 
plan of Betty's room. However, troubles emerge and even by the end of 
this fragment only one corner of the cupboard has been located on the 
plan. The images show successive attempts by Anna to locate where the 
box should be drawn. The asterisks mark where each image appears 
within the relevant section of transcript.
F r a g m e n t  9 . 8 ;  M T V I I / P 2
A:
11
right. (.) °hhh kuhehhh >this is 
going to be rather difficult 
to describe.< if you go to that 
big- (.) hole. (.) basically 
wh[ere there's nothing.
[here? *
( 0 . 2 )
°yeah.“
( 0 . 4 )
if you take- if you p-put in a 
very large box that 
somebody s'get °hhh=
=he[re? *
[no. (.) sticking out.=
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Ill «mm
I V
A: =he[re? *
B : [no. (.) no-no
B:
( . )
[further up.
[here?= *
=no. (0.5) go to the far edge
( 1 . 0 ) * 
that edge, yep.
Once again, then, a simple activity is rendered highly problematic within 
MTVII. Betty is merely trying to instruct Anna where to draw a box on 
her diagram. Within co-present interaction, such a task would be 
relatively straight forward, as Betty would be able to show or gesture over 
the diagram itself. However, this is not possible in MTVII. So, this whole 
sequence is devoted to establishing the starting point of the box. The 
drawing of the box as a whole goes on for many more minutes. However, 
the concern here is how they even secure this first corner of the box.
Firstly, they relatively unproblematically secure the general domain into 
which the cupboard or 'box' will be drawn (see image i). The troubles then 
follow. Each image displays the subsequent attempts by Anna to identify 
exactly where Betty wants her to draw the box. Each candidate position 
provides an appreciation of the referent. Each therefore, displays where 
Anna believes the referent might be. Each action is then assessed by 
Betty in that light. She rejects all of the attempts pictured in images ii-iv.
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She does not only reject each of these candidate positions, however, but 
rather gives further instruction as to the target position. These 
instructions are framed in terms of the current position of the pen. So for 
example she says "no. sticking out" or "no-no. further up" or "no. go to the 
far edge". It is almost as if  she is remotely controlling or guiding Anna's 
sequence of pointings. Eventually they collaboratively find the 
appropriate position for one corner of the box "yep that edge" (see image 
v).
In such a way, Anna and Betty almost iteratively work towards securing 
the common referent. The sequential ordering of talk, enables the 
assessm ent of each candidate position as appropriate or inappropriate. 
Furthermore, in the light of these candidate positions, further instructions 
can be given if  they are inappropriate and, moreover, these instructions 
may be characterised with regard to the current candidate position. That 
is to say, the current position provides a comparison. Hence "no-no. 
further up." can be heard as 'further up the page from the current position 
of the pen'.
So, MTVII makes the accomplishment of even simple tasks, such as 
drawing a box on a diagram or moving a bookcase across a model, more 
difficult. Nevertheless, co-participants still manage to secure the referent. 
They have the resources to overcome these problems and they get there 
using the mundane competencies of ordinary action. They rely on the 
other's displayed orientation to an object with regard to the activity at 
hand. This allows participants to establish whether they have achieved 
(or rather, can continue to assume) some inter subjective alignment toward 
the object at hand. If they discover that they have not - for instance, 
because the other cannot carry out a request - then they can elaborate 
their instructions in terms of that failure and work toward a shared 
referent.
This environment may lead to quite lengthy sequences in which a referent 
is secured, but the practices in and through which shared understandings 
are achieved remain the same. It does not create a new way of 
communicating. Indeed Sacks' thoughts on the telephone as a new  
communications technology still resonate a quarter of a century later 
when we discuss the virtual workplace:
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Now what happens is, like any other natural object, a culture secretes 
itself onto it in its well-shaped ways. It turns this technical apparatus 
which allows for conversation, into something in which the ways that 
conversation works are more or less brought to bear ... The technical 
apparatus is, then, being made at home with the rest of our world. And 
that's a thing that's routinely being done, and it's the source for the 
failures of technocratic dreams that if only we introduced some fantastic 
new communication machine the world will be transformed. Where 
what happens is that the object is made at home in the world that has 
whatever organization it already has.
Sacks, 1992 (Vol. 2), pp. 548-9.
9.8 D iscu ssion
This chapter has considered referential practice in the MTVII workspace 
as a contrast to the previous four chapters which examined the 
organisation of collaborative viewings in co-present interaction. The 
particular interest has been in why and how the system fails to support 
the basic practices of reference. In particular, it has focused upon those 
resources that individuals routinely rely upon in co-present interaction 
that are denied them in MTVII.
Most notably, participants tend to point to some remote object on their 
'desktop view' monitor, only to discover that their interlocutor cannot see 
where they are pointing. Intriguingly they design utterances similar to 
ones encountered in co-present interaction, where some deictic term  
("here", "there", etc.) is uttered and the sense of that term is embedded in 
the local environment. The resources to locate the referent are provided in 
part by the speaker's concomitant bodily orientation. In such a way, the 
speaker assumes the visibility not only of their bodily orientation, but also 
the objects to which they refer. Moreover, they assume the visibility of 
their orientation within and in relation to the referent.
These assumptions can be derived from Schutz's general thesis of 
reciprocal perspectives for face-to-face interaction. However, in MTVII, 
these assumptions are not upheld. The difference in perspctives cannot be 
assumed away. In next position, the problems that the other has in trying 
to make sense of the gesture become clear when they cannot accomplish 
the task at hand.
Even when participants devise their own methods for overcoming this 
problem, troubles remain. For example, it was shown how individuals
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sometimes transform their own workspace to reference features of the 
remote workspace. In Fragment 9.4, Doris drew a plan of Colin's model in 
order to point out features of it. However, that drawing was produced to 
accomplish a particular task, which it did successfully. However, when re­
used for a different task, it led to further confusions. Therefore, even 
being aware of some of the problems does not carry away some of the 
troubles the technology produces.
Participants also find that they have trouble assessing where another is 
looking at any particular moment. This means that tailoring the 
production of a gesture for another becomes difficult. For instance, when 
preparing to produce a gesture, it is much harder to assess whether 
another is attending to it or is in a position to see it. Therefore, rather 
than the seamless co-ordination of showing and looking, there tends to be 
more explicit requests for someone to "watch". W ithin traditional 
workplaces, when two individuals move out of a face-to-face orientation, 
each can see where the other has turned, to what artefacts and events 
they are now looking. Within the local terrain of artefacts, I (as a 
participant) can track where, and at what, my co-participant is looking 
when s/he is no longer looking at me. However, this relationship is 
somewhat warped within the virtual workplace. Participants do have 
face-to-face access to one another and are, thus, able to see when they are 
being looked at. However, when their co-participant shifts out of that 
configuration they have little immediate access to what the other is 
seeing, as they have little access to the other's physical surroundings.
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that these troubles emerge, the 
interaction does not come to a standstill. Participants do eventually  
secure the referent. Moreover, they draw on the ordinary competencies of 
interaction to do it. In particular, the appreciation of the object in next 
position provides the resources for individuals to establish whether the 
other has found the relevant object. For example, if they are not able to 
accomplish a requested task it may reveal some problem. Even a 
hesitation of a second or so can lead individuals to consider what the 
problem might be and conclude that "you can't see where I'm pointing can 
you?". Thus, the sequential organisation of interaction reveals an 
individual's orientation towards some object and enables their co­
participant to assess whether the referent has been secured. If it has not
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be secured, then the co-participant can provide further resources for the 
other to find it.
MTVII does, however, lead to the quite 'stilted' accomplishment of 
referential practice. It also allows us to reflect upon the ease with which 
people point things out to one another in co-present interaction. A simple 
gesture is often enough for a co-participant to find what we are interested 
in. Rather than simply and unproblematically being able to point out an 
object, in MTVII participants often have to recourse to quite lengthy 
descriptions of a location or feature of a document. Actually describing 
many features of the environment, such as a location in a model or a line 
of text on a document, can prove an arduous task. Alternatively they may 
engage in extended sequences in which participants iteratively move 
towards the relevant object. Indeed, the problems faced by 'users' of 
MTVII reveal just how useful and how powerful a simple 'showing' can be. 
It puts into sharp relief the problems that individuals face when they are 
denied the resources which co-participants in co-present interaction  
routinely draw on.
Furthermore, in co-present interaction, rendering an object visible in the 
local milieu is routinely conflated with or embedded in a more general 
activity. For instance, asking a question which refers to some object can 
simply be uttered along with the resources to find that object. Within the 
MTVII workspace, referencing an object becomes an activity in itself, 
which in some ways pre-figures (or is separately attended to within) the 
activity associated with the object. So, for instance, participants often 
establish mutual orientation towards an object before asking a question 
about it. In co-present interaction, these can be more easily conflated.
Indeed, these experiments have proved to be a valuable heuristic. In fact, 
they could be compared with some of Garfinkel's breaching experiments 
(see Garfinkel, 1967). Garfinkel asked his students to engage in a variety 
of tasks to try to reveal many of the taken-for-granted assumptions of 
everyday interaction. For instance, in one example he encouraged his 
students to engage a friend in conversation and then repeatedly insist that 
they clarify the sense of everyday remarks. They were instructed to do 
this without telling their friend that this was an experiment. The 
conversations produced exchanges such as the following:
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CASE 6
The victim waved his hand cheerily.
(S): How are you?
(E): How am I in regard to what? My health, my finance, my school
work, my peace of mind, my...?
(S): (Red in the face and suddenly out of control.) Look! I was just
trying to be polite. Frankly, I don't give a damn how you are.
Garfinkel, 1967, p. 44.
The taken-for-granted assumptions of 'what everybody knows' were 
'breached' by the experimenter's (E) activities. The everyday assumptions 
revealed in this case are that everybody knows what "how are you?" 
means. Heated responses often resulted, as the experimenters were taken 
as rude or challenging, rather than truthfully unclear or mystified. The 
experiments revealed some of the 'seen but unnoticed' features that 
underpin everyday interaction, for instance that individuals make certain 
assumptions regarding what is commonly known. For the MTVII 
experiments, rather than one of the participants 'breaching' any taken-for- 
granted assumptions, the technology does this.
In co-present interaction people have different standpoints with regard to 
an object, but they assume those differing standpoints to be irrelevant for 
them to see the object in an "empirically identical" manner (i.e. for the 
practical purposes at hand). Within the MTVII workspace, participants 
are given a sense of co-present interaction as they are able to see the same 
objects. Once again they have different standpoints on those objects. 
However, for MTVII these are critically different. When one participant 
points to the remote object, the object at the hands of the other, they are 
pointing to a screen image of it, a screen image which their co-participant 
cannot see.
Schütz suggested that the active maintenance of a world-in-common is 
sustained only in the absence of counter evidence. Here, counter evidence 
is encountered as particular actions and gestures are rendered senseless. 
However, even in the face of this counter evidence, participants moments 
later produce actions which reveal once again an assumption of a world-in- 
common. This would, therefore, seem to highlight the recalcitrant nature 
of such assumptions.
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In conclusion, the technology disrupts our ability to assume away our 
different standpoints. It fragments images of the body, the gesture and 
the referent and makes it difficult for co-participants to reconcile those 
views. Nevertheless, individuals continue to make everyday assumptions 
of a world-in-common that form the foundation to intelligible action in co­
present environments. However, these assumptions prove quite incorrect 
in MTVII.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
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10.1 In troduction
Within the space of this concluding chapter, I aim to review the key 
themes and issues which lie at the heart of the thesis. Moreover, I hope to 
show how this focus on the inanimate object is not only of substantive and 
theoretical interest to sociology, but also has more practical and everyday 
consequences.
The core themes that have permeated the thesis are threefold. Firstly, 
and most evidently, the thesis has addressed the object as a constituted 
object. It has examined the local, interactional practices in and through 
which objects are (literally) made sense of by individuals engaged in 
activities with others. Moreover, it has described how that constitution is 
both momentary and ongoing. Each action in the course of a collaborative 
viewing (re)produces (the occasioned sense of) the object. Secondly, the 
thesis has described some of the practical foundations to the problem of 
inter subjectivity. Drawing on the work of Schütz, it has investigated the 
interactional resources that enable individuals (to continue) to assume a 
'world-in-common'. Thirdly, the thesis has considered how the  
constitution of objects stands in relation to action and activity. In 
particular, it has shown how collaborative viewings of objects feature 
within, and are critical to, the production of workplace activities.
These themes are the spine of the thesis and an ethnomethodological 
approach has been adopted to address them. As such the thesis has 
certain distinctive contributions to make to both the emerging 'sociology of 
the object' and also to the body of work within Conversation Analysis. 
Therefore, this chapter will endeavour to lay out the nature of some of 
these contributions.
It has been noted that the analytic attention of a range of disciplines has 
recently converged on the inanimate object. These disciplines stretch  
across the social, cognitive and computer sciences: from linguistics to 
Computer-Supported Cooperative Work; from cognitive psychology to 
actor-network theory; from non-verbal communication to the sociology of 
scientific knowledge; from semiotics to the sociology of the body. As a 
result, the findings of this empirical study could also be used to address a 
range of (related) issues across these disciplines. Although there is not the 
space within this chapter to do justice to all of the potential areas of
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interest, it might be worth reflecting on two of the most pertinent. 
Therefore, the chapter will consider the relevance of this work for studies 
of gesture and it will also mention the more practical implications of these 
findings with regard to the design of 'virtual workplaces' to support 
physically-distributed collaborative work.
The chapter will then briefly discuss how certain issues that have emerged 
could be developed and addressed more explicitly in future work. In 
particular, it will be suggested that this thesis only begins to get to grips 
with one kind of occasion in which objects feature in interaction. There 
are more pervasive, yet less explicit, ways in which objects are invoked 
and oriented to by participants. It will be argued that investigating these 
occasions will provide a greater methodological challenge.
10.2 R eview  o f Core Them es
The thesis has considered the interactional organisation of collaborative 
viewings of workplace artefacts; occasions in which co-participants look at 
and discuss, or otherwise attend to, objects in the course of collaborative 
activities. These were focused on to address the problem of analytic 
relevance. It facilitated the examination of the ways in which participants 
display their understandings of objects to one another and how they  
constitute some shared sense of an object within the course of their 
collaborative activities. These displays 'between' participants are also 
available to the analyst. Therefore, whatever else, the analytic 
descriptions are warranted as revealing features relevant to the  
participants themselves. In such a way, the thesis has been able to 
consider the methods and resources members use to constitute objects, if  
only momentarily. In exploring these issues, the thesis has highlighted 
the critical relevance of 'sequence' and 'activity'. These deserve general 
review and consideration.
The sequential environment in which a collaborative viewing emerges is 
central to our understanding of the whole organisation of collaborative 
viewings and the ways in which objects are constituted. Consider, to begin 
with, the initiation of the viewing.
It was shown how individuals encourage others to look at an object with 
them by engaging them in particular activities. The main examples
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presented depicted one participant asking a question of their colleague 
with reference to an object in the local environment. That question placed 
certain interactional demands on the other to provide an appropriate 
response (such as, but not necessarily, an answer). However, the 
utterance itself was devoid of a description of the referent. It was merely 
referred to with a demonstrative ('that', for example). So, in order to 
attend to the question the hearer is encouraged to find the 'that' of the 
question. The concomitant visual conduct provides the very resources 
with which it can be found in the local milieu. So, the interactional 
demands placed on the other, encourage that other to turn to look at the 
object. The sequential environment provides a reason for the hearer to 
find and see the object.
The object is then encountered w ithin a particular sequential 
environment. When the recipient of a showing turns to view the object, 
they are turning in order to be able to answer the question that has been 
posed, for example (or find the joke, or attend to the instructions given, or 
whatever). They view the object with regard to those practical purposes; 
the practical purposes of answering a question. Therefore, the object is 
perceived in terms of its relevance to the question, rather than any of the 
other characteristics potentially attributable to it. It is seen in terms of 
the activity at hand (answering a question, finding a joke, taking  
instructions). It is made sense of in a local, sequential environment. 
Therefore, the initiation of a collaborative viewing provides a 'framework' 
in which the object is perceived.
When the recipient then attends, in next position, to the activity at hand, 
they display their appreciation of the object with regard to that activity. 
Indeed, they display their locally relevant understanding of the object. 
Their response to a question, for example, displays their appreciation of 
the object in terms of the question posed. So, once again, the activity at 
hand (and, more specifically, the sequential environment in which the 
object is encountered) provides the resources with which the recipient can 
assess how to respond to the object and display their appreciation of it.
This, of course, makes available to their co-participant, the person who 
initially attracted their attention to the object, their appreciation of the 
object. They are then in a position to assess whether or not they would 
seem to have found the relevant object in the appropriate way. Their
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appreciation reveals their orientation towards the object and may reveal, 
as in certain fragments discussed in Chapter 7, some difference in 
perspective. Interestingly, then, the very ways in which individuals 
initiate a collaborative viewing, furnish them with the resources to later 
assess whether or not the recipient has found the same object and the 
same sense of that object. Take, for example, an instance in which an 
individual asks a question with regard to an object. In next turn, the 
production of a sequentially appropriate answer reveals their co­
participant's appreciation of that object. If it is not forthcoming or is not 
an appropriate answer, then troubles may be revealed. Moreover, this 
resource does not disappear after next turn. As the activity develops each 
participant is able to assess whether the other seems to be treating the 
object in the same way as themselves.
So, the constitution of objects can be seen to be a fundamentally practical 
endeavour. Objects are presented and encountered within the confines of 
practical activities. They are pointed out to provide the answer to a 
question or to tell a joke. Similarly, they can be seen as an answer to a 
question or the punchline to a joke. They are thus constituted with regard 
to the practical nature of the activity at hand. They cannot be separated 
from the interactional context in which they are embedded. The sense of 
the object is embedded in and displayed through the activity of attending 
to a question or whatever. The object is not, then, simply a computer 
screen or a document, but is often a 'joke', 'evidence', the 'EIS system' and 
so forth; that is the object at that moment. The sense of the object is 
indexical to the interactional context in which it is produced.
Indeed, as w ith  all renderings of reality, they are contingent 
accomplishments, such that action is not a response to an a priori reality, 
but contributes to its constitution (see Heritage, 1984a). The study has 
from the outset treated the sense of objects as reflexive to the interactional 
practices in which they are embedded; it has treated objects as a 
fundamentally local phenomenon. The most radical aspect of this 
treatment, however, is the notion of 'local' that has been adopted. Many 
studies have examined how the 'profession' or 'location' in which an object 
is encountered effects the sense made of that object. However, this study 
has considered how the constitution of objects is reflexive to actions in an 
interaction. It has treated the sense of an object as reflexive to the 
moments of an interaction in which an object is encountered and treated.
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In such a way, it has examined how the sense made of an object is 
temporally organised. That is to say that participants draw on as 
resources certain taken-for-granted understandings about the activity and 
setting at hand: for example, they draw on existential notions of the object; 
they draw on how the object has previously been invoked within the 
sequence; they draw on understandings of what is expected and expectable 
of them in 'next position' (e.g. an answer to a question may be projected). 
These are used as resources to (momentarily) produce the object.
This leads to a rather flexible notion of the object. As Garfinkel cogently 
argued, any object may be treated in a multitude of ways, but at any 
particular moment it is treated with regard to the situation at hand. This 
thesis has adopted a more radical notion of situation than Garfinkel was 
arguing for, as it has adopted a temporal notion. Therefore, although 
many of the fragments discussed in the thesis end with the constitution of 
the object, this is achieved only momentarily. Each and every subsequent 
action with regard to the object provides a new understanding of, or 
orientation toward, the object at hand based on prior actions. Each and 
every action on the object therefore (re)produces the sense of the object. 
The object is ongoingly constituted. Thus, for example, when troubles 
arise they can be discovered. For example. Chapter 7 discussed a 
fragment, where within the course of a minute or so, the feature on a 
computer screen was (re)constituted a number of times as the participants 
in itia lly  assum ed a common referent and th en  discovered  
misapprehensions. So, there is no moment of 'interpretative closure', 
rather the sense of an object is produced momentarily and ongoingly.
The thesis has also demonstrated how the constitution of objects is an 
embodied endeavour. As participants make sense of talk and visual 
conduct as a "rich, dark, organic unity", so must the analyst. Participants 
can often only make sense of a question when they take account of the 
concomitant bodily orientation. A question like 'what's that?', for example, 
is recurrently made sense of by using the visible resources of the speaker's 
body. Similarly, recipients display their recognition of an object with the 
whole range of embodied actions. Where they are looking, what they point 
at, what they touch or what they grasp provides a physical display of their 
orientation in and to the world of objects. They physically reveal where, 
and how, and to what, they are attending. So, these displays and 
resources are provided not only through talk, but also gaze, posture,
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gesture and the like. In co-present interaction, participants have 
unproblematic and holistic access to these. However, media space 
separates the different aspects of the body and the referent itself, 
disrupting the practices through which objects are presented and 
identified. One result, for example, is that recipients often cannot 
ascertain where or what a pointing gesture is indicating.
The recognition of these practices facilitates a consideration of the 
practical foundations to the problem of intersubjectivity. One aspect of the 
problem of inter subjectivity was noted by Schütz (1970). No individual 
can see exactly the same object as another, due to their different locations 
in space and their different biographical histories. Therefore, how do we 
construct some shared sense of an object? Schütz suggests that we assume 
away these differences for the purposes at hand and, as a result, assume a 
common environment until evidence to the contrary. Indeed, participants 
can be seen to make this very assumption within the course of concrete 
instances of interaction. Many fragments discussed, depicted an 
individual pointing to an object and assuming that "that one there" or 
"that" or "this", is unproblematically available to their co-participant. 
These deictic terms are not used to refer to the same object in each case, so 
they cannot be discerned from the talk alone. Rather, the speaker 
assumes the mutual availability of the object, the gesture (and other 
bodily orientation) and the object in relation to that gesture. They assume 
a common, intersubjective world.
Furthermore, the thesis has described the resources available to 
participants, such that they can confidently continue to assume a 'world- 
in-common'. As Heritage (1984a) suggests, the sequential organisation of 
interaction is an "architecture of intersubjectivity". Each and every action 
within the course of the encounter provides evidence about the sense being 
made of the object by each participant. Each can, therefore, assess how 
the other is seeing the object at every moment in the interaction. Through 
this they are able to assess whether the other is looking at the 'same' 
object as themselves. Even when troubles arise individuals are routinely, 
and unproblematically, able to attend to them in next position and thereby 
sustain the 'world-in-common'.
It is intriguing that participants rely upon the 'assumption of a world-in- 
common' to actually constitute that world. They experience the world as
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an inter subjective world, in which objects are equally available (or, at 
least, potentially available) to their co-participants and through that 
assumption render visible features of it for others; thereby constituting 
those features. Indeed, the thesis also revealed the problems that arise 
when these assumptions are rendered problematic. For example, although 
participants in the MTVII experiments assume a common environment, 
the technology could not uphold such assumptions. The fragmentation of 
gaze, gesture and referent rendered the achievement of inter subjective 
alignment toward an object highly problematic.
The practices in and through which participants interactionally constitute 
the occasioned sense of an object in collaborative viewings also reveals 
how the object stands in relation to, and features within, sequences of 
action and activity. For example, it has been shown how the sense of 
objects is embedded within particular activities, such as dealing with a 
question, telling a joke or giving an instruction. Therefore, objects receive 
their determinate sense within the course of an activity.
Objects are also used to make sense of the actions of others. Consider, for 
example, a question that is asked, such as 'what's that?', which can only be 
understood with regard to the visible, physical referent. Or consider the 
exclamatory noticings, in which an individual chuckles or sighs or 
whatever. In those cases, it was shown how their co-participants turn to 
make sense of the exclamatory token, by looking at or inquiring about the 
oriented-to object. Therefore, the orientation of individuals to particular 
objects, and indeed the objects them selves, are integral to the 
understanding of the activities at hand and the actions of others. They are 
a resource with which participants can make sense of the social world.
Furthermore, the collaborative viewing of these objects provides an 
inter subjective foundation through which activities develop. For instance, 
achieving some common sense of a page of text, allows for the development 
of a discussion about how badly maintained the whole document is. 
Pointing out a computer screen to a colleague who has requested to see it, 
allows that colleague to find and use the computer screen. Recognising 
the relevant object enables colleagues to solve a workplace puzzle about 
the display of text on a computer screen. In each case, the appreciation of 
the relevance of the object accomplishes some sought-for action. Seeing
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the object provides a basis for action. Moreover, it provides a common, 
inter subjective basis through which the activity develops.
So, the appreciation of an object can be seen as both retroactive and 
proactive. An object is appreciated within and with regard to specific 
sequential environments. An object is made sense of, and appreciated, in 
terms of the prior actions of co-participants. Moreover, it projects next 
actions. It can provide the basis for a debate to develop or requested 
information to be distributed through the organisation. Note that, it is not 
the object itself that is retroactive and proactive, as the sense of the object 
does not exist outside of the local contexts of use. The sense of the object 
is only constituted in the actions of participants and therefore, it is the 
appreciation of an object that projects next actions. It is the appreciation 
of an object that reveals a misapprehension for example.
Now, although it has been suggested that these collaborative viewings of 
objects form the basis for next and future actions, this does not at all 
suggest that their sense is constituted as somehow 'stable' for the duration 
of the encounter. Each and every subsequent action (re)constitutes the 
nature of the object for each and every moment of the activity. In such a 
way, participants ongoingly (re)produce the object with regard to the 
practical purposes at hand.
From this understanding of objects and action it can be seen how work in 
the RCO is, in certain ways, mediated by the collaborative viewing of 
objects. Indeed, these practices form a critical element of the ways in  
which collaborative work is accomplished and organised. Basic activities 
have been shown to be facilitated by common regard to workplace 
artefacts. These various tasks include solving workplace queries; giving 
out instructions; pointing out errors in plans; debating the upkeep of 
documents; finding requested information; and establishing the status of 
an ongoing restoration.
In each case the collaborative viewing provides the basis for the  
development (and successful accomplishment) of the activity at hand - 
indeed, sometimes, it is the activity in toto. The relevant object is 
rendered visible to allow both for the production of that activity and, 
moreover, the parsimonious production of that activity. To illustrate this 
point, consider the media space environment. The experiments revealed
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the difficulties which arise when co-participants are forced to try to 
verbally describe where an object is located or what specific (feature of an) 
object they are referring to. In the RCO, the enormous array of work 
relevant artefacts would render the act of describing what or where they 
are talking about without recourse to extralinguistic cues enormously 
problematic. Verbose description would replace simple gesture. It would 
inhibit each and every one of the activities discussed in the empirical 
chapters.
Moreover, the ability to make sense of a referent may be enriched by the 
opportunity to see it in its natural environment. For example, discussing 
the spatial arrangement of text on a computer screen without the 
opportunity to look at it and remind yourself of the layout could lead to 
severe difficulties answering queries about it.
So, work in these kinds of workplaces is facilitated by the opportunity to 
engage in collaborative viewings of objects The objects can be used to 
promote and accomplish a whole range of activities. However, these  
collaborative viewings would be rendered precarious, w ithout the 
resources available to participants to comfortably assume the mutual 
availability of a common referent.
The 'professional vision' (Goodwin, 1994), for example, may be passed on 
and around, but only when a common notion of the scene can be 
constituted and discussed. It is critical, however, that the participants are 
sure that they are attending to and dealing with the same object. It would 
be useless if  participants were not able to be sure that they were 
interpreting the same alarm screen display, let alone in the same way.
Also, the bureaucratic demands of the modern organisation place certain 
significances on the ability to assuredly establish an inter subjective 
understanding of the object. During the course of the working day, 
personnel in the RCO deal with a number of restorations. Often these  
restorations are being dealt with in parallel and all of the staff on duty can 
be engaged in some element of the associated restoration work. There are 
certain common features of the work associated with organising make­
goods. Therefore, there may be occasions in which questions asked, could 
equally apply to a number of ongoing or recently completed make-goods. 
As has been demonstrated, these questions are often produced with regard
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to information displayed on computer screens or in documents. Given the 
time critical nature of the work, during busy periods phone calls and other 
communications are coming in thick and fast, so each of the personnel 
must have fast access to the current state of the work. Therefore, knowing 
(and knowing immediately) that a question is being asked and answered 
with reference to the same object is vital for ensuring that accurate 
information is being assembled and distributed within and out of the RCO.
Participants also need to know what actions are being engaged in by 
colleagues and what they themselves should be contributing or indeed 
what they are responsible for. In such a way, they need to be sure that 
they have a common frame of reference with which to organise these 
activities. For instance, the work of any modern organisation involves the 
distribution and manipulation of numerous paper documents. Recent 
research has suggested that paper documents, unlike current electronic 
forms, allow for participants to 'walk-through' or discuss the nature of the 
document at hand or the necessary action to be taken on it if  necessary 
(Harper & Sellen, 1995; Hindmarsh, 1996). In such instances colleagues 
achieve a common frame of reference both with regard to the workplace 
document and the work associated with that document. The assumption 
of a shared orientation to both object and associated activity, provides a 
basis for accountability within the organisation. As documents are 
exchanged, for instance, the responsibility for that document and the 
action to be taken on it can be exchanged as well. So, participants may be 
sure that they are attending to the same document.
This section has attempted to draw out the ways in which the core themes 
of the thesis can be seen to interrelate. In particular, the analysis of the 
practices in and through which objects are constituted can be seen to 
enrich our understanding of the interactional foundations to the problem 
of inter subjectivity; the relations between objects and action; and the ways 
in which collaborative viewings of objects 'mediate' workplace activity. 
These are the central issues that the thesis has attempted to address, 
however, there are a range of related concerns which could be elaborated.
10.3 Im plications for th e  'Sociology o f th e  Object'
The core themes of the thesis, as outlined above, have particular kinds of 
implications for the emerging 'sociology of the object'. Indeed, the thesis 
as a whole provides quite a distinctive and somewhat alternate approach
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to the study of the object in social life. To explore the consequences of this 
approach it may be worthwhile to return to certain issues and literatures 
introduced in Chapter 2.
Many have claimed that actor-network theorists are doomed to failure in 
their attempt to show how objects display various kinds of agency, because 
the object has no way of communicating with the analyst. Instead, 
particular descriptions of non-human agency are imposed on some activity 
by the analyst. However, there remains the noble objective of actor- 
network theory to embed the object into our descriptions of social action 
and activity. This thesis provides one alternative approach to accomplish 
this: to consider how participants themselves treat objects and how they 
display their understandings of objects in the course of their everyday 
affairs. The warrant for the relevance of invoking particular 
characteristics of objects is then firmly in the hands and voices of the 
producers of social action - the participants themselves.
This focus on participants' own orientations has demonstrated the 
fundamentally indexical character of objects. For example, what could 
have been generally termed a 'computer screen' has, within different 
situations, been treated in numerous ways. For example, an alarm screen 
has been invoked at different times as 'Maddley' and 'the AHS'. Different 
features of it have also been brought to bear in the course of the 
fragments. Particular images on the screen have been invoked and 
different features of those images have been rendered relevant - 'the latest 
one to come up', 'it was the latest alarm', 'what do you know about that' 
'it's red still', 'six oh two one' and so on and so forth. These different 
seeings of the 'same' screen reveal how the relevance of the object is 
indexical to the situation at hand. The concept of 'object' can then be 
exploded as a gloss for a huge number of participant distinctions and 
treatments. When re-visiting Latour's automatic door-closer, then, it may 
be possible to reveal the various ways in which participants make sense of 
it during the course of particular activities, such as discovering it to be 
broken, mending it, and so forth. In such a way, the focus would be on the 
members' own relevantly invoked distinctions, produced in situ . In 
comparison, Latour and his actor-network colleagues would gloss these 
various treatments by participants and, in their place, put their own 
abstract analytic interpretations.
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The nature of any object can be seen to be discovered within specific 
sequences of interaction, as individuals reveal their orientations towards 
object within the unfolding course of their social dealings. Moreover, the 
particular characterisation(s) used by the participants in the course of 
their activities can be used as a resource by the analysts to explicate the 
nature of those activities. The object is often (treated as) central to the 
production of some task and therefore is critical to its production.
It is worth re-iterating the distinctiveness of the particular notion of 
'situation' or 'context' that has been adopted throughout the thesis. Many 
science studies, for example, have highlighted the ways in which objects 
are seen within particular contexts. For instance, the context of a 
'profession', the context of 'using a guide book', the context of a 'laboratory 
conversation'. However, they have not adopted a 'sequential' notion of 
context. This thesis has revealed how objects are discovered, encountered, 
treated and fundamentally seen within particular sequential contexts of 
practical action. That is to say, the objects can be seen to have been made 
sense of in the course of attending to a question or finding a joke. This 
does not deny the findings of scholars working with a broader notion of 
context, nor does it deny the importance of 'profession', 'activity' and the 
like in the seeing of objects. However, it does stress the importance of 
examining the level at which individuals themselves collaborate over (and 
constitute the sense of) objects. It uncovers the rich benefits for the 
analyst of considering the same level of context to which participants are 
orienting.
Working w ith this notion of context also reveals the essen tia lly  
momentary and ongoing constitution of the 'objective', 'physical' world. 
There is certainly a tendency in the work of science studies to assert that 
the sense of scientific phenomena is somehow 'fixated'; some seem to 
suggest that the sense of those objects are 'stable', if only for the course of 
an encounter. However, this thesis has provided evidence to the contrary. 
The key example of this within the corpus was discussed at some length in 
Chapter 7 - "not Zagreb, Gloucester". It reveals how at one moment the 
participants orient to the shared sense of a computer screen, but moments 
later they discover this assumption to be problematic. Thus, their world is 
transformed such that they are again looking at the 'same' thing. As such, 
the seeing is quite momentary and ongoingly accomplished. Whereas 
some studies tend to assume interpretative closure, where the common
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sense of an object is (eventually) achieved, this thesis provides evidence to 
suggest that there is no such closure. Inter subjective understandings are 
accomplished, but they are forever under potential threat of re-positioning. 
Each next action may reveal some incipiently consequential trouble or 
misunderstanding. Moreover, such 're-positioning' does not purely rely on 
misunderstndings, as individuals unproblematically (re)constitute the 
sense of objects moment-to-moment. As such, the world of objects is 
ongoingly produced.
The defence of science studies cannot be that their, and their scientists', 
phenomena of concern are different from other worldly objects, as SSK, 
possibly more than any body of work, has collapsed the presumed 
distinction between scientific practice and ordinary action. Just as 
scientists 'interpret' the meaning of an autoradiograph chart, so too can 
colleagues of the RCO be seen to 'interpret' the meaning of an alarm  
screen for the current status of a restoration. Moreover, the scientific 
phenomena of charts, tables and diagrams are even the same categories of 
object as the computer screens, flashing icons and documents used in the 
RCO. As such they are continually open to (re)production. This is not to 
say that the participants orient to these objects as somehow 'unstable' - 
although some they may. Rather they draw on their presumed stability 
(or flexibility) as a resource with which to constitute them (for the first 
time) again. Such momentary seeings make up the world.
The thesis has also introduced the methodological resources with which to 
facilitate this distinctive look at the object in action. Resources from CA 
make available participants' own orientations towards, and treatments of, 
objects. This has opened up the possibility of considering how participants 
produce and recognise particular understandings of objects. Indeed, the 
focus on interaction, recognised by some in SSK, has been an imperative 
resource with which to reveal the indexical and radically reflexive 
character of objects. If analysts can explicate the ways in which objects 
feature within, and contribute to, emerging courses of action they will 
closer to uncovering the production of the world as it happens; how 
collections of momentary seeings constitute the world.
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10.4 C ontributions to  C onversation  A nalysis
This work may be most appropriately seen as developing from the 
distinctive heritage of ethnomethodologically-informed video studies that 
have emerged over the past twenty years or so. The work of Goodwin and 
Heath and, more recently, Whalen, provides a foundation for, and 
framework within which, this thesis may be seen as a progression and 
addition. They have progressed from an interest in visual conduct and 
talk, to a more explicit interest in introducing the 'material context' of the 
interaction into the analysis. As such, and in various ways, the thesis can 
be seen along with this video-based research as an innovative contribution 
to the corpus of Conversation Analytic studies.
CA studies have traditionally maintained a resolute focus on the nature of 
talk alone. Although these studies have increasingly examined talk in co­
present settings, they have not tended to consider the physical context of 
that talk and how it is relevant to participants' understandings of actions. 
However, the video-based studies of interaction have presented this as an 
issue. In early work by Goodwin, he highlighted the importance of 'gaze 
direction' to the understanding of turn-taking in conversation. Heath's 
work on medical consultations further introduced the study of gesture to 
our understanding of the organisation of co-present interaction. Heath 
and Goodwin then moved away from examining 'mutual gaze' to begin to 
consider the co-ordination and production of co-regard. This thesis has 
developed this line of inquiry further by clearly focusing on this as an 
issue. As a result, it has been able to begin an investigation of the ways in 
which objects, and the material 'surroundings' of talk, are critical to our 
understanding of the interactional production of actions and activities.
The research setting itself, also places certain challenges for a 
Conversation Analyst. The complex nature of the activities in this 
organisation renders the typical analyst an outsider to many of the most 
interesting phenomena. The analyst cannot draw on their knowledge as a 
competent member of society to explicate the nature of many of the 
observed actions and activities. Therefore, this thesis has had to engage 
with the ongoing problematic of when, where and how ethnographic 
m aterials and information may be appropriately and warrantably  
introduced into the body of a CA-informed analysis. Indeed many analysts 
who have attempted to get at the institutional character of particular
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actions, such as those in the institutional talk tradition (see Drew & 
Heritage for example, 1992), have faced these problems. As previously 
noted, in this case, a pragmatic solution to many of the issues was 
adopted. Where the analyst (or reader) is unable to understand the jargon 
or technologies in use, ethnographic information not im m ediately  
gleanable from the data was invoked. Indeed, an even more critical issue 
is at hand, as without the ethnographic understanding the analyst can not 
assess whether they have produced an adequate description of the 
interaction. The analyst also attempted to lock the use of ethnographic 
insights to moments when the participants displayed sensitivities to those 
phenomena. Thus, the ways in which the thesis addressed these concerns 
is embodied in the analysis itself.
The thesis has also begun to introduce CA to new sites of sociality - 
namely the new communicative environments discussed in Chapter 9. As 
more and more social interaction is conducted 'through' technological 
infrastructures, the challenge to CA analysts is to adapt their  
methodological resources to capture the distinctiveness (or routine nature) 
of such interaction. Indeed, a key challenge was to cope with the multiple 
images available to the participants themselves. This fragmented the 
scene for the analyst and made it quite difficult to make sense of the 
emerging activity. Ironically, this was also a key problem for the 
participants, and was the main source of their difficulties in indicating 
objects and understanding indications towards objects.
This leads to a further challenge in the production of the thesis: the 
presentation of data for the reader. The ability to present and distribute 
the 'raw data' to colleagues has been an abiding concern for conversation 
analysts over many years. It was founded on the idea that making the 
data available to others would enable them to assess analytic assertions 
for themselves. They would be able to check an observation with reference 
to the 'actual data'. The CA transcription system, developed primarily by 
Jefferson, can be seen to provide some support for the distribution of the 
data. Transcripts are not infallible, however, as for any reader of CA 
papers it is impossible to judge certain attributions made by the analyst 
about tone or what is 'hearable'. However, they do support the 
presentation of particular features of the talk with which conversation 
analysts are m ost concerned: tim ings, inflection and the like.
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Unfortunately these problems are multiplied when using and analysing 
video.
There is no adequate transcription system which easily represents the co­
ordination of v isual conduct. The (rather tortuous) extended  
transcriptions of visual conduct are little use in assembling a real sense of 
the emerging activities of co-participants. Moreover, for ethical, and 
indeed the more pragmatic reasons of cost and practicality, analytic 
papers cannot be accompanied by the raw data - namely the videos under 
scrutiny. A real challenge for analysts, therefore, is attempting to reveal 
the character of particular sequences of interaction such that 'readers' 
may assess for themselves particular analytic assertions. Due to the 
availability of (relatively) cheap computing equipment, and software that 
enables the grabbing and manipulation of video images, one 'style' of data 
presentation has been adopted in this thesis. It builds on the similar 
presentation of data in studies by Heath and Luff. Although, the thesis 
has attem pted to provide an adequate balance between textual 
description, transcript and image, the reader is greatly reliant upon the 
analyst's description of events. The challenge remains to provide the 
reader/hearer with as much access to the 'raw' data as is practical, such 
that they may be able to assess analytic claims for themselves.
10.5 R elated  T hem es
It is not possible within the space available to discuss how the findings of 
this thesis could contribute to the numerous emerging debates regarding 
the object across the social and cognitive sciences. So, rather than  
introduce a range of new topics it may be most appropriate to develop two 
areas that have already been touched upon in previous chapters: the study 
of gesture in non-verbal communication and the design of new  
technologies to support distributed working.
10.5,1 Understanding Gesture
Throughout the thesis, issues have been developed and points made with 
regard to the visual conduct of participants. It would be distracting to 
introduce a great deal of literature on non-verbal communication, but it 
would seem appropriate to make a few observations of potential interest to 
that literature. Observations that have been made throughout the thesis
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would seem to contribute in two main ways. Each of these observations 
relate to the production of referential gestures, such as finger points.
Firstly, there is a tendency in studies of non-verbal communication (NVC) 
to categorise or code different gestures. Indeed Birdwhistell (1970) went 
so far as to develop a detailed 'vocabulary' of bodily movements to suggest 
that these would function like words in a language. However, this 
tendency leads to a loss of the sense in which gestures are designed for the 
moment. Moreover, it loses the sense in which they are produced within  
interaction; indeed how they are interactionally produced. It has been 
shown, for example, how even a "universal gesture" (Argyle, 1988), such as 
the finger point, is produced with regard to the ongoing orientations of the 
recipient of the showing.
The fragments have begun to reveal some of the importance of seemingly 
trivial movements, like turning a pen over in the hand. Although, in 
many ways such gestural design may initially seem merely to reflect 
individual idiosyncrasies, further examination reveals some of the 
interactional work that these 'peculiar' movements are doing. For 
example, they may withhold the eventual pointing gesture until the other 
is in a position to see it. Therefore, it would seem fruitful to consider 
pointing gestures within their interactional context, rather than merely in 
terms of a snapshot of human activity. However, very little research has 
considered the very production of these gestures and how each and every 
gesture may be produced differently and for different practical purposes. 
This may have broader consequence for the study of gesture to 
accommodate the other (the recipient) in the analysis of gesture, as 
gestures can be seen to be designed for another and thus designed with  
regard to the ongoing actions of that other.
Moreover, many of the firagments revealed the mutual elaboration of talk 
and gesture in referential practice. This recognition of the importance of 
embodied action (the interplay of talk and visual conduct) also casts a 
shadow over the possibility of a universal vocabulary of gesture. It shows 
how separating the 'physical form' of a gesture from the surrounding talk 
(and other visual conduct) renders it devoid of the context in which it is 
produced. This context helps to render a gesture intelligib le to 
participants in real-time interaction.
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Secondly, there is a growing movement within NVC to consider gestures in 
their material contexts. To quote again the words of Goodwin & Goodwin:
Traditionally work on gesture in interaction (and deixis in linguistics) 
has drawn a bubble around the perimeters of the participants' bodies.
The body of the actor has not been connected to the built world within 
which it is situated.
Goodwin & Goodwin, 1992, p. 37.
Increasingly, however, scholars are analysing gesture in relation to the 
material world. One example is Streeck's (1993b) work on the ways that 
parts of the physical world may be manipulated for symbolic effect. This 
marks a major advancement in the study of gesture.
This thesis has contributed to these developments by explicating the ways 
in which pointing gestures are embedded within the material domain. 
Rather than considering merely a 'snapshot' gesture, in terms of where it 
comes to rest, the trajectory of the gesture has been seen to be equally 
important for participants. The very movement of a pointing gesture 
through the artefact-rich environment, both sheds light upon the position 
at which it comes to rest and instructs the ways in which the object should 
be seen. For instance, a fragment in Chapter 6 showed how the changing 
location of the hand is used, in concert with the talk, to highlight the 
relations between two lines of text. Also, the flick of a wrist can be used to 
indicate a 'list' of textual entries as opposed to a single entry on a 
document. So, rather than examine the 'end point' of a gesture, examining 
the movement of that gesture reveals how participants make sense of it. 
Studies can move beyond categorising 'types' of gesture to examine how 
the production of a particular gesture is locally tailored within material 
domains. It would certainly seem of relevance to participants in the 
production of intelligible actions, as they regularly delay or reproduce a 
gesture such that their co-participant can see its trajectory.
The media space data provide an interesting twist to this move to consider 
gestures within the domain of their production. Indeed, the media space 
produces dual contexts to be disambiguated by the participants 
themselves. Firstly, there is the local context of production, where the 
gesture is produced and designed by an individual with regard to its 
material surroundings. Secondly, there is the context in which the gesture 
is encountered or seen by the other. For co-present interaction, these are,
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for all practical purposes, equivalent. For MTVII, however, these can be 
quite distinct. They are produced within and with regard to the local 
artefactual terrain of one participant. However, the other participant 
encounters or sees that gesture within a quite different visible context.
In some of the instances discussed, the remote participants have little or 
no access to the visible context in which (and with regard to which) the 
gesture is produced. They cannot see the objects to which the gesture is 
pointing. These quite different gestural contexts can therefore lead to 
significant problems. So, considering gesture in context becomes not just a 
concern for social scientists, but a practical problem for the participants in 
the MTV experiments.
The thesis, then, contributes to a tradition of work, initiated some years 
ago by scholars who encourage an analytic sensitivity toward both the 
interactional and material contexts in which gestures are produced. 
Rather than the traditional focus on the 'physical form' of a gesture, 
scholars are increasingly recognising the importance of the context of 
those gestures to the participants who make sense of them.
10.5.2 Designing the 'Virtual Workplace'
The analysis of interaction within the MTVII media space was used to 
highlight the troubles that arise when individuals are denied resources 
that they routinely rely upon in co-present interaction. As such it was a 
valuable heuristic with which to reflect upon the workings of, and 
assumptions made in, everyday interaction. However, this analysis could 
have been re-framed to consider some of the essential elements required 
by systems to effectively support collaborative working over distance. 
Even though MTVII represents an innovative media space, for example, it 
fails even to support basic referential practice. Of course, participants 
rarely fail to eventually secure the referent, but much effort is required to 
achieve it; certainly much more effort than in many of the examples of co­
present activities discussed in earlier chapters. So, although there has 
been much discussion about the potential for new technologies to support 
distributed working (e.g. Barnatt, 1995), these visions of the future seem  
somewhat fanciful when faced w ith the pedestrian reality of the  
technologies currently available. However, it may be useful to draw out
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some implications of the findings of this thesis for the development of new 
systems, or at least suggest some avenues for future inquiry.
A key concern with MTVII is that the separation of views of the body, 
gesture and referent seems to engender difficulties for the users. 
Therefore, it would seem relevant to consider how such 'fragmentation' of 
images could be resolved.
One common suggestion is for designers to provide a 'feedback' monitor 
which depicts the views available to the other. In such a way, it is claimed 
that each participant would have access to the very image that the other is 
using and thus have access to what they can see. They would then be able 
to design or tailor their own actions accordingly. However, this is not as 
successful as it may seem, as individuals were often unsure what their co­
participants had access to during the MTVI experiments, in which a 
feedback monitor was made available. Even though examination of the 
feedback monitor would allow participants to gain access to what is 
available to their co-participant, it does not seem that this resource is 
(often) used to do this (see Heath et al, 1997). It is certainly not 
intuitively used in this way.
As the general problem for MTVII is that referents are often severed from 
the bodily orientations of the speaker, it would seem important to re- 
emhody the document or artefact at hand in some way; that is, give users a 
sense of their interlocutor's shifting bodily orientation with regard to that 
document. At present, gestures are separated from the referent and, also, 
the gaze of a participant is further removed. Indeed, the very sense in 
which co-participants are aligned to the emerging activity is lost. 
However, there may be some ways in which a common workspace can be 
developed to allow participants to more easily reconcile this fragmentation 
of relevant images or, better, do away with the fragmentation of images 
altogether. Some virtual workplaces already provide a common electronic 
workspace, where one of the views available to co-participants is the 
'common' computer desktop (e.g. Smith et al, 1989; McGuffin & Olson, 
1992). However, they tend to display 'disembodied' cursors 'floating' over 
that common screen. As a result, there is little sense of how particular 
cursor movements are related to either a person or their activities. So, as 
with MTVII, participants have the problem of reconciling the separation of 
talk, gaze, gesture and views of the document itself.
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There may be other ways of re-embodying the artefacts however. In the 
MTVII experiments, referential troubles mainly arose on occasions where 
an individual tried to refer to something in the other's domain. Pointing 
and referencing items clearly visible on their own desktop was not so 
much of a problem. Therefore, another alternative would be to develop 
technologies that could enable the immediate and unproblematic 
transmission of (copies of) documents or other artefacts to the remote 
other may provide one avenue to pursue. In such a way, both participants 
'in' the media space would have exact replicas to work with and point 
towards on their own desktops.
Maybe the most profitable avenue for further development, however, is not 
through media space, but virtual reality technologies. Collaborative 
Virtual Environments (see Benford et al, 1994) use virtual reality to 
enable multiple users to inhabit a single electronic domain with virtual 
bodies. The world can be furnished with a variety of objects and 
participants can manipulate and gesture towards those objects. 
Furthermore, the orientation of another is evident from their embodiment 
and different standpoints within the world can be assumed away as in co­
present interaction^.
However, current virtual embodiments are very crude representations of 
people (showing very little information regarding their orientation, 
gestures or facial expressions, for instance) and the objects do not contain 
the detail of real-world documents and the like. Nevertheless, the 
integration of video images into virtual environments may provide a way 
forward to overcome some of the respective inadequacies of CVEs and 
media spaces (Reynard & Benford, 1997).
Whatever way that these technologies develop, their success may be 
appropriately evaluated through the empirical investigation of even  
simple referential practice. Similarly, it is evident that an understanding
^However, CVEs could enable participants to texture the world as they wish. For 
instance, an individual could remove all doors or make up their own colour scheme for 
different objects. This ability to play on the 'subjectivity' of the user could be useful for 
certain activities, but it would also throw out the possibilities for co-participants to 
unproblematically assume a world-in-common. However, the criteria to be used to weigh 
up these competing benefits within the development of CVEs is a matter for ongoing 
discussion (see Snowdon et al, 1995).
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of the natural attitude furnished by Alfred Schütz will be of use to 
designers, as evidenced in Chapter 9.
10.6 D evelop in g  Them es
So there are a variety of themes and issues to which these findings may 
contribute. Indeed, this thesis only just begins to touch on many of these 
concerns. However, there are certain ways in which further work could 
enhance these findings and develop the understanding of the issues at 
hand.
For example, the data on which these findings have been generated 
provide little  access to the very objects that the participants are 
discussing. The video materials do not show in much detail the computer 
screens and documents referred to in the talk. Therefore, in many cases, 
it is extremely difficult to see the lines of text or words referenced. 
Although this would be unlikely to greatly transform the analysis, access 
to such materials would enrich the understanding of certain issues. For 
example, the design of the referential gestures and how they relate to both 
the talk and the objects would be easier to examine. The course of those 
gestures over and around the referent could be mapped out more clearly, 
rather than the simple transcription of the timing of gestures.
Therefore, a beneficial next step would be to enhance analytic access to the 
objects at hand. This could involve the addition of more cameras into the 
setting, but given the range of objects that are discussed in these  
materials that may lead to hindering the working lives of the participants. 
Indeed, any document or screen could be invoked at any time, so the 
number of cameras needed would be enormous. This would render such a 
task impractical. An alternative, however, would be to move into a 
different setting, where the objects referred to are fairly static and more 
easily captured on screen. This may involve larger, simpler artefacts for 
example, artefacts which do not have the detail of pages of text. One 
avenue to be explored, for instance, could be galleries or museums^.
^Indeed, for this very reason, during the course of this project I was trying to obtain 
access into a national museum and had reached an advanced stage of talks about access. 
However, there was an organisational upheaval when I was about to start filming and 
the relevant museum researcher no longer had time to assist the project. Nevertheless, a 
colleague of mine, Dirk vom Lehn, has subsequently begun a doctoral thesis within a 
range of Nottingham museums and he will hopefully develop some of these issues.
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Also, it would seem appropriate to enhance the data with materials 
depicting a wider range of settings and activities. The analyses seem to 
present generic practices which are tailored for local concerns. However, 
different ways in which different objects are pointed out in the course of 
different activities could enrich our understanding the generic aspects of 
those practices.
Finally, the project has (necessarily) focused on only one way in which 
objects feature in interaction. It has examined collaborative viewings, in 
which one individual encourages another to look at an object with them. 
However, this is clearly not the only way in which objects feature. All 
kinds of objects, and probably the spatial layout of those objects, seem to 
influence certain aspects of (workplace) interaction, but in more subtle 
ways. These in-visible artefacts, seen but not explicitly rendered visible, 
seem to influence the organisation of ways that colleagues orient to one 
another and to the tasks at hand. For instance, the telephone handset is 
not only a means of making telephone calls. Seeing a handset at the ear of 
another, provides an individual with an account for their colleague's 
seeming "self-talk" (Goffman, 1981). This is only one example of the ways 
in which objects are relevant in interaction without being explicitly 
rendered visible. The study of collaborative viewings is somewhat 
simplified by the fact that participants make their treatm ent of the 
relevant object available to each other (and therefore available to 
analysts). They show, they point, they describe, they appreciate. For in­
visible artefacts, however, such orientations are far more subtle and thus 
the study of how they feature in social life will demand an even more 
sophisticated analytic tool-box.
10.7 End N ote
This chapter and indeed the thesis more generally has argued that the 
study of the constitution of the inanimate object in everyday interaction 
has certain theoretical, substantive and practical benefits.
In particular, the thesis has provided a distinctive and novel approach to 
the study of the object in sociology. It has begun to show how participants 
produce and display their understandings of m aterial realities and 
constitute them in the course of their everyday interactional affairs. This 
has enable a consideration of the practical and interactional foundations
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to the problem of inter subjectivity. It has shown how the assumptions to 
which Schütz refers can (continue to) be made by participants and how 
those assumptions facilitate the constitution of the "world of We". 
Furthermore, it has described some of the ways in which objects stand in 
relation to action. In particular, it has shown how the occasioned sense of 
objects is embedded in activity, but also how the constitution of those 
objects is used to make sense of the actions of others and provide a basis 
through which activities develop.
These collaborative viewings of objects have also been shown to be critical 
to the parsimonious production of collaborative work in the RCO. As the 
media space experiments revealed, the inability to simply draw another's 
attention to an object can lead to long and involved descriptions to secure 
the referent. Rather than simply conflating the initiating action of an 
activity (e.g. a question) with simple a simple referential turn (as in many 
examples drawn from the RCO), each and every activity is prefigured by 
the major undertaking of securing the referent. Also, the resources to 
establish (or at least confidently assume) that a referent is secured is 
critical to collaborative work. Without knowing (or at least being able to 
confidently assume) that you have achieved a common referent, all kinds 
of workplace activities would develop very precariously - for how would 
colleagues be sure that they are delivering the appropriate document or 
answering a query with regard to the relevant alarm screen?
These findings have also been shown to have practical import. It would 
seem that there are potential benefits of a thorough understanding of 
referential practice to designers of the 'virtual workplace'. Copresent work 
is routinely grounded in collaborative viewings and discussion of objects. 
The fragments taken from the RCO quite clearly reveal this. So, if  there 
are to be virtual worlds of work, they must support basic reference to 
documents and other workplace artefacts. This chapter has hopefully 
revealed some of the issues which may provide avenues of inquiry relevant 
to the design or development of such systems. A thorough understanding 
of co-present referential practice may reveal the key resorces that would 
be essential to support activities in the virtual workplace.
However, the range of fine-grained observations about the organisation of 
collaborative viewings has some more general import.
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For instance, consider how unproblematically individuals are able to 
encourage others to turn to look at an object with them. Participants can 
be seen to look where another is pointing, attend to their activities, 
address their questions, turn their heads, move closer to an object and so 
forth. The fact that they routinely engage in all of these actions reveals 
their commitment to interact, their commitment to be involved with their 
co-participant. Furthermore, note how speakers encourage rather than 
demand others to look at an object, how they give them a reason to look, 
and how they present an object such that their co-participant has a clear 
view of it. As Gof&nan says:
These two tendencies, that of the speaker to scale down his expressions 
and that of the listeners to scale up their interests, each in the light of 
the other's capacities and demands, form the bridge that people build to 
one another, allowing them to meet for a moment of talk in a 
communion of reciprocally sustained involvement. It is this spark, not 
the more obvious kinds of love, that lights up the world.
Goffman, 1967, p. 116.
Moreover, it is intriguing that there is this huge organisation to something 
so simple as pointing an object out to another. This thesis has been 
consumed by it and yet, in many ways, it has just scratched the surface of 
the phenomenon. Blink and you will miss many of the showings, and yet 
the video rewind button provides access to the complex organisation of 
their production. Prima facie, it would seem such a trivial act to point 
something out and yet consider life without the interactional organisation 
that has been described. Consider the range of resources that can be 
conflated into a single action: practices which encourage another to look 
at an object; practices that show another where to look, when to look and 
how to look at that object; practices that instruct others what to do having 
seen that object; and indeed resources that make available what object the 
other is looking at or at least allow individuals to continue to assume that 
they are looking at the "empirically identical" object. Without this 
organisation, where would we be? How would we know what the other is 
talking about? How would we know when, where and what to look at? 
How would we know if  we had found 'it', whatever 'it' might be? How 
would we know whether we were answering a question with regard to the 
relevant object? Each and every activity would have to begin at first 
principles. Rather than just turning and pointing toward some 'thing', we 
would have to provide great verbal detail about the colour, shape, position 
of the object and still it would be impossible to know whether those
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concepts were of some meaning for the other. A hint of the troubles that 
would exist are to be found in the media space experiments, where 
confusion reigned every time a new referent was invoked.
When Schütz talks about how we can assume a reciprocity of perspectives, 
he glosses the interactional foundation to such assumptions. Hopefully, 
this thesis has begun to reveal the resources that enable individuals to 
make such assum ptions confidently and, thereby, to achieve  
intersubjective understandings of specific objects. For without those 
resources, we could not make those assumptions and our experience of 
'reality' would be monumentally different to the inter subjective world we 
currently enjoy. As Crossley suggests:
To confront the question of intersubjectivity is to consider the type of 
beings that we are and the sort of world to which we belong. 
Considerations of this sort lie at the heart of all our projects, whether 
academic or not.
Crossley, 1996, p. 174.
Each and every time we encourage someone to look at an object with us 
and establish some shared sense of that object, we once again affirm our 
existence in a common world with others.
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A p p en d ix
Transcription N otation
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The visual and vocal conduct is transcribed throughout this thesis 
according to orthographies widely adopted within Conversation Analysis 
and developed principally by Jefferson (1984) and Goodwin (1981). Some 
changes have been made to allow for different symbols available on my 
keyboard. Therefore, a brief outline of the notation may be of use in 
understanding the transcripts which appear throughout the paper:
The .Iden tity  of the speaker is indicated in the margin, sometimes 
alongisde a line number. This eaxmple shows line 30 of a transcript, in 
which Chris is the speaker:
30 C: in fact I'll do it right now.
Pauses between turns or within turns at talk are calculated to the nearest 
0.2 of a second and presented in brackets:
e.g.
( 0 . 6 )
(. ) = a maximum of a 0.2 second pause
Where there is no interval between adjacent utterances, the utterances are
linked by equal signs:
e.g.
29 I've got to get onto em=
30 C: =in fact I'll do it right now.
Overlapping utterances are marked by parallel square brackets: 
e.g.
30 C: in fa[ct I'll do it right now.
31 M: [oh right, okay
Elongated utterances are marked by colons - the longer the elongation, the
more colons are added to the utterance or section of the utterance:
e.g.
R: er: :m:
The abrupt cut-off of an utterance is marked by a dash at the end of the
relevant word or part of the word:
e.g.
N: I'll do that tomor-
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Louder stretches of talk are underlined: 
e.g.
C : oh that
Quieter stretches talk are contained within degree signs: 
e.g.
S: below it. "that" says
Faster stretches of talk are placed between 'greater than' and 'less than'
signs:
e.g.
P: >right<
Other characteristics of speech delivery are marked by the following:
. = a stopping fall in tone, not necessarily the end of a sentence
, = continuing intonation, not necessarily between clauses of sentences
? = rising inflection, not necessarily a question
= marked rising shift in intonation
" = marked falling shift in intonation
Audible breaths are marked by a series of aitches, the more aitches, the
longer the breath:
e.g.
In-breath: "hhh
Out-breath: hhh
Doubt - If the transcriber is unsure about an utterance, it is placed in 
single brackets. If the transciber knows that something is said, but they 
are not sure what, they leave the brackets empty.
The gaze of participants is transcribed as follows: 
e.g.
,C , , Scr______________________
R:   ----------/-- bonjou : r .
C: (thats) dodgy
, , Scr________________________ , , Doc______
The dashed lines each represent 0.1 of a second pause in the talk.
The gaze of R is transcribed above his talk, while C's gaze is transcribed 
below his talk. Both are transcribed in relation to the ongoing talk.
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Continuous lines mark continuous gaze towards either the other or an 
object. For example, R first looks at C and then shifts his gaze to an alarm 
screen (Scr).
The commas denote the gaze shifting towards (or away from) an object or 
the other.
Other visual conduct is transcribed in a similar way: 
e.g.
Ih ,,,,,,,,,, ■ * steady_________ *slide* steady____________________
T: — that one there: (.) Chris, that's: one- you- decided no'to-
The relevant part of the body to be transcribed is denoted in the margin 
(e.g. Ih = left hand).
The continuous line reveals that the hand has reached the object under 
discussion (in this case a document).
The words reveal what the hand is doing on the document and the 
asterisks mark the length of each action. So, in the case above, the hand 
is held steady on the document between the first and second asterisks, 
then slides over the document slightly and then is held steady once again. 
The commas denote the movement of the hand towards the object.
All movements are transcribed in relation to the concomitant talk.
Some other non-verhal actions are noted in double brackets or square
brackets:
e.g.
((call completion))
or
[raises hand to headset]
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